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Abstract 
This project examines whether we can consistently make two claims: i) God 
cannot prevent sin without destroying free will; and ii) in heaven, God prevents 
sin without destroying free will.  It explores the conditions under which agents 
may be said to be acting freely, guided by consideration of the free will defence to 
the problem of evil.  This involves considering prominent themes in the 
philosophy of action, and in the metaphysics of free will.  It develops, and defends, 
a non-causal incompatibilist account of free agency.  This is then applied to the 
theological problem of how God ensures the sinlessness of the saints in heaven, 
and why this could not be achieved prior to heaven. 
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1.  Evil, Freedom and Heavenly Agents 
 
Introduction 
This is a project in philosophical theology.  As such its purpose is two-fold, 
first, to illuminate a theological puzzle by applying the tools of analytic 
philosophy, and second, to explore the relationship between commitments in a 
philosophical puzzle more clearly by setting it in a well-defined theological 
framework.1  There will be limitations on what we can achieve: we will not provide 
anything like an exhaustive argument for what all of our philosophical and 
theological commitments should be, although our exploration of the issues will, of 
course, examine some of the reasons we might be led to our commitments.  The 
approach we will adopt is more counterfactual – if we are committed to this one 
thing, how does that commit us in another area, so it involves us in some 
substantial assumptions.  The details of positions we consider will still matter.  We 
will be interested in establishing the possibility of coherence between claims, and 
the details of those positions are the basis of demonstrating that there is a coherent 
position to be had.  However, there may be some objections to the positions we 
will consider that we will not be interested in entertaining given our assumptions.  
The purpose of this first chapter is to map out the theological puzzle that 
motivates this project, the philosophical issues it raises, and to make explicit the 
key assumptions and limitations.  In its briefest form, the puzzle we will address is 
one of consistency between two claims, which appear prima facie to be 
contradictory. 
i) God cannot prevent sin without destroying free will; 
ii) In heaven, God prevents sin without destroying free will. 
The first statement arises from a response to the problem of evil, and the second 
arises out of theological considerations pertaining to the state of human beings in 
heaven.  Our central question is whether there is a coherent theory of what it is for 
humans to be free agents that enables us to make both of these claims without 
contradiction.  Developing an answer to this question will enable us to clarify what 
God can and cannot do concerning his interaction with free beings through better 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 An approach well elucidated by Crisp (2009) and (2011).  Also note that we will limit 
ourselves to the Christian theological tradition. 
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The problem of evil and the free will defence 
The free will defence is a response to the problem of evil.  The problem of evil 
is a broad problem with many aspects, but the aspect with which the free will 
defence engages is why the evils that are in the world obtain, rather than not.  We 
will not argue that the free will defence is a successful defence, though it is widely 
taken to be so, but will be asking how we should proceed if we are committed to 
making this sort of defence.  As we will shortly see, the free will defence does not 
just commit us to free will in any sense, but in a particularly libertarian sense.2  
The defence proceeds along the following lines: given that there is some evil in the 
world, and that evil is a bad-making thing, when we ask why it is there, we would 
like to be able to answer that it is not because of God.  Whatever the reason for evil 
is, it had better not be God.  To have God be responsible for evil would be 
problematic, since we do not expect a wholly good God to produce anything other 
than good.  So, in order to escape this conclusion we say that the reason that evil is 
in the world is not, ultimately, because of God, but is because of the actions, or 
choices, of free creatures.  God could not prevent his free creatures from sinning 
(or falling) without destroying their capacity for freedom.  So, when investigating 
where to attribute responsibility, the buck stops not with God, but with free 
creatures. 
Asking where the buck stops is a useful turn of phrase for seeing why one 
might be concerned about evil in this way.  It depends on a particular connection 
between causation and responsibility.  We do not have space to consider in detail 
what responsibility consists in, it is a particularly complex issue, but there is one 
way of looking at responsibility, by no means the only, that we will assume in 
order to get the free will defence going.3  Part of what it is to identify when 
someone is responsible is, plausibly, to identify who is the cause of the event or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Although the terms have widespread consensus on usage, note that in our discussions, 
incompatibilist denotes someone who thinks that free will is not compatible with causal 
determinism, while a compatibilist thinks that it is.  A libertarian is an incompatibilist who 
thinks that there is actually free will, and is thus committed to the falsity of causal 
determinism.  Causal determinism, or often just determinism, is not as simple to define as 
it might appear, but is captured by the idea that given some complete description of the 
world at a time, and given the laws of nature, there is only one possible future state of the 
world for any given future time.  Determinists are committed to the view that there is no 
causal slack, or leeway, in the causal evolution of the world.  Not many people are 
committed to this strong form of determinism, but we will discuss variations of the issue in 
later chapters.  See Hoefer (2010), Steward (2012) and Vihvelin (2013) for a more 
thorough discussion, especially of varieties of determinism, and the importance of how we 
conceive of the ‘laws’. 
3 This assumption is not arbitrary, since this claim about responsibility seems to be an 
intuition that drives most proponents of the free will defence, but we will not argue that 
this is so, though it is interesting to note. 
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state that is morally praiseworthy or blameworthy.4  If Tom stabs Dick, killing 
him, then Tom is responsible for something bad happening, and is an appropriate 
recipient of blame, punishment, shame, and so on.  However, if Tom should 
protest that he never intended to stab Dick, and was only trying to cut his steak, 
when Harry grabbed his arm and moved it to stab Dick, then we are able to 
quickly conclude that Harry is responsible for what has happened to Dick, and not 
Tom.  There are a complex array of relevant issues we might want to know about, 
not least Tom, Dick and Harry’s intentions – after all perhaps Tom told Harry to 
grab his arm, or there was an element of self-defence.  But avoiding variations on 
the basic scenario that may introduce these considerations, Harry’s being the cause 
of the event of Dick being stabbed makes Harry responsible.  We do need to be a 
little careful with the word ‘cause’ here.  Harry might say he was caused to grab 
Tom’s arm because of something Tom (or Dick) said, or that he would never have 
thought of doing anything had Tom not been holding a knife, and that one of 
these features of the conditions Harry found himself in was the cause.  Harry 
might even go so far as to say that Tom knew about Harry’s temper, and had 
ample opportunity to intervene, and that Tom’s failure to do anything resulted 
(which implies a causal contribution) in Dick being stabbed.  Perhaps Harry is a 
psychiatric patient prone to grabbing people in fits of rage, and perhaps Tom is the 
psychiatric nurse responsible for overseeing Harry – in this case it may be Tom’s 
negligence that could be said to have caused the stabbing of Dick.5 
It is useful to distinguish between agential and moral responsibility.  Agential 
responsibility picks out the agent whose action brings about the state of affairs that 
we are considering.  This distinguishes agents who are involved in events as 
instrumental causes, from those who are involved as efficient causes.  To be 
agentially responsible an agent must be the efficient cause of an action.6  Moral 
responsibility identifies the agent whose exercise of their agency, through action or 
inaction, proximal or distal to the bad-instantiating event, makes them responsible 
in the sense that they are justifiable objects of blame and shame.7  So where Harry 
is a psychiatric patient, he is agentially responsible for the stabbing of Dick, but 
perhaps, depending on his condition, not morally responsible.  In the same 
scenario Tom is not agentially responsible for the stabbing of Dick, but may be 
morally responsible, especially if he was relevantly in the know about Harry’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This is a contentious issue, but forms part of our assumptions.  For a brief consideration 
of how a libertarian might go about defending this claim see the dialogue between Kane 
and Fischer (2007). 
5 For a brief discussion of omissions as actions see Bach (2010), and Alvarez (2001). 
6 This is more than a little vague, but we will discuss this issue in detail later.  It is enough 
now to label the difference for the purpose of explaining the free will defence, if not to 
analyse it fully, and to await later discussion. 
7 So it is, contra Strawson, satisfying certain conditions that makes one responsible, see 
Strawson (2008). 
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behaviour.  Of course Tom may have stabbed Dick in a well-considered plan of 
hatred, and he could be agentially and morally responsible.  Or the situation may 
be very similar to the one involving Harry as the psychiatric patient, except that 
Harry is not a patient, and is only a well-known friend of Tom.  We can imagine 
Tom and Harry getting into an altercation with Dick, and Tom threatening Dick 
with his knife, but Harry grabbing the knife and stabbing Dick with it.  Now Harry 
is agentially and morally responsible, but Tom may also be morally responsible.8  
Notice that we often have differing intuitions about how much blame to apportion 
to agents in these different circumstances. 9   Tom’s premeditated, deliberate 
stabbing of Dick in hatred seems to be a moral responsibility that involves his 
being more blameworthy than in the case where he is negligent, and allows Harry 
to grab his arm and stab Dick.  I will not argue that this judgement is well founded 
here (although I think that it is), but do think that it is a judgement that advocates 
of the free will defence should espouse, since it does seem to motivate the strategy 
of the argument. 
Consider now God’s relation to responsibility.  The situation involving God 
and the bringing about of evil can be taken as partially analogous to Tom, Dick 
and Harry cases, depending on how it is conceived.  God takes the role of Tom, 
we, the creatures, take the role of Harry, and the stabbing of Dick, is the evil.  In 
something like a process theology conception of creation our assessment will be 
like the case of Harry stabbing Dick, without Tom knowing it would happen, and 
thus not being in a position to foresee and prevent it.  For the process theologian 
God’s knowledge is like our natural knowledge, and comes via his experience of 
the world, so his providence is limited in some ways.10  God does not foreknow 
that evil will happen, though he may know it is a possibility, and in a sense foresee 
it as likely (in the same way I might be able to foresee that my children’s fighting 
will all end in tears).  Analogously Tom may know that Harry is capable of 
stabbing people, but without some direct reason to suspect Harry of any 
malevolent intentions, he has no reason to hide all the knives from Harry.  So for 
the process theologian to deal with the aspect of the problem of evil we are 
interested in, all they need to do is make God relatively surprised at what creatures 
end up doing so that God is not placed in a position of culpable negligence 
concerning his providential actions in the world, since God is not about to possess 
sovereign providential control.  In the limiting case God knows nothing of his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 He is agentially responsible for the threat, but not the eventual stabbing. 
9 Though I hope the examples are ones in which our intuitions about who is blameworthy 
are in general agreement.  There is considerable disagreement sometimes about what the 
agents are to be blamed for, but this is a complication we will ignore for now, and leave to 
another project. 
10 Actually process theologians come in many shapes and sizes, and would not all say this, 
but it characterizes one view worth our consideration. 
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creatures first actions until they are performed and he begins to get to know them, 
and thus bears what seems to be no moral responsibility, since he can exercise no 
providential control over this, in the same way that Tom would not be blamed if 
Harry was a stranger to him, and gave Tom no reason to suspect immanent foul 
play.  Process theologians can achieve this by making creatures autonomous 
agents, with the ability to act in a way that is not controlled by God, and is 
disentangled from his influence.  God’s providence over his creatures is then 
reactive. 
So the problem of evil is, at least in this regard, not much of a problem at all 
for process theology.  However, the free will defence was developed, in the main, 
by those with a desire to maintain God’s providence in a more conventional sense, 
so that God actually possesses infallible foreknowledge, and complete, sovereign 
guidance and control over the unfolding of the world, and cannot act (or be) 
surprised when his creatures begin to sin.  So we need to consider a free will 
defence scenario,11 one more like the case of Harry the psychiatric patient.  God 
may know that we have a weakness that makes us prone to do things that are bad, 
or if not prone, admits of the possibility of our so doing.  But God does not 
intervene to prevent our acting in a bad way, in an analogous way to Tom’s failure 
to intervene to prevent Harry stabbing Dick.  But now comes the crucial part of 
the defence.  If Harry is morally responsible for what he does, and he is agentially 
responsible as well, then he bears a greater responsibility than Tom, who is not 
agentially responsible for Harry’s act.  We made Harry a psychiatric patient, who 
may plausible fail to be morally responsible if he lacks certain cognitive capacities, 
so we need to alter the situation a little.  Harry may still be under Tom’s care, but 
has the faculties necessary to be responsible (in both senses) for what he does (it 
does not matter to this part of our argument what these are) – perhaps he is under 
surveillance, or is undergoing a psychiatric evaluation.  So with God’s creatures, 
they possess the faculties necessary for them to be responsible, and are thus 
agentially and morally responsible for their bad acts.  God however, remains only 
morally responsible, for permitting through failing to intervene, or to 
providentially prevent these acts, and the blame attached to this seems to be less 
severe. 
We need to consider this free will defence scenario in contrast with a 
compatibilist scenario to complete the free will defence.  In the compatibilist 
scenario the person that performs the bad act was determined to do so.  So the 
situation is more like Harry grabbing Tom’s arm, and causing him to stab Dick.  
Tom was only instrumentally involved, and did not seem to be blameworthy, or 
even if the recipient of some blame, was much less blameworthy than Harry, who 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 As apposed to the process theology scenario. 
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bears the brunt of moral responsibility.  So in our analogy the roles are different: 
we, the creatures, are the ones who are ‘grabbed’ like Tom is, or determined to do 
as we do, by the chain of past events which lead up to this moment.  This past 
chain terminates in something that bears the agential responsibility (or is the 
efficient cause) for what follows, and in our case, this is God.  So in the 
compatibilist scenario creatures are only morally responsible (if even that), 
whereas God is both morally and agentially responsible. 
Now we can see how the free will defence scenario mitigates the problem of 
evil compared to the compatibilist scenario.  Remember that where someone is 
both agentially and morally responsible, they bear a greater proportion of the 
blame than the person who is morally responsible, but not agentially responsible.  
Now, in the former scenario God is only morally responsible for what he permits 
to occur, whereas in the latter God is agentially responsible for the occurrence of 
everything, and is also morally responsible for everything that occurs.  The free 
will defence does not deny that there are some further questions outstanding 
regarding God’s responsibility for evil, however it does divide up the blame in a 
way that shifts the focus to creatures, and away from God.  Notice that this 
argument does not depend on the claim that agential responsibility is required for 
moral responsibility, or the claim that in the compatibilist scenario creatures are 
not responsible at all (which amounts to the same thing).  Although many people 
have attempted to argue this, it has proven a decidedly difficult claim to convince 
compatibilists of.  Compatibilists have claimed to be able to analyse our concepts 
of moral responsibility in terms of instrumental responsibility (where agents are 
‘moved’ by determining factors, like Tom is by Harry), with the addition of further 
criteria that ‘involve’ the agent in what occurs in some special way.12  Although I 
do think that there is something to the claim that there could be no moral 
responsibility without the possibility of exercising agential responsibility, it is not 
something we need to argue, and this is a strength of this formulation of the free 
will defence. 
 
Agents, aseity, and freedom 
So the free will defence hinges on creatures being able to be agentially 
responsible for some bad events, occurrences or actions.  We noted that we might 
begin to understand this intuition by the distinction between an efficient and 
instrumental cause.  We also noted that we can approach the issue by asking where 
the buck stops as we attribute responsibility.  Whatever it is for a creature to be 
agentially responsible, it must be a condition that prohibits us from reanalysing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For an introduction to the vast literature on this issue see Fischer (1999) and Eshleman 
(2014). 
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the situation in a way that shows the agent to be instrumentally involved, and 
reveals God (or the past) as the one that is agentially responsible.  This means that 
creatures will need to be able to act in a way that is considerably independent from 
determining factors.  If we consider some real instance of evil, or sin, such as my 
deliberately stabbing someone, then I am at fault for stabbing someone.  It will not 
do for me to say that I was forced into it, or was so constituted by my genetics, or 
God’s providence, to make my stabbing inevitable.  The buck stops with me.13  
Although there may be many facts about the past, about influences over my 
present constitution, and about God, all of which may have made it possible for 
me to sin, the making the sin actual was something that I did.  I may not be 
agentially responsible for the potential for sinning (ultimately I cannot be 
responsible for my own birth), but moving from potentiality to actuality was 
something that was within my power. 
Since we are using an Aristotelian way of talking about this, we might be 
reminded of his ‘unmoved mover’ – that which moves without itself being 
moved.14  When Harry grabbed Tom’s arm, Tom was moved.  But if Tom moves 
by himself, without any prior external conditions necessitating his so doing, then 
he moves himself.  This captures something of what Christians want to claim 
about God, that he initiates activity in the universe, and that all causally related 
chains of events terminate in God, but that God’s own activity is not dependent on 
anything prior to, or external to, God.  In God’s case he is entirely ‘unmoved’, 
there being nothing other than himself to even structure the possibilities of his 
movement.  In Tom’s case he does not enjoy the same sort of complete 
independence.  God is casua sui, having the ground of his own existence, and 
activity, in himself.  Theologians talk about God’s aseity (from the Latin a se – 
from himself), his independence, or rather self-dependence, when we explain his 
being and activity.15  Proponents of the free will defence want to say something 
similar about creatures.  The idea captures one similar to the claim we are trying to 
make about agential responsibility.  Although creatures do not need to possess 
aseity in the same way that God does,16 they do need to possess the possibility of 
aseity regarding at least some of their actions.  It is these moments of creaturely 
aseity that form the basis of being able to make the buck stop with creatures rather 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ultimately we will be interested in the instance of evil involved in the fall, both that of 
Adam, and of the Devil.  When Adam took the fruit and ate it he made that instance of evil 
obtain, but God did not make Adam take the fruit. 
14 See Chisholm (1964). 
15 See Strong (1907) and Grudem (1994) for a modern theological discussion of aseity, 
where the focus is normally on being rather than activity.  The scholastics have a lot to say 
on the subject, especially Aquinas, who develops the Aristotelian idea we have noted into 
arguments for God’s existence. 
16 Indeed that claim would be quite counter to Christian orthodoxy, in which all is 
dependent on God in some way. 
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than God when we are considering responsibility and the apportioning of blame.  
Sometimes creatures are, in a sense, unmoved movers, and although the possibility 
of their exercising this power may depend on God, and even the possibilities over 
which this power can range may depend on God, the exercise of the power is one 
that the creatures are agentially responsible for.17  It is plausible to claim that the 
possession of this aseity is part of what constitutes being made in the image of 
God. 
Now this is not much of an argument that creatures do, or should, possess 
this characteristic.  Indeed, we have merely tried to describe it, and identify it.  
However, it is required for the free will defence to work.  So part of what it is to be 
committed to the free will defence as a response to the problem of evil, is to be 
committed to at least some form of creaturely aseity.  This aseity is, hopefully, 
recognisable as something we sometimes term freedom.  I have deliberately shied 
away from couching our previous discussion in terms of freedom, or free will 
(even though the concept is implied by the name of the defence) because it is a 
term that is used to refer to a wide range of concepts.  Indeed, forms of the free 
will defence have been suggested that are supposed to be compatibilist friendly, so 
care is required.18  However, freedom is an appropriate term once the sense of 
freedom we are interested in has been clarified.  The free will defence requires an 
account of freedom that is libertarian, since a compatibilist notion of freedom will 
not allow us to make the sort of distinction we need to make to move the 
argument forward.  Agents must be free to act in a way that leaves them agentially 
and morally responsible.  We will not argue in detail that agents do possess aseity 
– it comes with our assumption of the free will defence.  However we will be 
concerned with what this aseity looks like once unpacked.  Since our target is what 
it is for agents to perform actions that are free in this sense, we will not approach 
the question of what it is for agents to be free in terms of what it is for agents to be 
morally responsible (as is often the case in the free will literature), but instead will 
approach the issue from the direction of what actions are, how they relate to 
agents, and what it is for an action to be free in the relevant sense.19 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Obviously if the possibilities over which this power ranges are all evil, then creatures find 
themselves in somewhat of a fix, one that they may justifiably complain about.  So it is 
important that as well as the possibility for sin, creatures have the possibility of 
righteousness – to good as well as evil.  We will say more about the range of possibilities in 
due course. 
18 See Cowan (2011), and a discussion of why compatibilist versions fail by Pawl & Timpe 
(2013). 
19 In fact, as we will see, for an agent to be agentially responsible actually involves several 
senses of freedom, all of which can prevent an agent being in the right sort of relation to a 
bad action to be the place where the buck stops. 
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What is so good about freedom? 
We should note though that an assumption of the free will defence involves 
us in more than just this.  We discussed aseity in the context of a version of the 
free will defence that maintains a strong sense of divine providence.  Process 
theologians may be able to claim that God permits creatures to sin, but that this is 
an unfortunate and unforeseen accident,20 but the free will defence is at its most 
interesting when providence is squarely on the table.  This is especially so given 
the problem we are interested in, for if God is surprised by his creatures’ actions, 
the idea that in heaven God secures a state that necessarily excludes sin, may be a 
problem.  However, the two claims of aseity, and of providence raise another 
puzzle of coherence.  How is it that the universe can be under God’s sovereign 
guidance and control yet we, part of that universe, remain free?  We do not have 
space to unravel this puzzle, though our later analysis of freedom may improve the 
prospects for usefully attempting to unravel it at a later date.  We will be assuming 
that there is a libertarian friendly solution to this problem.  Although it is not 
without its challenges, I suspect that Molinism will be of assistance in this regard.21  
This is a well-developed attempt to reconcile freedom and providence, and so this 
assumption is at least not without some warrant. 
But a more pressing issue for us to consider is about what else must be true of 
freedom, if the free will defence is to succeed.  Although our being agentially 
responsible shifts the focus of moral responsibility for the actualising of evil onto 
free creatures, there still remains a question about the responsibility for creating 
the possibility of creatures doing so in the first place.  Given that God possesses 
providential control over what will happen if this possibility is created, it seems 
that God is morally responsible for permitting evil.  It is a part of the free will 
defence to claim that God cannot prevent free creatures from exercising their 
freedom in evil ways without also destroying their freedom itself.  After all, our 
definition of aseity explicitly prohibits determination of its exercise by anyone 
other than the possessor of that aseity.  But it is possible that God could have not 
made creatures free, and so circumvented the possibility of their sinning.  There is 
another sense in which God might be thought to be permitting evil, and that is 
through his failure to intervene when evil is about to occur.  However, one can 
respond that God has, in fact, intervened on multiple occasions to prevent or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Though again, many would dissent, and not want to claim exactly this. 
21 The central problem seems to be the grounding objection, but it seems to me that the 
grounding objection will be a problem for any account of divine foreknowledge given 
anything like presentism.  If presentism is not the correct metaphysics of temporal being, 
then the problem looks eminently soluble without recourse to counterfactuals of creaturely 
freedom, but then, I suspect, libertarianism may need to be given up or radically revised as 
well.  I do not think that these issues will affect our discussion, but the possible connection 
between these ideas is noteworthy.  See Perszyk (2011) for a recent volume on the state of 
the Molinism debate. 
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remedy evil, most notably in the incarnation.  Even then though, those who see 
evil as a problem are likely to wonder why God does not intervene more often.22  
This is a different aspect of the problem,23 and not one that we will consider, 
though it is not an aspect that theists can ignore.  The point we need to notice for 
now is that in the sense in which God is responsible for permitting evil through 
creating the possibility of evil by creating creaturely freedom, God requires some 
justification for so doing.  Although ‘risk’ is a somewhat inappropriate term given 
God’s providential guidance and control, asking why freedom is worth the risk of 
all the evil that has now obtained, gets to the heart of the matter.  Since God knows 
all the evil that will befall creation if he makes creatures with aseity, permitting this 
to happen, that is, making it possible for creatures to become responsible for so 
much evil, can only be morally justified if doing so secures some good which 
outweighs all of the evil. 
Therefore, freedom must be a great good, and considering the prevalence of 
evil, and its severity, it must be a very great good indeed.24  There are a number of 
responses to this issue.  Some, like Plantinga (1974) focus on the fact that we are 
not in a good epistemic position to know what reasons God may have for 
permitting evil, and that as long there is not reason to think that a justifying 
reason is in principle impossible, we are left able to conclude that the problem of 
evil is not an insoluble problem.25  However consideration of what the form of 
these justifying reasons could be reveals an issue for the heavenly end of the 
problem we are considering.  Justifying reasons for freedom will focus on freedom 
having some intrinsic value, or on having some instrumental value.  If it is the 
intrinsic value of freedom that justifies the ‘risk’ of all of the evil, then the presence 
of freedom must be a very good-making property indeed.  Now given that the time 
creatures spend in heaven is eternity, whereas the time during which creatures 
have been, and will be, able to exercise freedom on earth before then is relatively 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 It can be argued that God is under no obligation to intervene, given that creaturely 
freedom includes bearing the consequences of our actions.  Consider Harry as the 
psychiatric patient again.  If Tom is not charged with Harry’s supervision, but is instead a 
stranger, then it might well be that Tom could have intervened in some way, but was not 
under any duty to do so – if he does it will be a supererogatory act.  However, given God’s 
special relationship with creatures he creates in Christianity, and the duty of care he 
espouses himself to be under, this does not seem to be a tactic that will work for a 
Christian response to the problem. 
23 Sometimes called the probabilistic problem of evil, but this term denotes a wide range of 
issues as well. 
24 Some have questioned whether libertarian freedom really secures any good not secured 
by compatibilism.  See Mele’s Diana fable (2006:8 ff.), there are many other compatibilist 
accounts of these ‘goods’, but we do not have space to critique them all. 
25 In his terms, the problem of evil is not a defeater for theism.  This marks Plantinga’s 
approach, and other like him, as offering a defence that seeks to explain why the problem 
is possibly soluble.  A theodicy tries to explain what the solution actually is, and what the 
reasons actually are. 
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short (by comparison), we can expect that if freedom is a great-making property 
that is valuable, it will be present in heaven as well as on earth.  There are two 
possible ways of reaching this conclusion.  First, the freedom on earth may 
outweigh the evil, and thus balance the books, but then, if freedom is valuable 
enough to achieve this then heaven would be a poor place without it.  This 
amounts to the claim that we expect heaven to contain very great goods, and that 
if freedom is such a great good, its absence in heaven would be a bad thing (and 
heaven cannot be bad in any way).  Secondly, perhaps the good of earthly freedom 
does not outweigh the evil, and so its continued presence in heaven is needed to 
add to the scales, and outweigh the evil. 
What if freedom is instrumentally good?  Well the situation may be very 
much the same, and if freedom is instrumentally required for great goods, if we 
want those great goods in heaven, then we will need freedom in heaven as well.  
This may be to outweigh the evil, or may be because heaven is such that it should 
contain great goods.  However, it may be possible that freedom is required to 
achieve some great good, or to bring about something of value, but that freedom is 
not required to maintain that good.  In this case it would be possible to balance the 
books without requiring freedom in heaven.  Consider a plausible example: 
perhaps I need to exercise freedom in order to achieve the valuable state of my 
possessing salvation, but once achieved I do not need to keep on exercising 
freedom in order to maintain this state.  If this is the case then I may need the 
opportunity to exercise freedom on earth, but not in heaven.  But the value of this 
good continues into heaven and so we stand a good chance of justifying the 
permission of evil, and do not miss out on this good in heaven.  Now if this were 
the case, and supposing this good to be the only good we need freedom for, then 
there would be no problem of consistency for us to solve, because our initial claim, 
ii) in heaven, God prevents sin without destroying free will, would be false.  It 
would be open to God to prevent sin and destroy free will at the same time – once 
the good of salvation had been secured.  Now this would make our proposed 
project an uninteresting one, and in order to have an interesting theological puzzle 
for us to get our philosophical teeth into, it is tempting to simply assume ii).  
However I think we can say something about why ii) is true; about why the 
proposed example fails, and about what goods we might need freedom for, and 
why they are not of a kind that can be maintained without the continued 
possession of freedom (note that we only need one freedom involving good to be 
like this to counter the above move).  It will be difficult to argue in as much depth 
as we would like given space considerations, so our discussion here will be a little 
speculative, but a short discussion will illuminate issues we will need to refer to 
later. 
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To establish the truth of ii) we need to see how it is possible for God to 
prevent sin, and this will be the concern of later chapters.  But we also need to see 
why it is desirable that God is bound by ii), in other words, why it would be a bad 
thing to destroy free will in heaven.  I will argue that there must be goods that can 
only obtain if there is a concurrent capacity to exercise freedom.  To begin 
thinking about this consider the example of salvation again.  Is salvation an 
intrinsic good, or not?  It appears to be instrumental.  It is good that we are saved, 
if we are thereby rescued from suffering.  It is good that we are saved if we thereby 
get to enjoy peace, joy, love and so on.  It is the presence of ‘thereby’ in these 
sentences that indicates the real reason that salvation is valuable – it is because of 
what it gets us.  Let us just label some good heavenly possibility that is available to 
us when saved as G.  Now it may well be that having exercised freedom to make G 
something that is available to us, we do not need to exercise our freedom further 
to maintain the availability of G.  However, the key question is whether our 
interaction with G, or our G-ing, is something that requires freedom or not.  If G-
ing does not require freedom, and if G-ing is the great good, the valuable thing that 
justifies the risk, then we might ask why God did not just create unfree creatures 
who G.  If our ability to G does not depend on the capacity for freedom, then it 
looks quite difficult to see why it would not be possible for God to make creatures 
that are not free, and hence cannot sin, but can still instantiate the good of G-ing.  
If G-ing does require freedom, then although questions about salvation may raise 
interesting issues about how we can exercise freedom valuably, there is no reason 
to suppose that it would be good for God to destroy freedom in heaven, in fact his 
so doing would destroy the possibility of a great good.  So if we are committed to 
the free will defence, we have, prima facie, a strong reason to think that the good 
that justifies the creation of free creatures is one that will also be present in heaven, 
and will require the continued presence of creaturely freedom. 
So what great good could be a plausible candidate for a good that justifies evil 
and requires freedom, but also requires freedom if it is not to be lost?  There are a 
number of possible goods whose dependence on libertarian freedom has been 
suggested.  For example Kane (1998:79-101) suggests creativity, self-creation, 
desert, moral responsibility, interpersonal reactive attitudes, individuality, dignity, 
life-hopes, love and friendship and objective worth.26  We will not examine all of 
these – that would be a substantial undertaking.  Compatibilist friendly accounts 
of most of these characteristics have been offered, but libertarians persist in 
claiming that there is an intuition about the good in these characteristics (or some 
of them) depending on the possession of libertarian freedom.  This is not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 That libertarian freedom is required for these goods is not uncontroversial, but that 
would require another chapter to argue, or more.  See Clarke (2003) and Pereboom (2001), 
especially on love. 
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particularly convincing in and of itself, but it does indicate that there is a wide 
array of options that the free will defence could explore.  Let us focus on one issue, 
that of relationship.  A relationship with God, one characterised by love, 
knowledge of God, trust and worship, is prominent in Christian thought as a 
valuable good, and even an incommensurable one.  Now, being in a relationship is 
a state, but it is a state whose obtaining depends on the exercise of various 
interpersonal interactions, such as loving someone, trusting someone, 
communicating with someone, and so on.  We should note the distinction 
between a good residing in a state, or in the exercise of some power, or activity.  If 
there is any prospect of discovering a candidate for G whose maintenance does not 
depend on freedom, it seems likely to be a state.  It is plausible that entering into a 
state could require an exercise of freedom, but that once entered into, no further 
exercise is required.  We are familiar with this through mundane examples: my 
entering the state of being sat at my desk requires some action to get me there, but 
once sat there, I do not need to keep myself there by some active exercise of my 
powers – I could even fall asleep and remain there.   Similarly my entering the 
state of being married requires my active involvement in saying my vows, but once 
the wedding is over I do not need to keep on saying them.27 
But many of the aspects of relationship are not states, and involve the active 
exercise of my ability to act freely.  Consider one aspect of love in a relationship 
with God, namely to be a worshipper of God (which involves the expression of 
love towards another28).  There are many states relevant to this, such as my 
possessing right beliefs about God.  However what it is to worship God, is not only 
to know that God is great, but also to respond to that knowledge in an appropriate 
way.  Now responding is reactive, and if there is to be any value to my reaction, 
then I must be reacting because of the value I discover in God.  I cannot be forced 
to play my heavenly harp for example.  But if I do not have freedom, then it is not 
possible for me to truly react to this value.  If I am not free, and the things that 
happen involving me, which are supposed to constitute worship, are caused to 
happen by God, then they are not appropriate candidates for being acts of 
worship.  This same intuition is sometimes expressed in the idea that you could 
not programme a robot to truly love you, since having caused all ‘loving reactions’ 
they would not really constitute acts of love at all.  Now, this is a difficult intuition 
to justify, as it deals with the knotty problem of acting for a reason, which is an 
issue on which libertarians and compatibilists are prone to disagree, and we will 
give this some discussion in a later chapter.  But I hope that brief consideration of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 This would be marriage as a legal institution, a marriage considered as a form of 
relationship may well require me to continue to live my vows. 
28 This is a pertinent example, since although one might claim that love exists in heaven, if 
it is not expressed and enjoyed, we would seem to have missed the point of love somewhat 
(the thought is certainly suggestive). 
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this claim does identify that there is something about being a worshipper that 
requires libertarian freedom.29  Lowe has given one of the clearest articulations of 
this thought. 
For a substance to act in a certain way because it was caused to act in that 
way … is not for that substance to act rationally, or genuinely ‘in the light’ of 
any reasons it may have for so acting.  By so acting, a substance may act in a 
way that is in accordance with certain of its reasons for acting, if it has any, 
but it cannot be acting for any of those reasons, given that it was caused to 
act in that way.  To act for a reason is to act in a way that is responsive to the 
cogency of certain considerations in favour of one’s so acting – and this is 
incompatible with one’s being caused to act in that way, because causal 
processes bring about their effects with complete indifference to the question 
of whether this effects have cogent considerations in their favour.  To act in 
the light of one’s reasons for acting in this or that way, one must, then, be 
able to choose so to act… [italics original] (Lowe, 2008:156). 
If the active exercise of my ability to interact with something good is to have 
value, I must be responding, here and now, to the goodness of that thing as I 
directly appreciate it.  It is not enough to say that I encountered some direct 
appreciation of something’s goodness in the past, and that this can be the basis of 
what I do now, as if what I am now doing is part of an extended response, or 
reaction, initiated by some freedom involving event in the past.  Imagine if a 
husband claimed this about his wife, with the marriage now considered 
relationally, not legally.  To say his current avowal, or expression, of love towards 
his wife is genuine because he did, after all, fall in love with her in the past, would 
not be counted genuine.  What she wants to know is whether he loves her now.  So 
although we talk of relationships as a state we are in, the continuation of a 
relationship depends on the continued free and active exercise of agents in the 
relationship towards one another in various ways.  In the case of a relationship 
with God we considered worshipping, but the principle extends to many other 
aspects of participating in a relationship.  We will not explore what these different 
aspects are now, since a philosophical account of relationship would be a 
significant detour.  We only needed one plausible example of a G that depends on 
freedom for it’s persistence, and we have that in worshipping.  However I hope 
that is not difficult for the reader to imagine how this thought could be extended 
to other aspects of relationship with God.  So we have a reason to think that at 
least some of the goods associated with justifying the permission of evil depend on 
freedom not only for their inception, but also for their continued persistence, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 That the possession of an objective practical reason depends on the freedom to do 
otherwise is also discussed by Haji (2012), though his focus is in the context of moral 
responsibility.  Wallace (2004) discusses the connection to normativity and the will, which 
may suggest that those with a Kantian intuition will agree with this claim.
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given that we expect these goods to be present in heaven, we have good reason to 
think that the same sort of freedom required to make the acquisition of these 
goods possible is also present in heaven.  This gives us a defence of claim ii). 
 
Active engagement in great goods 
However it is not only the presence of freedom in heaven that matters.  Susan 
Wolf has a phrase she has used to describe what it takes for agents to have 
meaning in their lives, and although she is not a libertarian, and was not directing 
her comments at the issue of freedom, it is apposite to our discussion.  To have 
meaning, or significance, in their lives, agents need to be appropriately connected 
to things that are good or valuable.  They need to have ‘active engagement in 
projects of worth’ where ‘subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness’ 
(Wolf, 1997:209, 211).  We have considered the need for agents to possess active 
engagement; this is a matter of their having the capacity to freely engage in a 
certain interaction.  But it is not enough to just stipulate that agents in heaven 
must possess freedom, because if the exercise of that freedom is to be of great 
value, or involve the instantiation of great goods, then how that freedom can be 
exercised is also critically important.  For example if I am free in the relevant 
sense, but can only exercise this freedom over the decision of whether to begin 
walking with my left foot or right foot first, then it would be difficult to see how 
this exercise of freedom could instantiate, or bring about, a great good.  Now, 
given our discussion, and the examples we have used, it should be clear that there 
is scope for freedom to be exercised in more significant ways than this.  But since 
this is such an important point, it is good to be explicit.  Whatever these projects 
are, that heavenly agents engage their freedom in the pursuit of, they must be 
projects of great worth.  In order to be a project of great worth, the project must 
instantiate some great good.  But in order to be actively involved in the pursuit of 
that project, an agent must exercise their freedom in choosing that project, or in 
carrying it out.  Therefore agents must be involved in an evaluative judgement 
about the normative goodness of whatever possibilities there are for them to 
exercise their heavenly freedom regarding.  Agents must make a judgement about 
which projects are ‘objectively attractive’, which will be a basis of their practical 
and evaluative rationality concerning their heavenly activity, and given the nature 
of heaven, we would expect agents to make a correct judgement about which 
projects are worth pursuing. 
Now, herein lies a possible problem: if there is one correct normative 
judgement about which project is most worthwhile, and if failing to be subjectively 
attracted to that which is most objectively attractive is a sin, then agents only seem 
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to have one possible course of action open to them.30  Now, does this mean that 
heavenly agents are so constrained regarding what they do, that they are no longer 
free?  Well, as long as the subjective attraction is not caused, we may be able to 
satisfy the conditions for agents being freely engaged by the good and valuable.31  
However quite how God will ensure that agents always do the most valuable thing 
without causing what they do, or choose, in some way looks to be a difficult 
puzzle.  But, of course, this is one of the questions we will be looking at once we 
have a clearer idea of what it takes for an agent to act freely, and how God can 
interact with agents without destroying this capacity.  But even if it is possible, 
there is something intuitively valuable about the capacity for freedom being 
exercised in making choices, and this is often especially so for libertarians.  We 
also noted that we expect the freedom-involving goods in heaven to require the 
continued exercise of freedom.  Perhaps though there is scope for there to be 
choice among alternatives that are of equal value, for example, whether to sing 
bass or tenor in the heavenly choir.32  But this begins to look like the choice of 
whether to walk with my left or right foot first, a choice that appears to be 
insignificant, even if where I am walking to, or why I am walking, is significant.  If 
the exercise of freedom is so constrained as to preclude choices that are between 
options that are significant, then the presence of freedom in heaven seems to lose 
its appeal. 
The intuition that there is a problem here is sometimes captured by children 
(and adults) who worry that heaven seems like a place that will be rather boring.33  
We seem to place a value on freedom as not only the freedom to be actively 
involved in the project of worth, but also in which projects of worth.  It matters 
which goods we pursue, and how we pursue them.  This is a theme echoed in 
Kane’s list, and draws on features of agency such as self-creation, creativity, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 This does depend on a plausible ethical principle that we are obligated to pursue the best 
goods we can.  This principle is not without detractors (and it is particularly difficult to see 
how this fits with the idea of supererogatory acts).  However, consider God, who in an 
Anselmian conception of a perfect being, must be he-who-does-that-than-which-no-
better-an-be-conceived.  This sort of conception of God is an instance of the application of 
just this principle, and since human agents are called to ‘be holy as God is holy’ this does 
provide some reason to think that we are also bound by this principle.  This is far from a 
conclusive argument, but at least we have acknowledged that there is an important ethical 
question here.  (Note that this observation also demonstrates that our discussion of 
whether heavenly agents possess freedom will also have some bearing on whether God is 
free.  We will not discuss this question, but it would be an interesting application of the 
analysis we will undertake.) 
31 This touches on whether alternative possibilities are required for freedom, an issue we 
will assess in more detail later. 
32 This is a rather silly example, and a caricature of what heaven might be, but we will 
discuss heavenly choices in detail in the last chapter, and it suffices for an example. 
33 Walls (2010) connects this to Williams’ Makropulos Case (in Fischer (1993)).  Though 
we will not tackle this issue directly, our discussion can be applied to Williams’ claim that 
eternity is a bad thing. 
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individuality.  I am going to call a choice significant if it engages an agent’s 
capacity for freedom between alternatives that engage the agent’s evaluative 
faculties in an assessment that recognises more than one good option, and if the 
choice matters to the agent because in making that choice they are determining 
what goods they want to instantiate, associate themselves with, and to prioritise – 
the choice reflects their power to not only react to the goods around them, but to 
exercise their freedom over who they are, and the goods that constitute their 
character, interests, loves, and so on.  Moreover, heaven must contain significant 
freedom, if heavenly freedom is to be a great good.  Put another way, we want to 
know whether the need for alignment with objective attractiveness allows agents 
any slack concerning how they are subjectively attracted, and to what.  This is a 
little stipulative, as we have not considered all the details of this definition.  
However it is not wholly stipulative, since we have discussed the need for a real 
exercise of freedom in heaven if we are committed to the free will defence.  We 
have also sketched some of the concerns that might drive the intuition that 
freedom is valued for its significant exercise.34  So if we are assuming that heaven 
must contain significant freedom, then we have, at least, weakly justified this 
claim.  But there is another reason to include the claim that heaven must contain 
significant freedom as a desideratum, and that is that it makes this project more 
interesting.  Although it is perhaps not necessary to do so, we have set the bar 
intentionally high in seeking whether heaven could contain the highest quality of 
freedom we can justifiably imagine or expect, and yet could still be a place without 
the possibility of sin.  This is important because the theologian especially will be 
particularly interested in exploring how agents can express themselves, and relate 
to God and each other, in heaven.  If we can construct a framework for 
understanding how the philosophical issues constrain these possibilities, then so 
much the better. 
 
The sinlessness of the saints 
We have used the idea that heaven must be without sin, but have not said 
much about this.  Heaven must be a place without sin, because sin is something 
that separates creatures from God, and in heaven creatures are with God, and in 
the most intimate contact with God.35  The salvation Christianity espouses is one 
in which our past sins are separated from us, enabling our entry into heaven and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 A discussion of the intuitions responsible for libertarianism would be a lengthy detour, 
but I suspect that the intuitions which are shared by libertarians, and by proponents of the 
free will defence, would lead them to support this claim, and this has been my experience 
in conversation with libertarians who espouse the free will defence.  Although this would 
be interesting to examine in detail, given the complexity of philosophical positions on how 
agents value things, it is beyond the scope of this project.  
35 See Isaiah 59:2 and 1 Corinthians 13:12. 
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God’s presence, but also the future possibility of sin is prevented, so that we can 
stay in the presence of God.  There is a contrast between human relations with 
God at creation and in heaven.  Humans had the capacity to fall by sinning in the 
beginning, but the redemption of humans means that we are not only able to 
overcome temptation and not sin, but can be secure in our salvation for eternity 
because we cannot fall.  These are fairly standard theological points.36  What this 
means is that the sinlessness of the redeemed in heaven (also called the saints) 
cannot be accidental.  The redeemed do not wake each morning wondering if they 
will, with God’s help, manage to steer clear of sin.  Instead they wake secure in the 
knowledge that the possibility of sinning is no longer something that they need to 
worry about.  So it has to be necessarily true of redeemed agents that they will not 
sin – sinning is impossible for them. 
This means that the heavenly state of humans is not merely a return to the 
state of innocence that they were created in.  If redemption to the heavenly state 
meant a return to the pre-fall state that Adam found himself in then it would still 
be possible for the redeemed to fall.  There is then, a difference between innocent 
Adam, and the redeemed.  There is also a difference between the redeemed and 
whatever state the angels were in before they fell.  We will need to bear these issues 
in mind when we explore how God can prevent sin in heaven, because however 
God achieves this feat it will not do to say something like ‘God removes 
temptations’.  Although Adam faced temptation in the garden, there was no 
tempter present to lure the Devil into his fall.  However God achieves necessary 
sinlessness, it must be by a means that was not present to Adam and the Devil.  So 
spotting the difference between these different states will help us to identify what 
makes the difference in heaven.  Whatever it is that makes the difference, our next 
question will be why, if God can implement this factor in heaven without 
destroying freedom, God could not do so earlier.  If we cannot answer this 
question then the free will defence will fail.  A key plank to the free will defence is 
that God could not have done anything to prevent creatures from sinning while 
maintaining their freedom.  So there must be some reason that it is only in heaven 
that this factor is effective, and also some reason why God could not have created 
this heavenly state at the outset. 
Hopefully what sin is, is something we have an intuitive grasp of.  A sin is 
failure to do something that we ought to do, or the doing of something that we 
ought not to do.  If there is some good that can be done, then failure to do that 
good thing (unless doing so would prevent some greater good being done) is a 
morally culpable failure, and a sin.  If there is some action that is bad, then unless 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 For a dissenting approach see Donnelly (1985) who attempts to solve the problem by 
denying heavenly impeccability. 
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there is a justification for that badness (such as it being necessary for the bringing 
about of a greater good), the performance of an action that brings about the 
badness, is itself bad, and a sin.  It is a staple of Christian ethics, that sinning is not 
only a matter of what agents instantiate in the external world through their 
actions, but it is also a matter of what they exemplify internally.  The familiar 
example is that murder is a harm, and is bad, and a sin; but also hating somebody, 
even though we might be horrified by the thought of acting on that hatred or 
making it known to anyone, is also a harm (plausibly to the possibility of goods 
being instantiated in our relationships), and bad, and thus a sin.  So, considering 
the heavenly situation, it will not do for heavenly agents to harbour thoughts of 
misdeed, but to be restrained by God’s continued reminders not to do what they 
are thinking about.  The external harm of the sin would be prevented, but there 
would still be sin in heaven, and thus separation.  Instead God needs to prevent sin 
in a way that means that heavenly agents do not even possess intentions to sin, 
imaginations of sinning, or imperfections in their internal attitudes towards 
themselves, others and God.  It is worth noting though, that agents can possess 
internal states required for being tempted without sinning.  We do not need to 
analyse why here, suffice it to note that Christ was impeccable (without any sin) 
and yet was tempted37.  So whatever considerations are made of what God needs to 
prevent in order to prevent heavenly sin, we do not need to add the condition that 
God makes it impossible for people to be tempted to sin.  This is not to say that 
God could not, perhaps, do this though.  Perhaps God can prevent heavenly agents 
from being tempted, and this helps with securing heavenly sinlessness, but it 
would not be required unless it was the only way of preventing sin. 
Another peculiarity of Christian ethics is the issue of sins of ignorance.  In the 
Old Testament followers of God were required to offer a sacrifice for sins they may 
have committed unknowingly.38  This means that the sorts of things that can count 
as a sin might be more than we ordinarily include with our intuitions.  We cannot 
get agents off the hook by claiming that, or making it the case that, they did not 
possess the knowledge requisite for performing the actions they should have.  
Now, it may be possible that sins of ignorance apply when agents should have, and 
could have, gained the requisite knowledge – a form of epistemic negligence.  This 
would bring them more in line with our modern western intuitions.  What this 
means for heavenly agents is that they will need to not only do the right things, 
and think/feel the right things, but will also need to know the right things. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 See Crisp (2004) and (2007b) for a brief discussion of the issues. 
38 See Leviticus 4:2. 
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Outline of our strategy 
We are in a position to now outline what we will need to do to demonstrate 
the possibility of coherence between i) and ii).  We will need to answer the 
following questions: 
1. What does it take for an agent to act freely (along the lines of creaturely 
aseity)? 
2. How could God prevent sin in heaven without destroying this freedom? 
3. Why could God not achieve this in the beginning? 
4. Does this leave heavenly agents with significant freedom? 
So we will begin by exploring what an action is, and then asking what it takes for 
an action to be free.  We will consider quite a basic conception of action, since we 
have not developed any detailed thesis about the connection between actions and 
sin (or responsibility), for example are actions, or sins, always intentional.39  So our 
account of action will leave many interesting issues to one side.40   Then we will 
consider what further conditions agents need to be under in order to act freely.  
We will then be able to stipulate that all of these conditions hold in heaven (for the 
free will defence) and ask what options are open to God to secure the sinlessness of 
agents under these conditions.  As we consider these options, in order to preserve 
faith in the free will defence we will need to explain why God could not utilise 
these options before the fall.  Our other constraint on these options will be that we 
require that divine interactions leave heavenly agents with significant freedom.  
The combination of these two issues can be framed as a question of whether we 
need to be free to sin, in order to be significantly free.41  If all of these constraints 
are applied, and we are left with a possible option for God’s sin preventing 
interaction, then we will have established that the claims that God cannot prevent 
sin without destroying free will, and that in heaven God prevents sin without 
destroying free will, are consistent. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 So we will not inherit a Davidsonian conception of action. 
40 This is unfortunate, because in the philosophy of action, and in the metaphysics of 
freewill, it is decidedly difficult to carve off parts of a problem without committing oneself 
on other contentious issues.  But, to be thorough would require separate volumes on 
action, and freedom (and probably responsibility as well), before we could even get to our 
theological puzzle.  So, we must content ourselves with trying to be judicious as we choose 
aspects of action and freedom that are central to explaining how God prevents sin, and try 
to say enough to be able to say something constructive about this theological puzzle. 
41 See Sennett (1999) and Rasmussen (2013) for a discussion of the problem in these terms. 
	   25 
2. Agents, Actions, and Controlling Sources 
 
Agents, sources and the power to do 
In order to understand the metaphysics of possible divine involvement in 
human agency, we must first understand the conditions under which agents can 
be said to act, and to act freely.  We need to distinguish an agent’s actions from 
other things that involve the agent.  Agents possess capacities to perform actions, 
and this capacity enables them to be more than passengers carried along by the 
unfolding natural physical drama of the universe.  Agents are more than conduits 
through which history pours into the future.  Their involvement is more than 
instrumental; they exercise capacities of agency in order to move the world, and 
themselves in it.42  Actions then, are things that agents do, not things that happen 
to agents, and it is this distinction that proves resistant to clear philosophical 
analysis.43  For instance an agent may be stood admiring the sunset at the seaside, 
when a sudden gust of wind blows them forward, into the water.  Their entering 
the water is something that happens to them.  Alternatively the same agent may 
decide that the water looks inviting (it is a hot day, and the water looks cool and 
inviting) and spontaneously jump into the water.  This time the agent does 
something; they make something happen that would not otherwise have occurred 
– the agent acts.  But for their intervention in the world by acting, they would have 
remained where they were.  However the agent may have been stood, wary of 
entering the water, when an unusual neural event in their brain occurred, 
unbeknownst to them, which subsequently caused an involuntary muscle twitch, 
causing them to fall into the water.  In this case it is not immediately clear whether 
the agent’s falling into the water is something that happened to the agent or not. 
Consider the case that looks most clearly like action by the agent; the agent 
exercised a capacity for choice and decided to enter the water.  In our example the 
agent had reasons to do so, and they acted in a way that responded to those 
reasons.  Their response was sensitive to their apprehension of their relationship 
to their circumstances.  They were aware that they were hot, that the water was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 This claim is a little stipulative, and does rather beg the case against compatibilists, but 
following our discussion of the type of freedom a free will defence requires, it is clear that 
this is the sense of freedom we need to investigate.  Frankfurt (1978) suggests the active 
nature of behaviour as an important indicator of being an action. 
43 Davidson (1971) limits actions to being something that agents do, adding that it must be 
intentional under some description.  We will not follow Davidson with this further 
condition.  I am not sure if intentional action is a sub-class of action or not, but it is a 
distinction we will not explore, partly because of space, and partly because it may turn out 
that some of what agents do that is significant, is not intentional.  Wilson & Shpall (2012) 
note that the connection Davidson proposes enjoys lots of support, but that explaining the 
connection has proven difficult. 
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cool, that it would be good for them to cool off, and that jumping into the water 
would be an effective means to that end.  In the case where the agent is blown into 
the water there is a reason for the occurrence too – the force of the wind on the 
agent is sufficient to topple them.  But in this case there is nothing to do with the 
agent’s apprehension of the gust of wind that is relevant to the outcome.  In a way 
they are sensitive to the reason, in the sense that when pushed by the wind, they 
reacted by falling over.  But such sensitivity is entirely passive, and demonstrates 
no more interesting a capacity than an inanimate object’s sensitivity of moving 
when pushed.  When the agent acts they are not passive, they are active at least 
inasmuch as that the influences over their jumping involve them in a way that 
allows us to identify the source of the action as being the agent. 
In an instance of action, the agent cannot be only passive with respect to the 
influences over their jumping into the water.  If their role is entirely passive, we 
can straightforwardly identify the occurrence as something happening to the 
agent.  If agents are active, then at least some contribution to the occurrence of 
their acting has its source in the agent.44  We have not elucidated in what ways the 
agent may exert an active influence, but we have identified a core issue of agency: 
agents control how they act, and part of what it is for an agent to be in control of 
how they act is for the agent to be the source of what happens when they act.45  
However, explaining what it is for an agent to be a source is no simple feat.  It is 
tempting to start talking about the sufficient conditions for jumping into the 
water, and claiming that these conditions must be mental, or neurophysiological, 
states of the agent.  However this cannot be quite right on two counts.  First, an 
agent could possess a state that is a sufficient condition for jumping without 
exercising the sort of control we are interested in, and second there are plausible 
examples where it is difficult to decide how to identify the sufficient condition of 
the agent’s act.  Regarding the first issue, consider a process whose outcome is 
controlled by a quantum interference device capable of producing a binary 
random output.  When activated, this device produces either a ‘1’ or ‘0’, and the 
output causes some observable event, like a blue or red light coming on for the ‘1’ 
and ‘0’ respectively.  Due to the nature of such devices it is in principle impossible 
to predict what the output will be for a single event of the device’s operation.  This 
is because there is no sufficient condition that can be identified as constraining the 
device to output in a particular way – it is purely random.  If we set up and activate 
the device then whichever colour light comes on, the device will have been the 
sufficient condition of that light glowing; the device will have been the source, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Which does not necessarily mean an internal prior cause, such as a ‘trying’, such as is 
suggested by Hornsby (1980) and Ginet (1990). 
45 For a good introduction to this approach to action, focused on agents as a type of source, 
see Mele (1992) and (1995). 
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there is no other possible candidate.  There is no prior factor that constrained how 
the experiment could play out which could be the source of the event of the device 
outputting the signal that it does.  So we can say that the device controls which 
colour light will come on. 
Now suppose that a device of this nature exists in an agent.  It need not have 
been put there by a malignant neurosurgeon, in fact, let us suppose that it is a 
naturally occurring biological phenomenon, an isolated neurophysiological system 
whose output sends a signal down a neuron to some part of the brain (the details 
will not matter).  The device activates at regular intervals.  In the biological case 
lights do not come on, but the effects are to determine either that the body remain 
as it is, or that it jumps forwards three feet.  Now consider our agent stood on the 
beach.  If the device activates and causes the agent to jump forwards into the sea 
then the source of this occurrence is not external to the agent.  We can ignore for a 
moment the question of whether being physically internal to the agent’s body is a 
correct analysis of having its source in the agent – let us suppose for now that it is, 
since we could construct an alternative case placing the device differently in the 
agent.  What we have done is construct a case where the source of the agent’s 
jumping into the sea is the agent (or within the agent), and yet I think we 
immediately see that it would be strange for us to claim that agent controls their 
jumping into the sea.  We can imagine such an agent finding themself very 
surprised to be jumping into the sea.46  So what has gone wrong in our analysis?  In 
the example as stipulated, that agent is the sufficient condition of the jump into 
the sea, and hence the source, but it is not the right kind of condition to constitute 
an exercise of control.  There is a disconnection between the agent and their 
circumstances, and the jump.  The factors mentioned before, the coolness of the 
water, the hot day, the agent’s desire to cool off – these do not seem to play a role 
in what the agent does.  The agent could just have well have jumped if they were 
cold and afraid of the sea.  It is perhaps easier to see the problem if we consider the 
same agent lecturing at the front of a lecture hall.  Now a jump would be a bizarre 
occurrence, disconnected from the agent’s activity, and inappropriate as a means 
to any conceivable end the agent may have while lecturing.  The key point is that 
the context of the situation agents find themselves in should matter.  If the agent is 
to be active by exercising control, then it is not having the source of what they do 
within them simpliciter that matters, it is their capacity for being the source of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 If the device has outputs with equal probabilities then the agent may be rather less 
surprised, their frequent inexplicable jumping being something they have grown used to.  
So, we can suppose that the output causing a jump is a very low probability event.  I do not 
mean to imply that agents need to possess any sort of phenomenology of acting, such as 
Ginet (1990) suggests, or might be implied by Anscombe’s (1957) ‘knowledge without 
observation’.  On the issue of cognitivism about one’s own actions see Setiya (2014). 
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how they respond to relevant features of the context in which they find 
themselves.47 
It is tempting to add that it must be responding appropriately to relevant 
features that is important.  But what could be meant by appropriately?  If we 
mean, ‘most appropriately’, in terms of what is maximally rational, or aligns most 
strongly with an agents desires, or something like this,48 then we have reason not 
to add the ‘appropriately’ caveat.  Agents sometimes do things that we find 
unexpected because we consider them to have reason to do otherwise, or to lack 
reason for what they do.  For example, the agent who fears the sea seems to have 
no reason to jump, and we might consider their jumping to be inappropriate.  
However it is possible that such an agent could spontaneously decide that they 
have had enough of their fear, and courageously (or foolishly) choose to leap.  It is 
at least plausible that agents can do this, and our own introspective awareness of 
acratic action does seem to admit of possibilities like this.  Agents do sometimes 
do quite unexpected things, even from their own perspective.  In this case though, 
if the agent makes a prior decision to face their fear, then the jump may have just 
become appropriate for them, given their altered mental states.  In this case they 
may still be doing what is most appropriate, at least, given the considerations of 
their own practical rationality.  The example we would require is an agent whose 
spontaneously jumping constitutes (rather than precedes) their sudden avowal to 
face their fear. 
Do agents possess the ability to be a source of what they do, in a way that is 
sensitive to the context of the situation they find themselves in, where what they 
do is not necessarily most appropriate (in the sense that they have no 
countervailing reason to do what they do)?  Relatively simple examples will suffice 
to show this is possible.  An agent may be offered a plate of biscuits containing 
chocolate and raisin varieties.  There is no feature of either variety that makes it a 
more appropriate choice for the agent to pick.  The agent must do nothing, take 
one or both biscuits, or refuse the offer (we will assume that this strange scenario 
is bare of any other considerations, and all other responses would be disconnected 
from any consideration the agent could posses of the features of the situation they 
are in).  So the agent picks one, eats it, and enjoys it.  If we asked the agent why 
they did what they did, they could respond by giving a reason for their action that 
relates to some feature of the circumstances of the scenario, “I decided to try a 
chocolate one” for instance.  The agent is responding to relevant features of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 O’Shaughnessy (2008) suggests that there is a connection between perception and action. 
48 A complex, but less naïve description of what someone might want to claim is: in a way 
that closely aligns with how those features are most likely to provoke the agent to respond 
given the nature of the agent, their desires for certain ends, and the possibility of attaining 
any desires in the circumstances they find themselves in, given long term considerations of 
the effects of their actions. 
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situation – biscuits are for eating, I have been made an offer, which provokes me 
to respond to the content of the offer, etc.  The agent is the source of their taking 
the chocolate biscuit, and it does not happen to them.  Moreover, they are a 
controlling source – the action arises from the agent in a way that engages the 
agent in the features of the scenario in a relevant way. 
If the agent had suddenly thrown themself to the floor then this would not 
have engaged the situation appropriately.  It is not that agents could never do this, 
but remember we are to imagine a scenario with no other factors pertinent to the 
possibilities.  The agent is not afraid someone will throw something at them, has 
no mischievous thought of pulling a prank, possesses no subliminal desire to take 
a closer look at the carpet, or any other possibility we could cook up.  If the agent 
did throw themselves to the floor in the absence of any feature of the situation’s 
being relevant to such a course of action – if there was no connection between 
such a course of action and any possible desire, motivation, or end the agent could 
aim at, then such an action may have its source in the agent, but the agent could 
not be a controlling source.  It would be similar to the jump instigated by the 
quantum interference device.  If the agent was an avowed chocaholic then they 
may have strongly wanted to take the chocolate biscuit, but on a whim may have 
taken the raisin one to try something different.  This action would be surprising, 
but it does still connect with the features of the situation in a way that is relevant 
to possible ends the agent can adopt as reasons at which their taking of that biscuit 
can aim.49  The action would be appropriate in the sense that it is not irrelevant or 
disconnected from the features of the scenario, but it would not be the ‘most 
appropriate’.  So we can dispense with any appropriateness condition in this sense, 
and explore what it is to be relevant, which seems to capture a condition required 
for an agent to be a controlling source. 
It may seem unnecessary to spend so long considering this appropriateness 
condition, but it does get us to the point of being able to note an important claim.  
We should be wary of any attempt to analyse what it is for an agent to be a 
controlling source that reduces control to terms of normative rationality. 50  
Agents, it seems, can do things which are irrational in the sense that they are 
acratic and fail to promote ends that the agent cares about most, or are actions 
done for reasons that the agent cares very little about compared to alternatives.51  
For example, an agent may succumb to a relatively weak temptation, even though 
they set out to avoid it.  But this does not mean that an agent is thereby not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 I do not want to imply that agents only exercise this sort of control in Buridan’s Ass type 
situations, but we will discuss the scope of agential control later. 
50 Even if that normativity has a subjective basis. 
51 For some discussion of what this possibility entails see Davidson (1969), Sandis (2008), 
Holton (1999), and Arpaly (2000). 
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exercising an agential capacity to control what they do.  Although acratic action 
may be an instance of the loss, or rather diminishing, of an agent’s rational 
control, it is no loss of their agential control.  Agents can do things that are quite 
out of keeping with their character, with what we expect of them, and they expect 
of themselves.  But at no point does the distance between what is expected, and 
what they actually do become so great that we deem them to have lost agential 
control, for this measure, though it may tell us something about whether a person 
is virtuous, stable, rational etc., tells us nothing about whether they are exercising 
agential control and thus performing an action.  It is not that we are not interested 
in these other issues, but they are a matter of how an agent exercises their agential 
control in action, not whether they are performing an action.  Care is needed in 
considering examples though, for it is possible that something unexpected 
happens because there has been a loss of agential control – perhaps, after all, a 
malignant neurosurgeon has fitted a quantum interference device to an agent. 
This does not mean that agents can do anything as an action, and that control 
is entirely unfettered, allowing the agent to do (or try) anything at all.  There are 
obvious metaphysical limitations on possible actions of agents.  An agent could 
not fly out of the window and up into the sky.  Human beings do not possess this 
capacity.  However an agent could get up on the windowsill and try.52  Their 
attempt would not last long, and would be highly irregular, perhaps indicating that 
the agent is confused about practical, rational or prudential concerns.  But it 
would not make what they do any less of an instance of controlled agency.  
However there is a scenario where we can imagine an agent who is not suffering 
any confusion, for whom, given the content of their beliefs, desires, goals,53 and 
any other candidates for what constitutes the possible connections between the 
agent’s capacities, self and the world, trying to fly is just metaphysically impossible.  
Such an agent does not have the ingredients to produce an action like this.  Since 
there is no relevant connection between them, the world, and trying to fly out of 
this window, the raw materials are not present for the agent to be a controlling 
source of that action.  So if this was to happen, the required ingredient must come 
from somewhere else, and the source would not be the agent; it would be 
something that happens to the agent, and not something they do. 
 
Agents, circumstances, and sensitivity 
We have used this idea of a relevant connection but have not really identified 
what it consists in yet.  What is it for there to be a relevant connection between an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Trying would be a slightly different action, but closely related as it would aim at, 
arguably, the same end (see Hornsby for further discussion). 
53 Or even their physical realisers, if there be such a thing. 
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agent and the world?  To move forward we need to know what this relation is 
between, and when the conditions for this relation are satisfied.  In some ways it 
would be good to be a little vague here, as we might be able to understand enough 
of this condition without having to commit ourselves on some contentious issues.  
For example, if our analysis requires us to claim that it is what, within an agent, is 
required to enable the production of an action that we are interested in, then it 
would be helpful not to have to worry about whether should talk of cognitive 
content, or it’s physical state realisers, or non-physical (perhaps emergent) states.  
I think we can be clear enough on the conditions for agency, without having to 
worry about every detail of the mechanism of agency, so we need not identify the 
relata in these terms.54 
When a relevant connection obtains, that connection explains what it is about 
the agent that enables them to produce that particular action in a controlled way.  
Whatever the mechanism of action production is, there must be something the 
agent possesses which provides the impetus for the agent to perform that action.  
It is customary to talk of desires as the motivators of action, or we could choose to 
talk of what an agent values, or what an agent perceives, or reasons, as something 
that resembles their conception of the good (or a good), or of a pro-attitude.55  But 
we need not quibble at this point about what it is that might supply motivation.  
We can use ‘desire’ as a placeholder term, but are not committing ourselves to any 
theory of action motivation.  Just as a mass does not move without being acted on 
by a force, so an agent does not act (or try to act, if you do not think trying is an 
action) without the presence of some motivation that is able to engage with some 
connected course of action.  I add the last caveat because it is plain that an agent’s 
having a desire to drink would not provide any impetus for them to jump on the 
spot.  It is difficult to see how to argue that there must be some motivation with 
which an agent acts, but I hope it is a plausible enough idea, whether it be a desire 
proper, or some other feature of agents.  It is certainly prevalent enough in our 
folk psychology, where we often talk about the reason why, or for which, an agent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54  Although some disciplines try to tackle these issues by first understanding the 
mechanism, and then seeing what that tells us about our capacities, it seems that there are 
some necessary pre-reflective assumptions about the metaphysics of different capacities 
that are required for the interpretation of theoretical models to have enough metaphysical 
content to engage these higher-order questions.  This is not much of an argument, but only 
a small gesture those who worry that something like neurophysiology should have priority.  
Steward (1997) even suggests there are fundamental metaphysical prohibitions to this form 
of analysis.  For a recent overview of the issues, see Gibb, et al. (2013). 
55 `I am being deliberately broad here, not wanting to commit to an explicitly Humean 
theory of motivation, perhaps agents can be motivated to act by reasons, ends, or 
something else.  For a discussion of the Humean theory of motivation see Smith (1987), 
Schueler (2009) & (2003) and Sehon (1997).  For a discussion of desires, and their role in 
motivation see Mele (2003), Schueler (1995), and Schroeder (2010). 
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acts, and we will leave it as an innocent enough assumption, and will leave the 
burden of proof with any objector.56 
Desires have objects; they are for something, an end at which they aim.  This 
is how we identify desires, often using the locution ‘my desire for E’, where E is the 
end.  The ends at which desires aim can be internal to the agent, for example a 
desire to feel warm, and they can be external, for example a desire for a chocolate 
biscuit.  We sometimes express our desire to act a certain way, for example ‘I 
desire to go swimming’.  It may well be that we can redescribe these ends in terms 
that are internal to the agent, for example ‘I desire the experience of enjoying 
swimming’.  This need not concern us, because we are interested in what is 
common to all these: that they express an identifiable end.  Note that there is an 
end that is valued when an agent sees something as valuable, or that is evaluated as 
good if a moral (or aesthetic) assessment is made57.  So we are not losing generality 
by continuing our discussion in terms of desires.  Desires are features of agents, 
and if the agent is to be in control of their action then the desire that provides the 
motivation (or reason) to act in a certain way must have an end that the agent 
takes to be possibly achieved by the performance of that action.  This seems to be 
an obvious point; if it were not the case then we could have an agent’s thirst 
(desire for water) providing the motivation for them to give a lecture.  Which, in 
the absence of a convoluted chain of events involving the lecture causing someone 
to buy them a drink, would be absurd.  Such a disconnection between motivation 
and action may exist in cases where a psychiatric disorder persists, but this is what 
we would consider a breakdown of agency and control. 
We characterised an action as an agent doing something.  This ‘something’ 
that the agent does can be described in many ways.  For example the ‘jump into 
the water’ is something the agent does, but the same action could be re-described 
by citing the bodily movements involved, that the agent ‘rapidly extended their 
legs’.  But in each case there is at least one description that identifies an action by 
the end at which it can be said to aim.  An agent can act in such a way as to pick up 
a biscuit, to throw a ball, to hurt their enemy, to find the product of two numbers 
(both as a mental action, and externally, on paper), to try to score a goal, to duck 
under a sudden obstacle, to recoil from a blow, to verbally express their 
frustration, and to ignore the telephone.58  Notice that these are not all what we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Pink (1996) has a lengthy discussion of this issue, however he establishes the point 
through example and appeal to intuition, which will not add much to our present 
discussion, so readers who find this folk conception unintuitive may consult his examples. 
57 It may, of course, be the case that the ‘making of an assessment’ is not something that 
immediately precedes action or decision, nor is concurrent with it.  Such assessment may 
be long standing states the agent has established, conscious or not. 
58 I am not going to provide an argument that this is so, as it is a fairly orthodox proposal, 
see Davidson (1963) and Pink (1996). 
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might call intentional actions, and exhibit differing degrees of engagement with an 
agents rational faculties, some we can imagine as following careful deliberation, 
others are what we might think of as instinctive.  These ends are states of affairs, 
features of the world (which can include features of the agent), which the 
performance of the action makes obtain. 
Remember that we said that relevance was a matter of connecting agents and 
the world in the right way to make being a controlling source possible.  The end at 
which an action aims is a feature of the world, and looks to be the right sort of 
thing to be one of our relata.  However, this would not be quite right, for actions 
sometimes fail to produce the state of affairs they aim at.  In this case the end is 
not a feature of the world, it does not obtain, and in some cases cannot obtain.  
This would mean that failed actions did not actually aim at what we thought they 
did, and this is implausible.  Instead we mean that actions aim at something more 
like a state of affairs that an action can make possible, a possible state of affairs.  
But it is important that we keep the right sort of possibility in mind here.  If we 
mean that the feature of the world agents must possess a connection with to be a 
controlling source is what is metaphysically possible, then we limit agents to only 
be able to control their actions when they act in a way that has at least the 
possibility of success.  But this would be too strong a constraint.  Sometimes the 
reason that agents fail to produce the state of affairs they aimed at with their action 
is because they make a mistake, or are wrong about what is possible.  For example 
an agent could throw a ball out of the window, and the end at which their action 
aims is the ball’s sailing into the garden.  However, if the window is closed, then 
their action is doomed to fail to achieve its end.  Does this mean that we wrongly 
described the action?  Well we could re-describe the action as the agent trying to 
throw the ball out of the window, and in a way this would be right, it is something 
the agent tried to do.  But what was the end at which the agent’s action aimed?  
Were they aiming to try to throw the ball out of the window, or to actually throw 
the ball out of the window?  Although agents are certainly capable of the former, 
especially when they are unsure of their ability to succeed, it seems problematic to 
deny that an agent could accurately report the relevant features of their agential 
control as aiming to throw the ball out of the window. 
So what sort of possibility matters?  It seems that it is what is possible in the 
eyes of the agent that matters.  If the agent perceives, intuits or deduces that an 
end is possible, then they can aim at it by acting.  So it must be a state of affairs 
that the agent actually grasps as possible that is aimed at in controlled action.  By 
grasp I do not mean that they have to be consciously, or reflectively, aware of it.  It 
might be a matter of non-conscious perceptions and habits learned in similar 
circumstances that provide the agent with the relevant states that would constitute 
their possession of a non-conscious awareness of what state of affairs is possibly 
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obtainable.  For example drivers of cars seem to have an awareness of whether they 
can brake in time to avoid an obstacle, or need to swerve instead, though people 
utilise this capacity for grasping possibility with differing degrees of success of 
course.  Now, if an agent threw a ball with the aim of doing something that they 
thought was impossible to achieve by that action, like making it rain, then there 
would be something wrong with the connection between the agent, and the end at 
which their action aims.  An agent may be deluded, and think that they can make 
it rain by throwing balls.  But if they do not, then there is no state of the agent that 
could possibly be a motivator for that action, whose content had to do with the 
end ‘making it rain’.  There is no desire present to engage with the features of what 
the agent could take to be possible action. 
However, it is not only what an agent ‘thinks’ is possible that matters.  For 
example a blind person may claim that they are going to throw the ball out of a 
window.  But if they are in a room they have not been in before, and have no 
knowledge of where the windows are, or even if there are any, and possess no 
reason to think that a window is in a particular direction (like a gust of wind), then 
it would be strange to say they are in control.  They might hope to get the ball 
through a window, but in the absence of any reason to think there is a window 
where they aim to throw the ball (no matter how flawed or weak that reason may 
be) it does not seem possible for the agent to be in possession of the ingredients 
required to be in control of ‘throwing the ball through the window’ (note: not 
trying, hoping, etc.).  Our earlier discussion noted that agents should be sensitive 
to the world around them in order to be controlling sources.  So it is not only what 
an agent thinks (or other states relevant to awareness) about the world that 
matters.  It must be real states of affairs in the world that provide the agent with 
the reasons, or ingredients, they need to surmise, intuit, deduce, or perceive that 
there is an end at which they can aim.  The agent need not always be right about 
whether, given the metaphysical possibilities, their action will in fact achieve the 
end at which it aims, nor need it even be a high probability that the action will 
achieve its end.  But there must be some feature of the world, which supplies a 
reason for taking the action to be a means to its end.59  The agent must be sensitive 
enough to the world around them that they have a reason, a minimal one, no 
matter how weak, or how much it misses other relevant features a more perceptive 
agent would notice, which is the reason why their action is a means fitted to an 
end, given their circumstances.  These reasons are about connecting means and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 ‘Tryings’ are a strange group of actions, because we are not necessarily concerned with a 
need to succeed – we can try all sorts of things quite speculatively.  So the features of the 
world required to provide a reason to try something can be very minimal indeed, and are 
most likely to involve features of the agent (for example I could not try to throw a ball if I 
was paralysed). 
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ends by being aware of features of both, and having these features as practical 
justification for performance of the action. 
So, our condition of there being a relevant connection between an agent and 
the world in cases where the agent is a controlling source, can be spelled out as 
follows – the following conditions are all necessary for an agent to be a controlling 
source (along with the condition that an agent is the source, and it is not 
something that is happening to the agent): 
I. An agent must possess a desire (or other motivation contributing 
state), for a particular end, E. 
II. We must be able to describe the agent’s action in terms that identify 
it as aiming at this same end, E. 
III. The agent must be aware of some feature of the world that provides a 
reason for them to take their action as a means to possibly achieve 
this end, E.60 
 
Do agents need to be conscious of reasons? 
Now, all of this talk of means-end rationality, reasons and practical 
justification, may immediately worry us.  Does this mean that agents can only be 
controlling sources when they are consciously, or deliberatively, exercising their 
capacity for practical rationality?  We have already discussed some cases where we 
might resist saying this, like sudden braking in a car, so some further explanation 
is required.  Although agents do possess a capacity for conscious reflection on 
their motivations, aims and action in practical rationality, it is not the presence of 
this capacity in action production that I want to invoke.61  An agent may be in 
possession of the states necessary to satisfy condition III, without their being 
conscious of there being a reason that the means fits the end.  So the sense of ‘take’ 
I have in mind in III is not one of conscious reflection, or formation of a practical 
judgement.  It is instead a matter of the agent’s faculties operating in a way that 
means that those systems whose job it is to be sensitive to the world are providing 
reliable inputs to those systems that orchestrate an agent’s responses to the world.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 An objector may worry that this is too strong of a condition, and that we have not 
allowed for situations in which agents are mistaken about their awareness of features of the 
world (like in cases of optical illusion, and displaced agency awareness experiments).  
However, if an agent is mistaken about their awareness of every feature, in the case where 
this condition is not satisfied, then how could they be in control of how they interact with 
the world?  It would be like the blind man with no knowledge of the window.  The agent 
could be a source of their bodily movements, and could be in control of how they move 
their limbs (proprioception still functioning), but they could not be in control of and 
action whose end involved their limbs interacting with something in the world. 
61 For a contrary position, though aimed at a particularly rich idea of acting, see Hodgson 
(2012). 
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It so happens that most of the time we are interested in cases where agents do 
deliberate, and are perhaps consciously wrestling about which ends to pursue, 
especially when we are interested in free action, or morally responsible action.  But 
at the moment we are not limiting ourselves to either of these, only to what it is for 
an agent to act. 
An example may serve us as a good explanation by illustration.  Consider 
examples of blindsight.  In cases of blindsight agents are not consciously aware of 
any visual perception, as far as their conscious awareness goes their visual systems 
are inoperative – they are blind.  However the physiological breakdown in the 
chain from the eye to conscious awareness has occurred relatively late in the 
system, that is to say towards the awareness end of the chain.  The details of this 
are not important to us, so we can construct a simplification.  We will characterise 
the system as the eyes, which send a signal down the optic nerve to the visual 
cortex, where there are a number of non-conscious processes responsible for 
interpreting this data, and relating it to other features of the agent to facilitate 
motor control feedback, perceptual error correction feedback, and so on.  The 
agent is then able to access the interpretation and bring their conscious awareness 
to bear on it, and it is this last step that the agent with blindsight is unable to 
complete.  If such an agent is presented with a task of posting letters through a 
rectangular slot we see some strange results.  If we can secretly change the 
orientation of the slot, we find that agents possess the capacity to orient the letters 
so that they will fit through the slot.  They do not do this with flawless accuracy, 
but they do so with significantly greater success than trial and error, or luck, would 
explain.  The explanation is that the agent can initiate an action of putting the 
letter through the slot, but the details of this, in terms of the bodily movements 
required, are not all ones that the agent consciously presides over.  In a similar way 
a violinist is not conscious of all of the minute adjustments in their arm, shoulder 
and hand, which are required to produce a range of tones while bowing their 
instrument.  Many systems whose function is to coordinate the activity of agents 
given perceptual, proprioceptive, and other feedback, function at a non-conscious 
level.  We can imagine a particularly mean instance of the experiment where we 
shout at agents to pick up the letter and post it, having previously threatened them 
with an electric shock for failure.  Does such an agent satisfy our conditions for 
being a controlling source? 
I. The agent possesses a desire to ‘post the letter though the slot’; after 
all they do not want to be shocked. 
II. The agent’s action is their ‘posting the letter through the slot’, which 
aims at the same end as the desire. 
III. The feature of the world that is the orientation of the slot is 
something that the agent is aware of, and it is a reason why their non-
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conscious system that coordinates motor control with visual 
perception guides the orientation of their hand to be a means fitted to 
possibly achieving this end. 
So, the agent can be a controlling source of this posting of the letter, they are 
relevantly sensitive to the world and their place in it.  If the agent is the source of 
what happens, and is not passive, that is, we do not initiate the process by fitting 
electrodes to their brain, or a quantum interference device, then the posting of the 
letter is an action the agent performs.  It is something they do, and is under their 
control.  There are a range of other interesting agent involving occurrences, which 
qualify as actions.  Consider a reflex reaction like flinching when you see 
something approaching out of the corner of your eye (perhaps a blind man is 
throwing balls around again).  This involves non-conscious processes, as did 
blindsight.  However, it differs from the blindsight case because there is no 
conscious deliberation about whether to avoid the ball, whereas there probably 
was when the blindsight agent decided to avoid the electric shock, in other words, 
it is clearly not intentional.  The reflex action is more innate, and is not something 
over which we are able to exercise direct conscious control.62  However there is still 
an end at which the reflex aims, to avoid whatever is approaching, and there is 
some motivator in the agent of desiring to avoid being hit (though now our term 
desire may be inappropriate, but remember it is a placeholder for a range of 
states).  Moreover the agents non-conscious systems involving perception and 
motor-control are again active, and coordinated in a way that the perception of 
whatever is moving (the feature of the world) does supply the agent with a reason 
for what they do.  If someone was worried about categorising reflexes of this type 
as actions, then we could push that intuition by considering cases of overlearned 
motor control.  Some bodily movements, for example those necessary for playing a 
complex instrument like the piano, can, through sufficient repetition, become 
memorised as programs in our premotor cortex.  So when a musician sees the note 
on the page, and is engaged in playing the music, they do not consciously decide to 
play that note, and neither do they need to apply conscious guidance to the 
production of the note.  This case is not directly analogous to that of the reflex, but 
is closely related.  If the reflex is in no sense an action, then it is only a short slide 
to claim that the playing of the note on the piano is not either – both are similarly 
controlled, have the agent as the source, and do not involve conscious intention.  
Yet, the playing of a note does seem to be a clear case of action by the musician. 
There are whole ranges of instances of action with a similar structure.  There 
are the many types of reflex reaction, like recoiling from a blow, putting out your 
arms when you fall, and, plausibly, sneezing when you get dust up your nose.  
These are all things that agents do, and are controlling sources of as they interact 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Though there are some reflex reactions we can resist, even if not initiate or control. 
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with their environment – they are actions.  This could be of importance.  Suppose 
that a, rather simple, theory of responsibility held that we are culpable for any 
action we perform, in this case we would be culpable for spilling a drink on 
someone because we flinched after seeing something flying across the room.  I am 
not sure many people would be persuaded that this would be an appropriate 
ascription of culpability, and there may well be further conditions on moral 
responsibility.  But it is these actions on the edge of agency, where there is a 
minimal degree of control, that can test other theories in which actions feature.  
Now, there are some reflex reactions that do not exhibit the qualities required to 
be actions.  Consider the knee-jerk reaction.  The agent is sensitive to their 
environment, after all knees do not jerk upon the sun shining on them, but only in 
specific circumstances.  However there is no end at which the knee jerk aims, and 
it does not engage any desire for an end that motivates the jerk.  A knee jerk is 
something that happens to the agent when struck on the kneecap, it is not 
something the agent does, and it is not an action.  Very plausibly the agent is not 
the source of what happens, so this could fail on this count as well.  We began this 
chapter by mentioning the case of a sudden muscle twitch caused by an 
unpredictable neural event in an agent, causing them to fall into the water.  In 
such a case the twitch does not aim at entering the water, and neither does the 
neural event aim at any end.  It should now be clear that the case is not one in 
which the agent acts, in fact it would be a situation in which an agent has lost 
control, analogous to someone’s suffering an epileptic seizure. 
There are some things that agents do seem clearly to be the source of, which 
fail for similar reasons.  For example an agent may nervously tap their foot while 
working.  This does not seem to be something that happens to the agent in the 
same way that a knee-jerk does.  It is a bodily movement generated by the agent.  
However, it is not something that aims at any identifiable end, nor is it motivated 
by a desire for any end.63  Tapping a foot along to a piece of music may well be 
different, for the agent may be expressing their enjoyment, or helping themselves 
to concentrate on the music.  It is difficult in some cases to decide whether the 
conditions are satisfied or not, and it may be that cognitive scientists can help the 
armchair philosopher by identifying candidates for systems or states that can 
satisfy these roles.  But, whatever the difficulty in identifying actions, in short, 
there are some things that agents are the source of, which are not actions.  
Therefore a theory of action that relies only on sourcehood simpliciter, without 
these additional conditions, will mis-ascribe agency in some cases.  So as we 
consider in what ways human agency can be interfered with, or influenced, we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 I have heard it said that such foot-tappings, and leg-jigglings, might be non-conscious 
expressions of some state of the agent.  I am not sure about this, but even if it is possible for 
this to occur, I ask the reader to imagine a case that is lacking this further feature. 
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need to consider whether these conditions are maintained.  Remember that these 
are not conditions for free action, intentional action, or any other sub-classes of 
action.  We are interested in these other aspect of agency, but the most basic aspect 
of agency is the power to do things – to act.  So we must be clear on this at the 
outset. 
 
Controlling sources in paradigm cases of action 
We should say something about how these conditions relate to cases in which 
the agent is more clearly performing an action, like when an agent intentionally 
pushes a button to detonate an explosive, kicks a ball towards a goal, decides to 
marry their girlfriend, or prays for God to do something.  These are examples of 
actions that we might describe as significant, to varying degrees.  Although it is 
easier to see how the conditions can be met in such cases, it is important that we 
are clear on how they are, since it is significant actions with which we are 
primarily concerned.  If heavenly freedom consisted in the ability to sneeze and 
flinch (supposing, rather implausibly, that such actions turned out to be free) then 
it would be difficult to see how that would constitute a great good, sufficient to 
justify the evil in the universe.  Consider the agent who pushes a button to 
detonate an explosive.  This could be a case where a building is being demolished.  
The agent desires to press the button, after all it is their job to demolish this 
building by detonating the explosive, and we have already described the action as 
aiming at the same end.  As long as the agent is aware of some feature of the world 
giving them reason to take their pushing of the button as a likely means to 
succeed, for example, they ran the fuses and set up the firing apparatus, then this is 
a fairly uncontentious case of action.  But it is illuminating to consider features 
that might make us think twice about whether the agent could be a controlling 
source.  If the agent was a passer by, who intensely disliked people who live in the 
building and wished it would blow up, and happened to see a button nearby which 
they pressed with the aim of so doing, then they would fail to possess any 
justification for believing that their pressing the button would achieve that end.  
They can be in control of pressing the button in the hope that it will blow up the 
building, but not of ‘pressing the button to detonate the explosive’. 
This might appear obvious, but it has application: what would we say if it just 
so happened that the building had been rigged with explosives for demolition, and 
the workers were showing residents round for a last goodbye (health and safety is 
fairly lax at the site) before clearing the building to demolish it.  We have 
mentioned a simple theory of responsibility where agents are culpable for actions 
they perform.  This agent did not perform the action of blowing up the building, 
so would not be culpable of wilfully blowing up people they hate.  Not because 
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they lacked the intention – this they possessed, although were deluded about their 
circumstances.  They fail because they were not in control, and did not perform 
the action.  Some theorists focus on intention in culpability ascription, and the 
agent may well be blamed for having an ‘evil thought/intention’, however they did 
not act on this thought, because this was not the action they performed.  What we 
should make of this is best left to a discussion of responsibility, which we will not 
begin here, but it does highlight the importance of clarity on these points. 
In an alternative case the agent may have been a local official, tasked with 
pressing the button at a public demolition ceremony.  However, there may be 
reasons that the agent is against the demolition of the building.  They may 
consider it to have architectural value, or have a sentimental attachment to it, and 
dislike the proposed development that will replace it.  Nevertheless, if they have 
decided to press the button because, having examined themselves, and wrestled 
with what to do, they feel that they have some small sense of duty to their office, 
then the desire that aims at the relevant end is present.  I mention this case because 
it demonstrates a case where we might plausibly think that any state that could 
motivate the agent to perform the action would be swamped by the motivation not 
to (we have to imagine that the agent really liked the building).  Although we 
might judge the agent to be acting against their interests, the agent does not 
thereby lose their ability to be a controlling source.  The experience of the agent, 
who may hate what they do in this case, is not positive at all.  And the placeholder 
term desire may seem out of place, because almost every fibre of their being cries 
out ‘no’ – but note it cannot be every part of the agent, some part must provide the 
agent with a reason to press the button.  The case is interesting because the agent 
would be considered to be acting out of character, and we might not say that their 
action reflects them.  Sometimes philosophers talk about actions, or free actions, 
having a condition of expressing the character of the agent.  So this demonstrates 
that care will be needed on this point.  Consider an agent who succumbs to the 
weak temptation to press the button out of curiosity about how big the bang will 
be.  They would more clearly be acting out of character.  But remember that we 
can distinguish agential control, from normative rational control.  Although the 
action does not express the character of the agent, or is not expressive of the agent 
all things considered, it is expressive of some part of the agent.  If an event 
involving the agent expressed no part of the agent’s character (taken to encompass 
his virtues and vices, conceptions of the good, ends he values, reasons etc.) then 
the agent could not have been a source, and hence could not have acted. 
The case of an agent scoring a goal is often taken to present a difficulty when 
we consider the control that agents can exhibit, thanks to Austin’s excellent paper, 
Ifs and cans (1956) on what an agent ‘can’ do.  I have deliberately avoided this 
locution.  If an agent kicks a ball towards a goal then kicking the ball towards the 
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goal is an end at which their action can aim, an end that the agent desires, and one 
that the agent can have good reason to consider achievable by their bodily 
movements given their sensitivity to their circumstances.  But what about the end 
of scoring a goal, is scoring the goal something that the agent has control over, is it 
something they can do?  Considering control in terms of whether the agent can 
bring about a certain end becomes confusing.  After all, the goalkeeper may stop 
the ball, or the agent may just miss since they are fallible in their exercise of the 
skill of ball kicking.  However, given our criteria scoring a goal is a desirable end at 
which the agent’s action aims, and one that the agents sensitivity to features of the 
ball, his body, to goal, etc. provides them with a reason to take what they do as a 
means that will possibly achieve this end.  So the agent’s action of scoring a goal 
fits the criteria.  This is because we have not included anywhere a criterion of 
success.  Although there is a sense in which we are interested in whether agents 
have the control to successfully implement a plan, such a scoring a goal (or holing 
a putt), this sort of control considers the skill of an agent, and the probabilities of 
various interactions with the world being successful given the skills, abilities and 
capacities of the agent.  But the level of skill-control an agent possesses is not the 
same as whether an agent is exercising agential control – and the two need to be 
kept distinct.  Agents are not always successful in completion of their actions 
because they are not the only influence over the way the world evolves. 
Some have sought to analyse this problem in terms of agents being able to 
always perform basic actions, ones that are immune from defeasibility, or are 
internal to the agent, such as mental actions, or basic bodily movements.64  I am 
not going to endorse this distinction, but neither am I going to deny that it may be 
a useful one.65  For our purposes it is enough to understand when agents act, and 
act freely, without having criteria for when agents are in control of the obtaining 
of certain ends, that is, how much control agents exhibit not over their actions, but 
over the world.  To see why consider a case where a heavenly agent acts with the 
aim of successfully bringing about some sinful state of affairs.  Were God, angels 
or anything else to intervene (consciously, or even accidentally), then there would 
still remain a description of the action under which the agent would be sinful – 
that of attempting to bring about such a state of affairs, or that of performing some 
action with the intention of bringing about sin.  If God is going to secure heavenly 
sinlessness, he cannot do so by saving metaphorical attempts at the goal of sin. 
We should also note that some actions do not affect the world external to the 
agent, but affect that part of the world that constitutes the agent.  We do not need 
a taxonomy of mental actions, but ends such as finding the product of two 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 See Hornsby (2004) for a discussion of bodily movements especially. 
65 Basic actions, as a primitive beginning to what agents do, is introduced by Danto (1965), 
and developed by (among others) Stoutland (1968) 
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numbers, forming an intention to telephone friend (which seems to be a persisting 
state of an agent), trying to remember what happened yesterday, and so on, are 
typical of the sorts of ends agents can do something about by acting.  Agents do 
not aim at the movement of their bodies in order to perform these actions, though 
(unless one is a Cartesian dualist of some sort) the performance of such mental 
actions will have an effect on the bodies of agents, in the fine details of their 
neurophysiology.  Agents do not try to change their physical state, or aim at 
producing these changes in their action.  Agents do not have the requisite faculties 
for sensitivity to their brain states that they would need to be aware of features of 
the world necessary for having a reason to take any attempted action as likely to 
produce the desired neurophysiological effect.  So such ends cannot be ones agents 
aim at in action, as they fail criterion III.  This points to a non-reducibility of the 
description of mental actions, to neurophysiological processes.  It may be that the 
same is true of other actions, and perhaps the intentionality of throwing a ball is 
likewise non-reducible.  There is also a difficult question regarding which ends 
agents can aim at concerning their own bodies.  Plausibly an agent can aim at 
contracting some of their muscles, but cannot aim at the firing of a motor neuron.  
However such question, while noteworthy, and tangential to our concerns, and 
thankfully we do not need to worry about such distinctions. 
One further concern about our criteria is that agents sometimes report that 
they do something ‘for no reason’, which might seem to be a problem as prima 
facie this could be taken as reporting that there is no end the agent desires, and 
thus no reason which could possibly be provided as to why they take their action 
as a practically justified means.  Pink (1996) considers the case of somebody who 
while out walking, sits on a park bench, enjoying a rest, who then spontaneously 
gets up and continues walking.  Is their getting up from the bench an action?  
Intuitively it seems like we should say that this is an action the agent performs.  
First of all we should be careful about how we understand the claim of doing 
something for no reason.66  Often agents report this and mean by it that they are 
not performing an action as a means towards some further end – in other words 
the action is not part of a plan.67  For example, I may throw a stone into a stream, 
and when asked why, say that I was trying to hit a stump of wood protruding from 
the water.  In this case my throwing of the stone is something that is part of a plan 
to amuse myself by attempting to hit the stump.  However I could have said for no 
reason, meaning that there was no objective I hoped to achieve by throwing the 
stones, I was just doing it absentmindedly, perhaps while thinking about 
something entirely unrelated. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 See also Hursthouse (1991) on how reasons can play a role in these types of action. 
67 See Bratman (1987) for more on the role of plans in practical reasoning and guiding of 
agency. 
	   43 
In the case of getting up from the bench, that action is spontaneous, and we 
can imagine that the agent could just as well have risen five minutes earlier or 
later.  Furthermore that doesn’t seem to be anything that explains why the agent 
rose when they did, since nothing significant had changed (we can stipulate that 
this is the case).68  The agent did not suddenly notice the time, or feel rain starting 
to fall.  But it is still the case that the agent did have an end at which they aimed – 
they aimed at standing up.  Some actions are reflexive, and are best described as 
aiming at their own performance.  Such actions may be rare, and relatively 
uninteresting, but are an important class of actions as they characterise an agent’s 
capacity for spontaneity.  The agent who rises from the bench in order to stand up 
can also possess a reason, or motivation for standing up (the same end).  They may 
have suddenly felt like doing so, or have impulsively decided that it would be a 
good idea to do so although not for some further end, like stretching their legs.  
Furthermore the agent is aware of the relevant features of the world, the position 
of their body, that they are sat down, the bodily movements required to stand up, 
and so on, and these features give the agent a reason to do what they do in order to 
achieve their end of standing up.  The description of the case demonstrates just 
how minimal the conditions on performance of an action are.  It is a reminder 
that, although we are often interested in examples of action that have other 
features, we have only analysed what it is for an agent to act.  We have not said 
anything about the varieties of action, intentional, premeditated, etc., nor about 
the means by which agents may guide their agency and self, such as decisions, 
plans, practical reasoning, intentions, deliberation and so on.  If an agent really did 
stand up, but had no part of their psychology engaged in awareness of their sitting 
on a bench, nor of any feeling, desire, reason, decision, inclination, or any other 
possible motivational state related to standing up, then standing up would not 
have been an action the agent performed.  The agent’s faculties that are pertinent 
to controlling their agency are absent the description, and even if the source of the 
standing were within the agent, it would not qualify as an action.  It would be 
something that happens to the agent, like the twitch caused by a neural anomaly 
discussed earlier. 
 
Agents, sourcehood and sufficient conditions 
We began our discussion by noting a distinction between an agent being 
active as a source, and being passive, and only instrumental in the production of 
some effect or event involving them.  We rejected the idea that we could just 
identify when the agent was the source by identifying when the agent was the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 This raises the issue of action explanation, one that we will examine in detail later, but 
for now we are just trying to characterise the scenario. 
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sufficient condition simpliciter because it is not only being a source that is relevant 
to action, it is being a controlling source, and we have discussed, at length, what 
this consists in.  However we also noted that there are cases where identifying the 
sufficient condition is difficult, and we must now expand on this.  Consider a case 
where an agent has a firmly established habit, such as stepping back from the edge 
of the road when hearing a car approaching.69  Our agent has developed an 
ingrained reaction to these circumstances and ‘automatically’ steps back when this 
happens.70  Given this description of the situation, it is plausibly correct to say that 
the approach of a car is the sufficient condition for the agent’s action of stepping 
back.  Nothing else needed to be added to the situation for the stepping back to 
occur.  We can think of the sufficient condition as the trigger that eventuated what 
followed, in the case the approach of the car. Contrariwise, if the agent had not 
been in the habit of doing this, perhaps having never seen a car before, and they 
consciously deliberated about what to do, eventually deciding to step back, then it 
may be more appropriate to say that the agent was the trigger for what occurred, it 
is more clear that the agent settles what happens.71 
It appears that if sourcehood has to do with sufficient conditions, then in 
such a case the agent is not the source.  The agent is still relevant to what happens, 
because if the agent had not been structured in a particular way then they would 
not have reacted as they did.  Of course, in some situations we would say that had 
the agent not chosen as they did then what happened would have been different.  
When agents choose, in the sense that they exercise something like a two-way 
power, then the issue of identifying the source is intuitively easier to determine, a 
choice is in this sense a paradigm trigger.  If choice is a two-way power then there 
are no sufficient conditions for either option (supposing a choice to be between 
two options), only for the possibility of the agent exercising a choice between 
them.  We will discuss this in detail later when we consider free actions, however 
in the habit scenario, the agent does not choose, so these types of scenario 
constitute the more difficult case that might be thought a counterexample to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 It is an interesting to consider which actions can be habitual, for example there may be 
very complex actions that are habitual in sport.  In cases of psychiatric disorder such as 
kleptomania, there are interesting questions about the control agents have and whether 
they are caused to perform certain acts by events that happen to the agent.  However a 
review of how control is affected by cases of disorder, how actions become habitual, and 
the mechanisms of habitual action is beyond the scope of this discussion.  I do not believe 
that any of these cases present counter-examples to the material points of our discussion, 
but I will not argue that here. 
70 Pollard (2003, 2006 & 2010) discusses habits in the philosophy of action, noting that they 
do not fit well under a Davidsonian reason based scheme.  We do not have space to 
consider the relationship between habits and reasons here, but our discussion may point 
the way forward for developing this. 
71See Steward (2012) for a full discussion of the idea of agency as the power to settle what 
happens.  I will not relate and critique her position, but settling is a useful an intuitive 
notion we can make use of nonetheless. 
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sourcehood being a condition of agency.  Now, although the agent is not the 
trigger for the event of their stepping back, they are still relevant to what happens.  
Although the agent is not the source (in the trigger sense) of it being the case that 
the event of their stepping back occurred, they are the source of how they respond, 
and what occurs.72  The car’s approaching is external to the agent, and is the 
trigger of the event of the action’s occurring, but what action occurs, that is, how 
the agent responds sensitively to their environment, is determined by the agent.  
The agent settles what happens, and it is not settled for them.  What we are 
distinguishing is the sufficient condition for the event of the agent so acting, and 
the sufficient condition for the agent’s action.73  When an agent is active, rather 
than passive, and performs an action, then the agent may not be the source of  ‘the 
event of an action being performed’, but they are the source of ‘which action they 
perform’. 
In the case of stepping back from the kerb the agent is active rather than 
passive because is it something about the agent that makes a difference to what 
occurs.  But it is not making any old difference that will do here.  Think back to 
our earlier example of the gust of wind blowing an agent into the sea.  We noted 
that in this case the agent was passive regarding their falling into the sea – they 
were not a source of their falling into the sea.  It is tempting to say that there was 
nothing about the agent that made a difference to what happened.  But this is not 
true.  In a counterfactual sense, if the agent had a different mass or shape, then the 
outcome could have been different.  We could try noting that there was nothing 
that the agent could do (as an exercise of agency) to make a difference.  But this 
would also be false as the agent could have knelt down or otherwise altered their 
surface area, even in complete ignorance of the threat of the wind interacting with 
them, and could have unknowingly prevented what happened.  The agent could 
do these things and remain passive regarding their falling, or not, into the sea.  
The difference between the two cases can be drawn out be expanding on the 
observation that it is how the agent is structured that makes a difference to what 
occurs.  In the case where the agent falls into the sea it is structural elements of the 
agent like mass, shape and so on that make a difference.  However in the case of 
stepping back from the kerb it is those structural details of how the agent is 
constituted as a controller, their capacity to be sensitive to relevant features of 
their environment, to possess ends, motivation, and the capacity to direct matter 
in relation to those ends.  So, if the source of how the agent responds is the agent’s 
faculties that constitute their being able to control their responses, then the agent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Steward (1997) has some helpful observations on the pitfalls here. 
73 See Sandis 2012a and 2012b for more on the importance of this distinction. 
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is the source in the relevant sense.74  Furthermore, if they exercise those faculties, 
or capacities, in the right way, as we have discussed, then what the agent does is an 
action. 
 
Agents, manipulation and failure of agency 
We can clarify these conditions by considering some cases in which an agent-
involving event occurs, but where it is unclear whether an action is not performed 
because of some interaction, intervention or manipulation.  This is especially 
pertinent to this project, as we are interested in cases where agency is destroyed, 
though when ‘free’ agency is destroyed will have to await further discussion.  As 
well as intervention by other agents, we should also note cases where such 
interaction is non-personal, and involves only natural physical processes.75 
The most obvious case of a loss of agency is the remote-controlled agent.  If 
we imagine a series of neural implants that allow us to hijack the agent’s motor 
control systems, then the agent would become effectively a puppet on a string.  By 
hijacking only the motor control systems we can imagine, however implausible the 
reality of it may seem, that the agent is aware of what is happening, and may well 
look on what their body is doing in horror.  They are disengaged from the 
production of the action, probably horrified at their inability to regain control.  
The sourcehood condition is clearly broken; it is a situation that is effectively a 
sophisticated case of me moving the agent’s arm by tying a string to it and then 
pulling on the string.  In a slightly different case we could imagine some 
counterfactually sensitive neural devices, such that the hijacker controls the agent’s 
body, but should the agent try to regain control, or exert themselves to stop or 
change the action, the devices will terminate their influence and the agent will be 
able to do as they please.  This is a twist on well-known counterfactual intervener 
cases.  Now, should the agent remain in the control of the hijacker because they 
omit to exert themselves in regaining control, then this would not make the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Note that this is a condition on action, not free action.  There are some cases where 
libertarians will be concerned that the agent may not be ultimately responsible for the way 
they are constituted to respond, such as responses that are genetically hardwired like the 
response of a newborn to ‘walk’ when held standing on a surface (although newborns may 
not be the best place to look for cases of agency).  These are cases like the habit case, but 
where the agent never exercised any choice about the development of the habit.  In due 
course we will discuss whether agents who are hardwired to respond in a certain way could 
be considered freely acting.  For now, since it is a point of likely confusion, it is worth 
pointing out that even if they are not, this does not mean that they are not still acting, and 
on this account, they could be.  Therefore nothing we have said so far commits us to any 
form of sourcehood incompatibilism, in contrast with other accounts of action that also 
focus on the power to settle, such as Steward’s (2012). 
75 Especially as some have charged various positions in the free will literature of unduly 
anthropomorphizing natural influences over agents. 
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movement of their body any more of an action, it would still fail for the same 
reasons as before.  Even if the agent was not observing in horror, but was pleased 
to see something being done which they had never had the courage to do, the 
occurrence would remain a non-action for the agent.  The closest a natural 
phenomenon may come to breaking the criteria for action in a similar way is 
something like electrocution.  The source is external to the agent, and causes 
muscles to contract, and the agent’s body to move, without engaging any of the 
agent’s faculties for control, often bypassing the central nervous system and 
directly causing muscle contraction by exciting proximate motor neurons.76 
Another case where control is influenced is coercion, such as when an agent 
has a gun held to their head, and is told to do something, such as handing over 
their money.77  Now prior to being threatened we can assume that the agent had 
no desire to hand over their money, but agents need a desire for the end at which 
their action aims in order to perform an action.78  However, once threatened the 
agent soon finds that they have reason to hand over the money, and a strong desire 
to do so.  It may well be a desire they wish they did not have – to be more precise 
they are probably glad that they have the desire, otherwise they would be unmoved 
by the threat, and probably shot, what we mean is that they wish they were not put 
in a situation of having to act on a desire like this.  So agents under coercion fulfil 
all the criteria for action, they possess a desire to hand over the money, which is an 
apt description of the end at which their action aims, and an end which engages 
their sensitivity to their environment.  Some analyses of the agent’s motivational 
state may worry that the agent’s desire is really that they not be shot.  However we 
are not interested in which desire is strongest, or the agent cares about most.  It 
may be true that the agent desires to avoid being shot, but this entails a further 
desire to hand over the money, one that the agent would be impotent to secure 
their safety without. 
There are natural circumstances that agents may find themselves in that are 
analogous to coercion.  For example a volcano may be about to erupt on the agent, 
‘forcing’ them to run away.  The agent is, of course, not really forced (as the sad 
cases of the incautious and overly inquisitive attest to), but is provided with strong 
reasons, and strong motivation, to run away.  If the agent acts in the gun case, 
there does not seem to be any relevant difference to the volcano case, therefore 
they act there too.  There are less extreme cases, such as a mother who discovers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76  Readers familiar with alien-hand syndrome may want to think about this as an 
interesting special case.  Although the agent’s consciousness is disengaged with the 
movements of the alien hand, it is still the case that these movements are controlled, and 
have the agent as their source.  So alien hand movements may indeed be actions, though 
perhaps not free ones, nor ones for which agents are responsible. 
77 Kane (1998: 64) calls this constraining control. 
78 Or other motivating state, desire is still a placeholder term. 
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that her children are trapped in the burning building, and runs in to save them.  
Here the desire to run into the building is something that the mother, as is 
normally supposed in such examples, is unable to escape due to the strength of her 
maternal instinct.  But no matter the reason for her desire, the key is that she 
possesses it, and acts towards the same end in a way that satisfies the criteria.  It is 
worth noting that we can continue to cite examples, each less extreme than the 
last, from Luther’s “here I stand, I can do no other” all the way to the addict, and 
even beyond to the person with a penchant for chocolate cake.  It is equally true to 
say of all of them, that they are performers of actions, as long as each case does not 
fall foul of the criteria through any strange details like suffering from an abnormal 
delusion.  We should also note that the influence over the agent need not be as 
sudden, or proximate as pointing a gun, the influences of an agent’s motivation 
and reasons may be slow and gradual.  While these issues may have a bearing on 
questions of the extent of moral culpability, or of whether agents could be 
reasonable expected to make other choices, they have no bearing on whether the 
agent is performing an action or not. 
Another way an agent could be ‘forced’ to do something would be through 
manipulation of their desires.79  Desires could be implanted through neurophysical 
manipulation, or by hypnosis.  A less extreme example would be the manipulation 
of an agents desires by behaviour modification through positive reinforcement.  In 
this scenario we have a covert plan to reward an agent with the aim of establishing 
a desire to perform a certain action towards a given end, or as an end in itself.  
Now the agent may have some other desire to perform the action at the beginning 
of this process, because they may aim at a different end.  For example an agent 
may eat healthy food because they will be fined for eating unhealthy options, but 
through behaviour modification may come to desire the healthy food because they 
prefer its taste, or find they have a craving for fruit rather than cream buns.  In the 
case of an improved diet we may be untroubled by the prospect of manipulation, 
but it is not significantly different from cases where agents may be manipulated to 
perform actions that we might worry about, such as giving money to somebody, or 
being drawn into a sexual relationship.  Suppose an agent has been manipulated to 
give money to somebody.  They do still possess a desire relevant to satisfying the 
criteria, such as a desire to give money to Bill, and their action aims to secure this 
same end, and we can assume that the agent is sensitive to Bill and the relevant 
features of money giving.  So even though the agent was manipulated they still 
perform an action, though, once again, we might raise questions about whether 
such an action is free. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 These cases are similar to Kane’s cases of non-constraining, and covert non-constraining 
control. 
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It is interesting to now consider a case where the agent is manipulated by a 
more direct implantation of a desire, such as through hypnotic suggestion.  Cases 
involving hypnosis are complex, as they can involve more than implanting a 
desire.  It may be more correct to say that desires are adjusted rather than 
implanted, but we could imagine a case involving a malignant neurosurgeon who 
really can implant desires.  In such a case, as long as the agent really does possess 
the desire, then they would still be acting.  I add the caveat ‘really does’, because 
there may be cases of manipulation that make it appear that the agent has a desire, 
when really they only appear to because their behaviour does not stem from any 
motivational state but is sophisticated neurophysiological manipulation like the 
remote controlled agent case – so it may be difficult to assess whether agents have 
the desire.  If a desire is suddenly implanted it would need to be accessible to the 
agent’s faculties of control, that is, they would need to be able to have the desire 
play a role in their practical reasoning, or to aim at the end the desire is for.  Such 
radical manipulation could involve a large-scale reformulation of the agent’s 
states, as many desires could be altered.  But even in this case, though the agent 
may have been changed beyond recognition, they still perform actions.  
Manipulation calls to mind control by another agent, but again, such changes in 
agents could be brought about by natural, non-personal means, such as agents 
who experience a severe alteration of personality, tastes and so on, after 
experiencing severe brain trauma. 
In other cases of manipulation by hypnosis the behaviour of the agent is 
altered in a different way.  For example the agent may believe that they are holding 
an apple, which is good to eat, rather than a raw onion, which is not.  In this case 
the agent’s desires have not been altered, but their ability to be sensitive to their 
environment has.  They lack the ability to perceive their environment rightly, and 
therefore cannot be aware of a feature of the environment relevant to their 
possibly achieving the end they aim at.  So in this case the agent is moving their 
body, but not performing an action, at least not the action of eating an apple, or 
even of satisfying their hunger.  Agents suffering from a perceptual breakdown fail 
to satisfy criterion III.  So if it were possible to hypnotise an agent into thinking 
that they were preparing vegetables, when in fact they were murdering Jones, then 
being able to determine that the cutting of Jones is not even an action the agent 
performed would be very useful for determining the ascription of culpability.  It 
would also, presumably, be a comfort to the agent to know that they need not 
suffer by thinking that they did something terrible, even if manipulated to do so, 
but instead that the terrible thing was not even something they did.80  It is not the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 This presumes quite a lot about the connection to responsibility, which I do not want to 
be drawn into – the case is just interesting in this regard, even if someone claimed 
something different about responsibility. 
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presence of a personal intervener, the hypnotist, that determines that the agent did 
not perform an action.  There are cases where there is a perceptual breakdown for 
natural reasons, for example an agent may be suffering from a naturally occurring 
hallucination, perhaps that Jones is a pumpkin, meaning that there is a breakdown 
in their ability to be aware of features of their environment that could provide any 
reasons for taking their action as a possible means to an end.  This is interesting 
because cases of delusion and hallucination do not involve only a breakdown of 
agents to orient their actions, but furthermore to even perform an action. 
Perceptual breakdown cases are not always easy to resolve however.  Consider 
the case of Ken Parks, who one night got up, got into his car, drove across town, 
stopping for red lights, and avoiding obstacles, entered the house of his relatives 
and stabbed two people before returning to his car, putting the bloodied knife on 
the back seat, and driving away.  Ken Parks, though, was asleep, and all that 
occurred was a case of extended global automatism (essentially complex activity 
while sleep walking).81  Since the agent was not conscious, we might think that 
they were not able to be perceptually aware.  However, he did manage to stop for 
red light, avoid obstacles, use doors, pick up a knife by its handle, and so on.  So at 
a non-conscious level he was aware of features of his surroundings.  What is less 
clear is that Ken possessed any desire for anything that would be a candidate for 
an end at which his ‘actions’ aimed.  Whatever motivational states were possessed 
by Ken, they did not involve stabbing his relatives, who he liked and got on well 
with, and it is speculated that he had a non-conscious ‘repel-threat’ response when 
interrupted during his sleepwalk, though what got him to the house in the first 
case is unclear.  The point is that above the suspicion that Ken did not perform an 
action of stabbing, murdering etc., because he lacked the relevant desire, there is 
also a worry about a breakdown of criterion III again.  Although Ken was aware, 
albeit non-consciously, of some features of his environment, he seemed to be 
unable to be aware of some of the features that would have been pertinent to an 
action described with a specific end in mind.  For example he may have had a non-
conscious motivation to repel an attack, or threat, but he lacked the requisite 
awareness to provide himself with a reason that he was under attack.  The case of 
Ken Parks is unusually complex, and without a thorough examination of the 
relevant psychological and neurophysiological issues, we cannot rule definitively 
on it. 
A related example is that of an agent who jumps up and runs across the desert 
because they think that they see water – but, of course, there is no water, and they 
have only seen a mirage.  In this case the agent has a perceptual experience, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Levy (2014) has a thorough examination of the Ken Parks case.  For those who can’t bear 
the suspense, he was acquitted. 
	   51 
they interpret as the presence of water.  They are wrong though, so does this mean 
that they are not aware of any feature that would give them reason to take their 
actions as a possible means to fulfil the end, which we can take to be satisfying 
their thirst – is criterion III broken again?  Well, even though the agent is wrong, 
they are aware of a feature of their environment which is relevant to whether their 
action would possibly achieve their end.  They see the refracted light, and this light 
gives them reason to investigate.  If they saw a heap of dry bones on a dune, and 
ran towards those with the same end, then we would quickly worry about the 
agent’s sanity.  However, even though the agent is wrong about the presence of 
water, it does seem that they possess a justification for what they do, a justification, 
or reason, that is grounded in their awareness of the reflection they see.  Therefore 
criterion III is not broken, and the agent does perform an action (which I hope we 
intuitively thought anyway).  The case is important because it highlights that the 
awareness and reasons agents need to possess to be performing actions are 
defeasible – agents can be wrong.  However in cases where the agent cannot be 
aware of features of the world, such as when experiencing a hallucination, they are 
not only wrong about whether Jones is a pumpkin, they are not aware of any 
feature of the world, they only think that they are.  So it is not only a question of 
whether agents take themselves to be aware of something, but whether there 
actually exists some connection between the agent’s faculties and the way the 
world actually is.  In the case of hallucination, this connection does not obtain, in 
the case of a mirage it does. 
Criterion III could also be broken by a breakdown of the agent’s capacity for 
practical rationality.  An agent could have a perspicuous awareness of their 
environment, but if they lack the ability to relate ends to possible means then they 
would not be able to take a feature of their environment to provide a reason to 
take their action as possibly achieving their end.  Cases like this seem to be quite 
rare, especially since agents can be very bad at practical reasoning, exercising very 
poor judgement about how possible means connect to ends, but are still acting as 
long as the connection they take themselves to make is grounded in some feature 
that they are aware of.  However, it does seem conceivable that a hypnotist could 
suggest to an agent that a suitably disconnected (not just poorly connected, for 
then there could be a reason to so act, albeit a bad one) pair of means and end, are 
in fact connected, for example that throwing books out of the window is a means 
to reading them.  I do not think that we would consider agent under such 
conditions to be performing the action of reading a book.  If we replace the 
hypnotist with a naturally occurring neural disorder, the same analysis applies. 
Some of the most notorious manipulation cases are Frankfurt style cases, 
though they are normally examined in terms of whether the agent is free, or could 
have done otherwise (questions we will turn to in due course).  The normal 
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protagonists are Jones and Black.  Black wants to ensure that Jones performs a 
certain action, for example shooting Smith, but is prepared to see if Jones will do 
so on his own.  If Jones decides to pull the trigger on his own, then Black merely 
watches events unfolding.  However, should Jones decide not to, then Black acts as 
a counterfactual intervener in some way to ensure that Jones pulls the trigger.  
There are a multitude of such cases detailing different ways in which Black might 
be able to assess whether Jones has, or will, decide not to pull the trigger, and also 
a multitude of ways in which Black can interfere with Jones to ensure the pulling 
of the trigger.  Let us consider a case where Jones is looking down the gun, and has 
a five second opportunity to fire the gun to kill Smith, who is passing by, so Jones 
will either decide to fire the gun and pull the trigger, or will omit to do anything 
and the window of opportunity will pass.  Black has implanted a device in Jones’ 
brain so that Black can tell whether Jones is initiating decision-to-fire activity that 
will cause the pulling of the trigger.  If Black does not detect any activity then he 
will, at the last nanosecond when it is now too late for Jones’ initiation of motor 
activity to cause the trigger to be pulled in time, activate a second implanted device 
that causes a signal to be sent from the motor cortex to the muscles involved in 
pulling the trigger, thus securing the shooting of Smith.  (In some variants of cases 
like this Black does not need to activate the device, since it is set to activate at a 
certain time, or in a certain situation, unless Jones acts first, cases like this will 
follow a similar analysis.)  In a case like this Jones is not the source of the pulling 
of the trigger since his faculties of control are disengaged from the event of the 
activation of the second device.  Jones’ desires do not play a part in bringing about 
the action, the output of his motor control systems are influenced in a way that 
effectively rules out their contribution.  Therefore in Frankfurt-style cases such as 
this Jones does not even perform an action when the counterfactual intervener is 
activated, let alone do so freely or responsibly. 
However, not all Frankfurt cases involve the same overruling of the agent’s 
faculties of control.  We can imagine a similar scenario where the second device 
leaves the agent’s faculties for control intact, and connected to the production of 
the eventual pulling of the trigger in the same way they would be if no intervention 
had occurred.  This could be achieved by having the second device give the agent a 
strong desire to pull the trigger.  If this desire was then effective in producing the 
pulling of the trigger, as Black desires, then it looks like all the criteria are satisfied, 
and the counterfactually influenced pulling of the trigger is indeed an action 
(though there may be concerns about whether it is free).  The case becomes similar 
to the ones of desire implantation discussed above.  However, the point of 
Frankfurt-style cases is that it is supposed to be impossible for the agent to 
perform any alternative action, in our case refraining from pulling the trigger.  
Now, if Jones was looking down the gun, but had no desire whatsoever to pull the 
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trigger, then it would be impossible for him to so act.  Providing him with the 
desire required does make it possible for Jones to now perform the action of 
pulling the trigger, however it does not make it impossible for Jones to refrain 
from so doing.  We have already noted that agents do not need to act on their 
strongest desires.  This is not because of concerns about freedom, but purely to do 
with what an action is.  So a device that provides Jones with a desire to pull the 
trigger does not necessitate his pulling the trigger, even if it is a strong desire.  
Perhaps the device could remove all other desires, even the desire to refrain, so 
that the agent is left with no other choice?  I am not sure that such a state is 
achievable by intervention, but if conceptually coherent, then perhaps now the 
agent will perform the desired action, and could not do otherwise. 
However, the timing of the action matters as well, since there is a window of 
opportunity.  We might wonder whether such desire manipulation is really 
enough to ensure that Jones does not miss the window of opportunity.  It may well 
be that in order to secure Black’s designs for the death of Smith an intervention is 
required that goes beyond desire implantation alone, and once we start to add 
other features to the device, such as the initiation of some neural event, there is a 
threat that the sourcehood condition would be broken again, and that the pulling 
of the trigger would no longer be an action of Jones.  The initiating of a neural 
event by anything other than the agent’s own faculties looks like it threatens 
sourcehood, so this raises a doubt about whether Frankfurt-style cases really do 
show that agents can find themselves in a position where they perform an action 
but could not have done otherwise.82  Although the agent could not do anything to 
ensure that the trigger was not pulled, intentionally or not, there is a sense in 
which the agent could do otherwise – although the trigger is pulled, and Smith is 
killed, the agent fails to perform the action.  Note however that such Frankfurt-
style intervention could be used to prevent an agent from performing an action.  If 
desires are manipulated then the intervention can make possible some actions 
which were not possible before (though not necessitating them), but can also 
prevent the agent of performing actions with certain ends by removing any 
motivational basis for an action being performed for that end.  Since the issues of 
timing and necessitation do not occur, the sourcehood of whatever the agent does 
do are intact. 
The last kind of case is one that involves breaking criterion II.  For this 
criterion to be broken, the agent must do something, but we must be unable to 
describe it in terms that identify it as aiming at an end that the agent has.  Cases 
like this are what we might call accidental actions, though the term action here is 
misleading.  Consider the case where I leave a rake out in my front garden.  In the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 See Alvarez (2009) for a similar objection. 
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morning the postman comes, and steps on the rake, injuring himself.  The 
question is whether I performed the action of injuring my postman with a rake.  
We may suppose that I really dislike my postman, and would like it if he was 
harmed, in fact I would like nothing better than to see him step on a rake in my 
garden and injuring himself, though this is a desire that I feel I should not act 
upon.  Now, in our case, I leave the rake out through neglect or absentmindedness.  
Leaving the rake in the garden is something I do, however injuring my postman is 
not, because we cannot describe my leaving the rake out in terms that identify it as 
aiming at this end.  The fact that the postman injuring himself matches my desire 
is a happy accident, at least for me, if not for the postman.  Therefore the second of 
our criteria is broken.  I may still be responsible or culpable, for the injury to my 
postman (intuitively this seems so), which hints that agents can be responsible for 
things that are not their actions, but we will not explore that issue here. 
The stepping on the rake, and injury, is a result of my action, and it is not 
something I did.  If I had run at my postman, rake in hand, and taken a swing at 
him, then my action could appropriately be described as aiming at the end of 
injuring the postman with my rake.  The distinction between an agent’s actions 
and the later, or further, results of their actions (since results can be occurrent) is 
an issue that we find in the problem of action individuation.83  The classic case is 
the agent who flips the light switch, thus making the bulb come on, illuminating 
the room, and startling the burglar who was hidden in the room.  I do not want to 
enter into a full discussion of action individuation now, but we can note how our 
discussion may inform this issue.  The agent’s action may be described as aiming 
at flipping the switch, turning on the light, and illuminating the room, since the 
criteria can be satisfied when this is the end under which the occurrence is 
described.  However the startling of the burglar is not an action the agent 
performs, since it fails to meet, perhaps all, of the criteria (I hope this is obvious 
after so much discussion of what it takes to satisfy them, so will not labour the 
point here).  The startling of the burglar is a result of the agent’s action then, but is 
not something the agent does – it is something the agent makes happen as a result 
of what they do.  Given the appropriateness of the agent reporting something like, 
“I startled a burglar” it is clear that we are not very precise in making this 
distinction in our everyday dealings with agents and agency.  However, it is a 
useful distinction when we require more precision, for example when difficult 
issues of ascription of culpability arise. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 Ruben (1999) gives a good outline of this problem. 
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3. Free Actions and Alternative Possibilities 
 
Being free to do what we want 
Now that we have clarified what it is for an agent to act, we must now turn 
our attention to what it is for an agent to act freely.84  One important sense in 
which agents may be free is in regards to the question of whether an agent is free 
to do as they want.85  Sometimes an agent may not be free because some external 
constraint prevents them from performing the action they would like to perform.  
For instance, I may want to go to the theatre to see a play, but find that I cannot 
because somebody has hidden the tickets.  My freedom of action is curtailed, 
because there is some action that I want to perform, and would perform if 
circumstances were different, but cannot.  This issue is to do with the scope of 
open possibilities over which my action is free to range, and is often discussed in 
terms of social and political freedom.  There is a wide range of factors that can 
constrain my freedom of action in this way, and they need not be personal, like 
another agent hiding my tickets – a gust of wind could have blown the tickets into 
the fire and destroyed them.  It is nearly impossible to avoid both limiting the 
possible range of free action of others, and having our own possibilities curtailed, 
because almost anything we do impacts future possibilities for ourselves, and 
others.86  On the other hand, our actions do not only curtail possibilities, they also 
make things possible that would not otherwise have been open to us.  There are 
interesting questions about how we ought to act, about promoting certain 
possibilities, and not others, but these are questions of ethics and practical 
rationality, and about what ends are good, valuable and worth pursuing.  This 
sense of freedom is not about what it is for an action of an agent to be free, but 
rather about which actions and agent could be free to perform – call it freedom of 
possibilities.  There may be many things that I am not free to do, but in a way, the 
fact that I could try to, or want to do, these things shows that this is not the issue at 
stake for heavenly freedom.  If God ‘hid the tickets’ every time I was about to do 
something sinful, it would not eliminate sin, only the ability of agents to succeed 
in achieving sinful ends.  This points us in the direction of the freedom of an agent 
to choose at which end they will aim to act – what the agent wills. 
However there is a related claim, normally the focus of compatibilist accounts 
of free action, which may be more to the point.  We might ask of an agent whether 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 For excellent overviews of the issues see collections by Kane (2011), (2002a) & (2002b), 
and Watson (2003). 
85 O’Connor (2010) notes that we find influential seeds of this conception in Hume (1748) 
and Edwards (1754). 
86 Considerations in a similar vein have led some to claim that only a minimal amount may 
be solely up to an agent, see van Inwagen (1994). 
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they were free to act in the way they prefer, given how they are.  This is a matter of 
what choices an agent can make in view of any constraints upon them.  When an 
agent is free they should be able to act in a way that accords with their all things 
considered preferences given their character, desires, reasons and so on.  It should 
be the way the agent is rationally and motivationally constituted that determines 
what happens, they should be free to act according to their judgements.  Thus this 
sense of freedom has to do with the power of self-determination, that is, that the 
self is free to determine, or guide, what action is performed, so that action 
expresses the agent.  We can call it freedom of action guidance.87  However it turns 
out that this condition is relatively easy to satisfy, and even agents in cases of 
compulsion still turn out to be free.88  Consider a case where the agent is being 
compelled to hand over some money by having a gun held to their head.  The 
agent hands over the money - did the agent act freely?  We previously decided that 
an agent in this situation does perform an action, and this action does accord with 
how the agent is psychologically constituted at the time.  The agent may well not 
want to hand over the money, but they want even less to be shot, so on balance 
they make a rational and informed judgement to hand the money over.  Since 
what they do accords with their beliefs, desires, reasons and so on, they are free in 
the sense that their action is expressive of their all things considered preference – 
they possess freedom of action guidance. 
However, it seems that we are loath to say that an agent who is so compelled 
is really free, but why?  It is clear that the agent is being forced to act in a way that 
they would rather did not happen – that is, they would rather not even be in the 
position of being threatened, they would prefer this, and the associated keeping of 
their money.  The agent is being forced (not literally, but is under extreme 
psychological duress) to pursue an end that they have not chosen.  They are being 
forced to hand over money, and using their money in order to preserve their life 
under these circumstances is not an end that they value for their money.  They 
would rather spend the money, or put it to some other use, and whatever that use 
is, it is something that the agent is being forced to give up as an end.  By saying 
they do not value the end they are being forced to act upon we cannot mean that 
this is an end that they lack any motivational basis for, otherwise it would not be 
an action.  Nor can we mean that they do not possess a strong, or strongest, 
motivation for this end.  If this is what we meant then we would be claiming that 
agents are free only when they can act on ends, or reasons, for which they have the 
strongest motivational basis.  Besides, with a gun held to their head it certainly 
seems true to say that the agent probably has their strongest motivations, and 
reasons, directing them towards handing the money over and saving their life.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 This is a gesture, of course, to Fischer’s useful terminology of guidance control (1994). 
88 Strawson makes this point (2011). 
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Instead we mean that there is something about how the agent is constituted that 
means that the action of handing over money to preserve life is not as good as the 
end of spending it as they might have otherwise intended (we can suppose that 
they were going to spend it on a present for a friend, not to buy drugs, or some 
other questionable end).  ‘Good’ is a notoriously difficult word to define, but for 
now we needn’t concern ourselves with why agents do, or even ought to, conceive 
of something as good.  It is the effect of their so conceiving that is important, if an 
agent conceives of something as good then they value it differently relative to 
other things, they might see it as something worth sacrificing other things for in 
order to pursue, or something to become attached to.  It is not a matter of forming 
a practical or ethical judgement, these seem to be much more circumstantial.  But 
an agent’s valuing something as good is a matter of structuring their conception of 
the world around them, and their relationship to it, and this in turn gives structure 
to their practical and ethical rationality. 
So, under compulsion, the agent is forced to adopt an end that they 
considered to be bad, or worse, for them.  The agent acted when they handed over 
the money, and in the sense that they acted in accordance with their own 
preferences, they acted with freedom of action guidance.  However they did not 
act freely in the sense that their choice between ends, regarding how to use the 
money, was not one that was made on the basis of what they thought the money 
was good for.  Under compulsion the agent was placed in a position where their 
agency was manipulated in a way that meant that their strongest reasons and 
motivations were directed at ends that the agent did not value as good, and the 
ends which the agent did value, and that were expressive of their character, plans, 
values and intentions, took a back seat.  Obviously the agent did value saving their 
life, and so there was something of value in handing over the money, but handing 
over money to save their life is not an end that the agent would choose based on 
their conceiving of it as a good choice of end (or of purpose89).  Note that it is not 
that the agent was unable to act in any other way, or was unable to act in a way 
that upheld their character.90  The agent is still the source of how they act, and 
could have done otherwise.  The agent could always have acted in such a way that 
caused them to be shot – there are cases of people doing just this, people refuse to 
hand over what are sometimes quite small amounts of money to muggers, or bank 
clerks refuse to hand over money to robbers.  Perhaps the agent thought that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 ‘Purpose’ and ‘end’ are close synonyms in action theory, however sometimes the term 
‘purpose’ has a helpful tendency to focus our attention on an end’s being intentionally 
adopted by an agent, which may not be true of all ends.  So I will sometimes use both to try 
to cover the broad range of types of goal agents may direct themselves towards. 
90 I am using ‘character’ in a rather loose way here, to gesture to the set of things that 
encompass an agents natural dispositions, inclinations and so on, we will have more to say 
about character later. 
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handing over the money was the wrong thing to do, and that doing the right thing 
was just worth more than their life.  Or perhaps the agent didn’t think that the 
compeller would really pull the trigger.  In such cases it is possible that the agent 
possessed an even stronger motivation to act in a way that eventuated their being 
shot than they did to give in to the demands of the compeller.  So the agent got to 
do something that, at least in a sense, they preferred, so why do they count as 
suffering from a freedom diminishing compulsion? 
The actions of the compeller made a change to the agent – they changed the 
way that the agent related to ends that they value, the means apposite to those 
ends, and the practical and moral rationality of pursuing different ends, and, 
crucially, how these all relate to the agent’s conception of the good.  The agent did 
not exercise any control, any aspect of agency, in the production of this change.  
Such a change constitutes an alteration in the capacity for self-determination of 
the agent.  It does not alter how the agent is able to exercise self-determination in 
terms of limiting possible actions (the agent can, after all, refuse and be shot), so 
they still possess freedom of action guidance.  But it does alter it by forcing a 
change upon the agent regarding their ability to have reasons to pursue certain 
courses of action based on ends that the agent actually values as good – the agent 
does not possess freedom of value-alignment.91  Freedom of value-alignment is the 
freedom of an agent to align their motivational bases, purposes, ends, and the 
structure of their practical rationality92, with their conception of what is good.93  
This condition is supposed to rule out instances where an agent is compelled, or 
manipulated, to desire, aim at, choose, or adopt an end that their prior 
constitution as an agent would lead them to judge as bad.  By constitution of the 
agent I mean the sum of their beliefs, desires, valuings, and other attitudes, which 
structure allows them to make personal judgements about whether something is 
good.94  For example the agent having the gun pointed to their head is put in a 
position of having strong reasons to adopt a purpose which they think is bad – 
having to hand over money to save your life.  An agent who was hypnotised and 
given the implanted purpose of wanting to murder their spouse (if such a thing is 
even possible) has a purpose foisted upon them, which they conceive of as bad.  
An agent like Jones in Frankfurt-style cases may also fail to possess freedom of 
value-alignment.  If the changes Black makes to ensure that Jones pulls the trigger 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 A similar connection between freedom and value is explored in Fischer (2012). 
92 I do not mean that the agent can change the ‘rules’ of practical judgment making, but 
rather those inputs relevant to deliberation and consideration of practical problems.  This 
is rather vague, but an account of practical rationality is beyond the scope of this project.  
We will have some things to say about it, but must beg the reader’s forgiveness for not 
exploring these issues fully here. 
93 See Bratman (2000) on the connection of valuing and agency. 
94 Not that such a use of good is supposed to be broad, and can include value-judgements 
such as whether something is beautiful and so on. 
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to kill Smith are ones that constitute the implanting of something that is at odds 
with, and perhaps replaces, that part of Jones’ psychology which is the basis of his 
decision not to pull the trigger, then Jones would fail to be free, just as in the 
hypnotist case.  There are some Frankfurt-style cases, questionable in their 
coherence, in which Jones fails to pull the trigger, but does not decide against it.  
The Jones in such cases may need a different analysis concerning their freedom. 
These examples have characterised the absence of freedom of value-
alignment as involving intervention by other agents, and although it is often these 
cases that interest us, they are not the only ones.  It is possible for agents to act in 
such a way that they diminish their own freedom of value-alignment.  Consider an 
agent who decides to take some highly addictive drug.  We can assume, 
reasonably, that they act with freedom of action guidance in so doing.  However 
the effect of taking the drug, and the ensuing symptoms of addiction, may be ones 
that the agent finds quite unforeseen.  Perhaps the agent was overly confident 
about their ability to quit whenever they wanted.  The effect of these symptoms on 
the agent’s psychology will be ones that constitute a breakdown of the agent’s 
freedom of value-alignment.  They might find themselves strongly motivated to do 
things they are ashamed of, such as the way they treat their family, or stealing.  
They do not have the ability to align their practical rationality in a way that 
respects their conception of the good.  Of course, over time, such an agent may 
find that their shame, values, character and conception of the good, such as they 
were, become eroded.  Their freedom of value-alignment returns because the 
values they want to align their ends with are not ones that their symptoms and 
circumstances get in the way of. 
An agent could find themselves in a similar predicament to our examples 
through some non-personal event occurring.  For example if an agent’s house was 
struck by lightning, starting a fire, and trapping their children inside, then this 
could place the agent under the sort of unexpected psychological duress that is 
analogous to having a gun held to your head.  We could say that the agent was 
compelled to try to save their children, perhaps at the cost of sacrificing something 
of great value.  The change in circumstances was beyond the agent’s control, and 
impacted their ability to align their ends with things they valued as good, so they 
lost freedom of value-alignment.  The agent is placed in a position of having 
strong reason to adopt a purpose which they think is bad, given what they value, 
and their conception of the good.  It might be wondered whether the impact of 
natural events is really something that it is pertinent to speak about in terms of 
freedom and compulsion.  However, we could quite naturally speak of a case like 
this in terms of tragedy, which does involve the loss of things that we value, such 
as opportunities to have and do certain things.  But, what about natural events that 
are not quite so dramatic, and do not involve personal tragedy.  Imagine a case 
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where the agent wants to tend to the roses growing in their garden.  This is 
something the agent values, as they are a collector and cultivator of rare varieties 
of rose.  Now, if there were a sudden rainstorm, then the agent would be unable to 
go out into their garden, and the roses would be subsequently damaged.  Well, 
actually, this may be overstating the severity of the situation, surely they are not 
compelled to stay indoors, after all it is only a bit of water.  So perhaps we should 
increase the severity to be a strong gale that is bringing down braches from trees 
and the like, or something similar with a moderate element of risk.  In both cases 
there is something bad about pursuing their original aim, though to different 
degrees, and in both cases what the agent has to forego is a loss, again to varying 
degrees.  But the agent doesn’t seem to be compelled; wanting to avoid rain is a 
weaker influence than the risk of injury during a gale, and both are much weaker 
than the risk of the death of your children. 
The cases involve similar features, but to different degrees, which suggests 
that freedom of value-alignment admits of degrees.95  Freedom seemed to be 
destroyed in the paradigm case of compulsion because the misalignment of 
motivated ends and valuable ends was forced upon the agent.  In these new cases a 
restructuring is again forced upon the agent, but either the end the agent is left 
with motivation to perform is not as bad as in the paradigm case (it is perhaps 
annoying rather than abhorrent), or the agent’s motivational bases for various 
ends is influenced to a lesser degree (they have good reason not to go outside, but 
no ‘compelling’ reason).  So there are degrees to which freedom of value-
alignment can be lost because there are degrees to which the agent is able to align 
their motivational bases for ends with what they value, and there are degrees to 
which the ends agents can contemplate compare to their conception of the good.  
Incidentally it seems fairly intuitive that compulsion comes in degrees, so this 
appears to be a sensible result to have arrived at. 
 
What agents value and mesh-theories of agency 
Now, those familiar with mesh theories of freedom will recognise this general 
approach.  Mesh theories claim that free actions are ones that suitably mesh with 
features of the agent, and given this basic definition, freedom of value-alignment is 
a form of mesh theory.  But why not adopt a well-developed mesh theory, such as 
Frankfurt’s, that has been highly influential in the literature?  We should note 
some of the differences then, and why the freedom of value-alignment may offer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 See O’Connor (2009) on degrees of freedom. 
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some advantage.96  Frankfurt (1971) offers a hierarchical mesh theory according to 
which agents have free will when their action issues from a first-order desire that 
the agent wants.  He models an agent’s capacity for willing on a hierarchy of 
desires.  First-order desires can produce actions, but need not do so.  The agent 
also possesses second-order desires, the objects of which are first-order desires.  If 
an agent possesses a second-order desire for a certain first-order desire, and if the 
agent acts on that same first-order desire, then the agent has acted with a will that 
they want, and has acted freely.  For example if an agent has a first-order desire to 
eat a piece of cake, and another first-order desire to eat a piece of fruit (the two are 
in conflict), and a second-order desire to desire to eat a piece of cake, then if the 
agent’s desire to eat a piece of cake produces the action of cake eating, then the 
agent will have acted freely.  However, if the agent possessed no second-order 
desire to desire to eat a piece of cake, and instead possessed a second-order desire 
to desire a piece of fruit (perhaps they are on a diet), then the production of a cake 
eating action by a first-order desire to eat a piece of cake would be an instance of 
an unfree action.  If an agent possessed no second-order desires relevant to either 
of these first-order desires (one to eat cake, the other to eat fruit), and the agent 
happened to act on one of the first-order desires, then the agent would not only be 
unfree, but would be a wanton, with no control over their actions, but passive to 
being moved, unreflectively, by their various first-order desires.  According to 
Frankfurt wantons are not even persons. 
One concern about this hierarchical theory is whether it captures the 
phenomenology of action and willing.  In one way, it does powerfully capture 
something of our experience of what it is for have a will to act a certain way.  I may 
desire a piece of cake, but wish I didn’t desire cake so much, because I know it is 
bad for me while I am on a diet.  This does seem to be an instance of possessing 
something like a second-order desire.  I desire the end of my being constituted 
differently, so that I do not have such a penchant for cake.  Note though, that it is a 
desire not to have a first order desire.  Is this the same as having a desire for a 
different, the contrary, first-order desire?  In this case it may involve the desire to 
possess some other desire, but the situation seems more complex than just 
possessing such a second-order desire, which indicates that, at least in this 
situation, having the will you want may relate to more than just the first order 
desire that produces action, and whether there is a second-order desire for this 
first-order desire.  If I found myself desiring a healthy piece of fruit, I might be 
pleased with myself for having developed this good habit, or taste for fruit, and be 
glad, but is it the case that I possess a desire that I desire fruit?  While I can be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 We will not do justice to developments of Frankfurt’s ideas here, and my aim is not to 
assess Frankfurt in detail.  However an alternative mesh theory is a useful foil for situating 
our discussion of freedom. 
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aware that I do not possess any conflicting desires, and have no reason to consider 
my desire to be bad, this is not the same as possessing a second-order desire whose 
object is my first-order desire.  Rather than actively desiring this desire, I may 
instead be glad that I do not possess any conflicting desires instead.  There may 
indeed be cases where I do possess a desire to have a certain desire, but it appears 
that we have reason to doubt whether what it is to have the desire that I want 
producing my actions is always captured by possession of a second-order desire. 
I have attempted to sketch descriptions of agents who plausibly possess a 
mesh, but not a Frankfurtian second-order desire.  I do not think that these 
descriptions are wrong, or reducible to Frankfurtian descriptions.  Further, I do 
not think we would describe agents like this as wantons.  We have not 
demonstrated that Frankfurt is wrong though, that would take a lot more work, 
and would be a considerable project in it’s own right.  But having done something 
to create doubt, let us compare with the alternative mesh-style analysis we have 
discussed.  It does seem possible to account for agents’ self-reflective attitudes to 
their own desires without necessitating a hierarchical structure.  In terms of what 
agent’s value, and their conception of the good, we can describe an agent who 
wishes that they desired fruit more than they do as an agent who desires the end of 
being constituted differently.  The desire to eat fruit is not in itself valuable, but 
only instrumentally so, and it is the agent’s desire to be healthy which motivates 
their adoption, promotion or identification with one desire rather than another.  
The agent’s desire is not for a certain desire itself, but is that they be constituted in 
a way that aligns closer with their conceptions of the good and valuable.  This is 
not a matter of possessing a hierarchy of desires regarding other desires, but is 
about the overall structure of the agent – what things do they value, and what are 
the relative values of the things they care about.  Although agents possess desires 
that they would like to change, and lack desires that they wish they had, we do not 
need to make the possession of the relevant second-order desire necessary for 
freedom.  These desires that are a bad fit, are a bad fit within the agent, they cohere 
badly with rest of the things that the agent values.  An agent may, of course, be 
able to reflect on their beliefs and motivations, and express their judgement about 
their constitution in terms of a desire to change some facet of their psychology.  
But this need not be the case.  Agents can act on desires that fit well, without 
possessing any desire for that desire.  But agents like this are not wanton, and are 
still free in the sense that they possess freedom of action guidance. 
But do such agents possess freedom of value-alignment?  Well, this depends 
on how the agent came to be constituted as they are concerning their desires.  If 
they have developed desires that have good and valuable ends, for the agent, as 
their objects, then they can be.  This raises another problem for Frankfurt.  
Although the mesh of the hierarchy may give some insight into whether the action 
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the agent performs is one that expresses the agent’s true self, the agent’s true self 
could be one that was formed by manipulation.  For example, remember our case 
of the hypnotist, who implants a desire to murder the spouse.  If the hypnotist is 
clever, and implants a number of beliefs and desires about the benefits of murder, 
the harm of allowing the spouse to live, the desire to desire to murder, and so on, 
then a suitable mesh could be achieved.  However an agent with this mesh would 
be the victim of a terrible, freedom destroying manipulation.  Frankfurt does not 
have the resources within the hierarchy itself to explain why.97  However we have 
successfully used freedom of value-alignment to conclude that an agent like this is 
not free. 
The most pressing problem for Frankfurt is the regress problem.  If agents 
can be wanton when they do not possess some desire that presides over their 
conflicting first-order desires, then why can this same problem of wantonness not 
occur at a higher order? For example, returning to our dieting agent who has 
conflicting first order desires about whether to eat cake or fruit, suppose that this 
agent also possesses conflicting second order desires – would the role of one of 
these second-order desires in the first-order desire’s production of action not be 
something that is arbitrary?  Even if there is not a conflict among second-order 
desires, how do we know that the agent has the second-order desire that they 
want?  Adding third and fourth-order desires will not help, because we can always 
ask in virtue of what it is that the agent endorses the desires they possess.  So if 
agents can be wanton with respect to their first-order desires because they lack a 
higher-order desire for that desire, then agents can be wanton with respect to all 
their desires.  The hierarchy cannot be extended indefinitely, and so either an 
agent can possess a complex mesh, but ultimately remain passive and wanton with 
respect to their actions, or there is some other way of grounding a desire, or other 
action-relevant attitude, as one that the agent wants, and is active regarding.  If an 
agent is ultimately passive regarding the structure of their will, or desires, then 
they do not have control over their means of action production.  If the reason the 
agent has the will they have is, ultimately, arbitrary then the agent cannot be in 
control of their will.  If the agent is not in control then something else is, even if it 
is blind luck, the random occurrence of a neural event, or any other candidate for 
what stands in the explanatory relation to the will the agent has.  And, if 
something else is in control, then the agent is not free.  The second-order desires 
introduced by Frankfurt were supposed to be the active exercise of control by an 
agent over their first-order desires by which an agent can ‘identify’ with one desire 
over another.  Frankfurt later suggested (1987) that if an agent’s higher-order 
desire is unopposed, then they do not have any need of further deliberation, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 See Fischer and Ravizza (1998) for a discussion of this, though in the context of 
responsibility. 
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so no recourse to a higher desire is required.  But, even an unopposed high-order 
desire can be one that the agent finds themself in possession of passively, and if 
this is so then it is not clear why the agent should identify themselves with any of 
the desires in their hierarchy.  In this case, the desires lower down in the agent’s 
will would be affected by something that has happened to the agent.  Frankfurt 
amended the position (1994) to include a stipulation that the agent’s identification 
must be active rather than passive, and when an agent has actively produced a 
desire then they are wholehearted towards that desire.  However, we do not know 
in virtue of what an agent’s production of a desire is active rather than passive, 
since the hierarchy was not able to secure it. 
Watson (1975) saw the regress problem and tried to avoid it by making the 
mesh one that was not between different levels in the hierarchy of desires, but was 
between the agent’s system of desiring, and their system of valuing.98  However, as 
Velleman (1992) notes, the same problem will arise.  If an agent can be subject to a 
desire operating upon him, then an agent can also be subject to a valuing playing a 
role in his psychology.  There is no reason to think that the possession of a value is 
something that is more active than the possession of a desire.  Bratman (2003)99 
offered an even more complex solution in which agent’s plans and intentions are 
policies that guide his action production in a way that analyses the agent’s 
identification in terms of long-term features of the agent’s capacity for 
intentionality, and how their desires and valuings mesh with these policies.  
However, once again, the dogged question will arise: why is it that agents are not 
ultimately passive regarding the possession of a policy or intention?  Velleman’s 
own proposal (1992) is that instead of a motivational hierarchy, or mesh with 
another system, it is more of a matter of an agent’s ability to identify with a desire 
by making it prevail by adding to it the motivational weight of the agent 
themselves.  However the agent is identified as whatever it is that plays the role of 
resolving motivational conflict.  This is not a higher-order part of the agent, nor 
another system parallel to the agent’s motivational system.  The picture is more 
like a web, and the influence of the web upon deliberations situated within it are 
the influences of the agent, and are those which Velleman would identify as 
active.100 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 There is a similarity between Watson’s position and the one we have been discussing, but 
there is not much to be gained by examining Watson’s proposal in detail, the crux of the 
matter we are about to arrive at will be the same anyway (and having arrived at the 
proposed model in the previous section quite independently of consideration of Watson’s 
theory, the similarities are incidental). 
99 Bratman’s position is developed over a large body of work, and his 2003 article is a 
succinct  articulation, but see also Bratman (1987, 1997 and 2004). 
100 There is some similarity to our previous discussion of freedom of value-alignment, 
which involved coherence with the agents values, and conception of the good.  So, 
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However, no matter how we develop the agent’s relevant features the 
question will still arise.  Even if we give them a hierarchical structure of 
motivations, with parallel systems of valuing, all within a complex web that 
comprises the entire psychology of the agent, if the constitution of the agent is 
something that has happened to them, then they are not active, and have not 
identified actively with their desires, or ultimately their actions. 
Now, note that this same problem attends the freedom of value-alignment.  
The proposal is a sketch, and there is much we could do to develop it, but we will 
not do that here.  We have said enough to be able to identify when freedom is lost 
through external manipulation or influence – freedom of value-alignment does 
help us to identify freedom from this.  But there is a further sense of freedom we 
need to identify.  Complex though this proposal is, increasing complexity will not 
escape the problem of passivity.  Our whistle-stop tour of some other mesh 
theories has taken us from the simplicity of Frankfurt’s initial proposal (where the 
problem is readily identifiable) through to being able to see why it is not escaped 
by the freedom of value-alignment.  Even if an agent is free from any external 
influence that would constrain their psychology in a way that prevented them 
from having a basis for self-determination that is aligned with what the agent 
conceives of as good, it is still an open question whether the ‘self’ doing the 
determining is something that was itself determined, or whether it was something 
that the agent possesses any control over.  This brings us to the crux of the 
problem; if agents are going to be free then they need an active power of self-
creation.101 
 
Free action, and being up-to-the-agent 
An agent may be instrumentally involved in their self-formation, and the on-
going exercise of their capacities, but still fail to have ever had the capacity to make 
a difference to how that self is constituted – what they conceive of as good, what 
they value, and ultimately how they act.  Now, in a sense, they have made a 
difference, for if the agent did not possess certain beliefs for example, then they 
would not have placed a certain value on an end, or been motivated in a certain 
way.  However we can mean something else by ‘making a difference’, though 
articulating this has proven difficult for philosophers.  One way to get at what we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
unsurprisingly I am sympathetic to Velleman’s insights.  Ekstrom (2000) proposes a 
similar account in terms of preferences. 
101 I have borrowed this phrase from Wolf (1987), though she thought such a power was 
logically impossible.  Kane (1998) has a similar concept, what he calls self-forming actions.  
However I have chosen not to use this term as it is defined partially in terms of 
voluntariness, and agents being causes of these action, and this associated baggage will be 
unhelpful to our analysis  - so we can note the similarity, but I ask the reader to resist 
reading self-creation in Kane’s terms. 
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mean is by analogy, the case of snooker balls is a classic example.  During a game 
of snooker a red ball travels across the table with a particular velocity and spin, 
and goes into one of the pockets.  These features of the ball make a difference to 
the ball going into the pocket, if the velocity had been different, for example, then 
the ball would have hit the cushion and bounced away from the pocket instead.  
But there is nothing that the red ball does that makes a difference to its possession 
of these properties; it is passive regarding the gaining of the velocity and spin it 
possesses.  These properties are imparted to the red ball by the cue ball, which 
strikes it with a certain momentum, velocity and spin.  So, what made a difference 
to the red ball’s being so constituted as to go into the pocket was the cue ball.  The 
influence of the cue ball on the red ball gave the red ball no opportunity to make a 
difference to whether it went into the pocket or not.  A natural way to express this 
is that the red ball had no choice about whether it would go into the pocket or not.  
Once the cue ball had struck it, its fate was determined.  So, the ultimate reason 
why the red ball went into the pocket rather than missed, is the cue ball102, and not 
the red ball.  And this is the sense of making a difference we are interested in.  
Notice it is not a matter of whether the red ball (or its properties) is the reason 
why it went in the pocket.  In this sense the red ball did make a difference.  For 
example, the red ball’s position relative to the pocket is one of the reasons it went 
in.  Instead the question asks for the ultimate reason that X occurred rather than 
Y, and is contrastive.  It focuses our attention on the question of at which point the 
world went in a red-ball-going-in direction, rather than a red-ball-missing one.  
Once we identify this fork in the road, it asks why it happened, so we can identify 
where the buck stops for an explanation of the state of affairs’ obtaining rather 
than not. 
What would it take for the red ball to be able to make a difference?  Well, it 
seems that the red ball must be able to do one of several things.  It could avoid 
going into the pocket by changing the nature of its interaction with the cue ball.  
This could be by either changing the properties of the cue ball, or by changing the 
way that properties are acquired through a given interaction.  Or, the ball could 
spontaneously swerve to the side, altering its properties of its own accord.  The 
swerve could not be because of a gust of wind, or other influence, or it would be 
just like introducing another cue ball, it would have to be spontaneous in the sense 
that an occurrence of radioactive decay is spontaneous.  An explanation can be 
offered that enables us to determine when radioactive decay is possible, but no 
explanation is possible that enables us to determine when, or that, an event of 
decay will occur.103  Now to change the cue ball, the red ball would have to exercise 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 It may be more natural to say ‘how the cue ball hit it’, but as will become clear, we do 
not lose anything by not using this locution. 
103 And this impossibility has nothing to do with epistemic limitations. 
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some power, the exercise of which could not be caused by another external factor, 
on pain of reintroducing the problem.  To change the nature of the interaction the 
red ball would have to again exercise some power, or the nature of the interaction 
would have to be such that it admitted of some possibility of variation.  This 
variation could not be something that was determined by other factors, otherwise 
we are merely introducing more ‘cue balls’, so it would have to be spontaneous.  
But introducing randomness as the reason why the interaction exhibits 
spontaneous variety, and hence a difference is made to whether the red ball goes 
into the pocket or not, will not help.  Although a difference is made it is not made 
by the red ball.104  So if the nature of the interaction is to be changed it must be by 
the exercise of a power of the red ball.  These exercises of a power would plausibly 
mean the red ball spontaneously coming to have some new property, by which it 
either affects a change in the cue ball, which changes the nature of the interaction.  
So, however the red ball achieved the making of a difference about whether it went 
into the pocket or not, it would involve the ball in some self-change which was not 
determined by anything.  So, we can see why the term self-creation is an 
appropriate one. 
To extend the analogy to agents, we need only ask why the cue ball had the 
properties it had, which depends on how it was struck by the cue.  This in turn 
depends on how the agent moved their body in using the cue to strike the ball.  
Did the agent make a difference to how the cue was used to strike the ball?  Did 
they make a difference to how their body moved?  Well, if the way the agent 
moved their body was the product of the influence of various ‘cue balls’ upon 
them, such as the lighting in the room, how much sleep they had the night before, 
how many hours practice they did this month, whether they had a beer before the 
game, their biochemistry, and so on, then what made a difference was these 
factors, and not the agent.  Remember that we mean ‘made a difference’ in the 
special sense of being the ultimate reason why one thing happened rather than 
another.  So an agent can be constituted so as to be able to perform actions, and 
can possess freedom of action guidance, and of value-alignment, but still not be 
able to make a difference to whether they act one way rather than another.  If this 
is the case then the way that the agent acts is not up to the agent, and if it is not up 
to the agent, then it cannot be within their control.  This is a different sense of 
control to that which we have discussed previously, and it would be a mistake to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Such randomness happens to the ball, and passivity is not going to help us elucidate 
control.  We will consider this issue more when we discuss the luck problem. 
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think that this power of self-creation was the basis for understanding the former 
sense of control as well, although they are obviously related to each other.105 
Being up to the agent to make a difference about whether something occurs 
or not marks another sort of freedom then, which we will call freedom of choice.  
Unfortunately the term ‘choice’ is prone to come with a lot of baggage, which 
might make us think of particular types of conscious deliberation.  However, we 
will adopt the term in the sense that the red ball was said to have no choice about 
whether it went into the pocket rather than missing, and questions about how the 
exercise of this freedom involves consciousness, deliberation, rationality, or any 
other capacities are a further question.  We should note that this freedom of choice 
is incompatible with determinism.  By determinism we mean that given the state 
of the world at some given time, there is only one possible way the world can be 
constituted at a later time, and that this later state depends, in all its details, upon 
the prior state of the world – because the states of the world evolve according to 
fixed natural laws.  Facts about the past, the details of that past state, fix what the 
details of the present will be, and fix what the details of all future states will be.  
Consider our red ball again, whose velocity and spin were fixed by the influence of 
the cue ball.  If we trace back the history of causal influences, then if at no point we 
find any spontaneous variation of any sort, then not only did the red ball not have 
a choice, but neither did the cue ball, and neither did the cue, and neither did the 
agent’s muscles, and neither did the agent’s motor cortex, their neural 
development between the ages of three and six months, their mother’s diet during 
pregnancy, their great-grandfather’s exposure to radiation working with Marie 
Curie, the Indo-European migration’s effect on the population of western Europe, 
the formation of the continents through plate-tectonics, the formation of the solar 
planets following gravitational collapse of the pre-solar nebula, the evolution of 
the universe during the cosmic inflationary period, and so on.  In short, there is no 
opportunity for there to have ever been any choice about anything.106 
It so happens that this is not as much of a worry as is sometimes thought, 
since thanks to the influence of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum 
physics, not many people really believe in this sort of determinism.  The possibility 
of spontaneous variety in the outcome of quantum events means that the future 
states of the world are, to an extent, open.107  However there is an extent to which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 There is considerable confusion in discussions of free will where it is assumed that there 
is only one sort of control relevant to agency, and only one sort of freedom relevant to 
whether agents actions (or wills) are free. 
106 We will avoid the thorny issue of the origin of this chain. 
107 I do not want to get drawn into a discussion about the interpretation of quantum 
physics, since this observation only mitigates the issue we are interested in, however, 
should the reader be concerned, it should be noted that genuine indeterminism also exists 
in classical mechanics as well, see Hoefer (2010). 
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the future can still fail to be open, as it pertains to its being open in regard to 
events over which no quantum events can make a difference.  For example, if we 
put a gramme of radium in the red ball, there would be a chance of some radium 
atoms decaying between the cue ball striking it, and it going in the pocket.  
However with a half life of 1600 years, the change in mass of the ball due to the 
radium’s decay would not be sufficient to make a difference to whether the ball 
went in the pocket or not.  So even a form of nomological determinism qualified 
by the statistical interpretation of laws governing quantum behaviour will present 
a threat to the ability of agent to make a difference to things which we might think 
of as being up to them.108  The things that we want agents to be able to make a 
difference to, are things like the value agents place on an end, the making of a 
practical judgement, and the actions they perform.  There is no conclusive reason 
to think that these issues could be governed by the occurrence of a single quantum 
event, and much more reason to think that the physical processes involved in the 
production of these occurrences in agents relate to macro-scale physics.  For 
example, it may be possible that some quantum indeterminacy in the behaviour of 
calcium ions at the synapses connecting effector neurons to a muscular system, 
means that there is some indeterminacy in the number of muscle fibers that 
contract.  Although this may open the possibility of an agent’s arm moving with a 
slightly different speed, it will not open the possibility of the agent’s arm not rising 
at all.  So although quantum indeterminacy opens some possibilities, whether the 
agent raises their arm (that is, what action they perform) is something that is still 
governed by determinism.109  We cannot discuss the openness that quantum 
events may allow in the world any further here, but the point is that even this 
modified form of determinism is still a threat to freedom of choice.   
 
Freedom, forking paths, and alternative possibilities 
One way of articulating why freedom of choice is incompatible with 
determinism is to consider this freedom as the ability of agents to guide 
themselves through a garden of forking paths.  Fischer describes the argument 
thus, 
We tend to think of the future as a branching, tree-like structure with many 
nodes at which there are various paths into the future.  Perhaps there are points 
at which we have no alternatives to our actual course of action.  And maybe 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 There have been some attempts to ground the openness of agent’s futures concerning 
their action in quantum events in the brain, however I am skeptical that this will be 
helpful.  We noted that mere indeterminism is not helpful for securing a controlled 
freedom of choice, and given the stochastic nature of quantum events, control over their 
outcomes is ipso facto impossible. 
109 There is also a concern about whether such quantum events could constitute the 
exercise of control, but we will say more about this in due course. 
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some individuals rarely or never have such alternatives.  But we naturally think 
that there are many times when we (most of us) have various paths genuinely 
open to us.  That is, we think of ourselves as frequently having alternative 
possibilities. 
When we take one path rather than another in a situation in which the other 
path is genuinely available to us, we say that we have a certain control over our 
behaviour.  In this kind of circumstance, a person has the sort of control which 
involves alternative possibilities: he follows one path, and yet he can (“is able 
to,” “has it in his power to”) follow another path (1994: 3-4). 
Now, there is some intuitive appeal to this analogy, because our experience as 
agents does seem to suggest that we do sometimes stand at points of decision 
where the future is genuinely open, and something we do makes a difference to 
how things turn out.  However, this phenomenological argument has been 
undercut by the suggestion that epistemic concerns could also explain why we 
experience our sense of agency as we do.  Dennett (1984) in particular has argued 
that if agents do not have epistemic access to the causes of their actions at the 
micro-level, because these causes leave no phenomenal footprint, then our 
experience would be precisely as if the future was open, when it may, in fact, not 
be at all.110  So, by itself, this may be more of an intuition pump than a persuasive 
argument for incompatibilism.  Nevertheless, it helpfully connects two important 
ideas: up-to-us-ness and alternative possibilities.  Another way of talking about 
whether something is up to an agent, is whether they could have done otherwise.  
If something is not up to an agent then they possess no power over whether one 
possibility obtains rather than another.  If there are no open alternative 
possibilities, then there is nothing that the agent can do, no power they can 
exercise, to leave matters up to them.  In terms of the garden of forking paths, the 
picture would be of a path, tracing the agent’s history, which never contains a fork.  
If anything is ever up to the agent, then this entails that at the point that 
something is up to the agent, there is some set of alternatives that the agent could 
possibly have made obtain through the exercise of their agency.  But note that 
alternative possibilities only mean that there is something that can be up to the 
agent, and not that anything actually is – so alternative possibilities are necessary 
but not sufficient for up-to-us-ness (and hence freedom of choice).  The existence 
of some alternative means that there is something for the agent to control, but 
whether, and how, that control is exercised is a further matter. 
Alternative possibilities are often discussed in terms of whether an agent 
performs one, or other, of two actions, often with great moral implications 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 See Goetz (2008), chapter 2, for a discussion of possible responses, and the limits of 
Dennett’s claim. 
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attached to each.111  But, the alternatives can also be a matter of whether an agent 
performs an action or not, so a relevant alternative can be refraining from 
performing a particular action, and not performing some other action instead.112  
This is particularly important since it is not uncommon for compatibilists to, 
perhaps rightly, charge incompatibilists with placing an unreasonable condition 
on free action.113  If agents only have one reasonable course of action presented to 
them, it seems strange to assert that they are only free if they can also do 
something quite strange, and unreasonable, instead.  Consider a case raised by 
Steward (2012), we are asked to consider Joe, who has to decide whether to move 
in with his girlfriend.  Joe has many good reasons to move in with his girlfriend, 
emotional, practical, financial, etc.  He lacks any reason to decide not to move in 
with her.  It would then be strange to insist that an agent’s freedom requires the 
possibility that they act in a way that contravenes their reasons.  In the case of Joe 
it would be strange to insist that he was not free to choose to move in with his 
girlfriend unless he could also decide not to do so.  Steward thinks that the 
compatibilists are correct about this, saying, 
an insistence upon such chances cannot help to secure or improve the agent’s 
control over the course of events.  I will argue that they [the compatibilists] are 
quite correct in thinking so and therefore, if the libertarian thinks that having 
the power to φ requires the existence of some objective chance that one will φ, 
she is mistaken, since when what puts one’s φ-ing quite out of the question is 
only such things as one’s own wants, principles, motivations, etc. (and where 
there are no further special worries about how these wants, principles and 
motivations have been arrived at) there should be no concern that an absence 
of possibility here amounts to a lack of freedom (2012:126). 
Now, given our criteria for action, we might suspect that agents like Joe are 
rather unusual.  If Joe really possesses no reason at all to refrain from deciding to 
move in with his girlfriend, he must be a position where he has no desires (or 
other motivationally relevant states) that do not aim, directly or indirectly, at his 
moving in with his girlfriend.  If Joe did possess a desire that aimed at some other 
end, such as a desire for a cup of tea, then he could act on it, and take relevant 
features of the world as reasons to so act, such as that it would quench his thirst.  
Joe would not be deciding not to move in with his girlfriend, but would be 
refraining from making that decision, and acting in some other way instead.  But 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111  In fact, there is a tendency for alternative possibilities to feature particularly 
prominently in approaches to the free will problem that focus on free will as a condition 
for moral responsibility, and approach which we are not adopting here. 
112 Although there is some debate about whether refraining is an action (or negative 
action), see McGrath (2005), Thomson (2003) and Vermazen (1985).  See Muller (2012) 
for a good discussion of what could constitute the branching of a path. 
113 Although not a compatibilist, Steward (2009) notes that compatibilists are right about 
something when it comes to just how open the futures of libertarian agents should be. 
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perhaps we can place Joe in a position where refraining from either deciding to 
move in, or not, is not a possibility.  Perhaps his girlfriend has cornered Joe, and 
delivered an ultimatum that he either tell her, or show her, that his is committed 
to moving in, or not.  Now, going and making a cup of tea is tantamount to 
admitting his lack of commitment.  But surely Joe could pause for thought, or to 
look deeply into his girlfriend’s eyes, or to tell himself that he really must focus 
and stop thinking about tea.  It looks quite difficult to place an agent in a situation 
where they do not have any alternative possibility open to them that is a viable 
action, one which engages their rational and agential capacities.  This is no 
surprise, since we have already argued that agents’ actions are not necessitated by 
their motivations, or their strongest motivations. Even if his girlfriend has set a 
time limit, and failure to respond by the set time will constitute a ‘no, I will not 
move in’, Joe could still fail to act, not from a conscious desire to wait and see what 
his girlfriend says (since, by stipulation he has no desire relevant to this end), or in 
order to achieve any other end, but just out of absent-mindedness.  
However, we still might be interested in what Joe does regarding his response 
to his girlfriend in another sense.  In many situations in which we are interested in 
freedom, the fine details about exactly how and when an action is performed, or 
not, are not of paramount importance.  Joe will at some point soon tell his 
girlfriend that he is committed to moving in, or will fail to do so.  But is Joe free to 
decide not to, and to wait until the time is up in the uncomfortable knowledge that 
he does not want to commit to moving in, even though he cannot come out and 
say it?  When Joe fails to decide due to his absent-mindedness, this is different to 
an active decision to remain silent.  It is not that his absent-mindedness is passive, 
and his failure is something that happens to Joe, robbing him of the ability to act, 
but forgetting to act is not something that agents seem to actively do – forgetting is 
not an action.  Because of our interests in responsibility, and the significance of 
what Joe can do (what lies within his agential power given his constitution) and 
it’s relevance to his relationship with his girlfriend, which is something valuable 
(despite its dysfunctional nature), we will often want to ask whether an agent like 
Joe was free to choose to move in, or to choose not to.  We want to know whether 
actually deciding to move in is up to Joe, not just how, or when.  Remember, up-
to-us-ness is about the power to settle whether X rather than Y occurs.  And if X is 
moving in, Joe may be able to settle Y (not doing so) by his inaction, but it would 
be more significant of a settling, both for Joe and his girlfriend, if Joe can settle 
matters Y-ly by his action.  An active decision not to move in would involve some 
self-creation of Joe’s psychological constitution, or character, that would have 
significant ramifications.  Such an active settling of matters involves his 
intentionality, and other important features of his character, self-formation, and 
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agency.  So Steward, and compatibilists, are still identifying a question that is 
important. 
 
Alternative possibilities and the effects of freedom in the past 
Given how Joe is constituted, he cannot choose not to move in with his 
girlfriend.  So it seems correct to say that Joe is not free to decide to not move in 
with his girlfriend.  If Joe makes a decision, how that decision goes is not 
something that is up to him, because there is no alternative to his deciding to 
move in with his girlfriend.  So if the way that Joe can act admits of no alternatives, 
and alternative possibilities are a necessary condition for an agent having 
something up to them, and within their power of self-creation, then does Joe fail to 
possess freedom of choice?  Well, it all depends on why Joe is so constituted as to 
be unable to decide otherwise than to move in with his girlfriend.  To understand 
why, we can consider an analogy with ascription of culpability.114  When it comes 
to ascribing culpability we are used to considering whether the way things are is 
because of an agent or not.  It is not the only relevant question, responsibility is 
more complex than that, but we are sometimes led in our intuitions by a 
consideration of whether the obtaining of some state of affairs is something that 
was up to the agent or not.  Once again, if it were up to the agent, then we would 
expect to find some alternative possibility.  The usual case in these sorts of 
discussions concerns the drunk driver, who hits somebody with their car because 
they lack the requisite reaction speed to have any possibility of braking in time to 
avoid hitting them.  Given the way things are with the inebriated agent, it is 
impossible for them to brake in time to avoid the accident, and there is nothing 
they can do to make braking in time a possibility.115 
Of course, this would not be much a of an excuse for the driver, and were 
they to offer such an excuse, we would be likely to retort that the reason that they 
found themselves in the position they did was because of their choice to drink and 
drive, and that this was up to them.  The driver is responsible for being in a 
position that is bad because of something they did that was up to them (we do not 
need to examine all the ways of thinking about this badness now – neglect, risk, 
foresight and so on).  Notice though, that in this instance ‘responsible’ is not 
meant in a moral sense.  What our intuition is picking up on is that the driver is 
agentially responsible for hitting someone with their car, because they are 
agentially responsible for putting themselves in the situation because of some prior 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Remembering that I do not wish to claim that freedom and responsibility amount to the 
same thing, or are even contiguous. 
115 Readers concerned about strange occurrences, like braking for other reasons and so on, 
can stipulate further conditions to secure the impossibility of any alternative. 
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action or choice.  An agent is agentially responsible for some event when the 
determination of that event’s occurring is something that is up to the agent and 
under their control – it is something they have freedom of choice regarding.  
Although the agent is not able to control the conditions that limit there being any 
alternative possibilities at the time of the accident, they were able to control the 
conditions leading to this limitation at a prior point.116  So freedom of choice is 
something that can be derivative.  The driver’s failure to brake is up to the agent, 
because although he has no alternative possibilities at this point, his finding 
himself in such a position is itself something that is up to the agent.  Consider 
another case where someone has cut the brake lines of the car.  Now when the 
driver comes to brake he again has no alternative possibilities, but this time his 
finding himself in such a situation is not something that was up to him, it is 
something that has happened to him, without his exercise of freedom of choice, 
and is outside of his control.117 
We can relate this to the analogy of the garden of forking paths.  The driver 
finds himself on a path that is destined to include their hitting someone with their 
car.  Because of the features of the path they find themselves on, their hitting 
someone is determined; it is an inescapable occurrence in the life of the agent.  
The agent does not possess the possibility of exercising their agency in a way that 
will create any alternative future regarding this detail.  But we can trace the path 
back to an earlier junction with a path that provides the possibility of avoiding the 
accident.  This could be because on the alternative path the accident is determined 
not to occur, perhaps because the agent gives their car keys to the barman, or the 
path may leave the accident’s occurrence undetermined, and further junctions lie 
between this point and the time that the accident could occur.  If the taking of one 
path rather than another from this junction is something that is up to the agent, 
then things that are determined by the choice of path from the junction are also up 
to the agent.  At the risk of multiplying metaphors, it is like an agent who pulls on 
a piece of rope that runs across the room and is tied to a table, leading to the table 
falling over.  The agent is agentially responsible for the table falling over.  They 
may well say that they only pulled on the few inches of the rope they touched with 
their hand, but because the table falling over was determined by this occurrence, 
they are agentially responsible for the table falling over as well.118  If their pull on 
the rope only pulled the table three feet across the room, perhaps away from the 
wall to being closer to a doorway, then things could be different.  If some children 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Pink (1996:89) makes the point this way, and notes that this is considering alternative 
possibilities in a way that is autonomy-centered rather than time-centered. 
117 There are some similarities to Wolf’s (1990) claim about ‘bad’ choices requiring 
alternative possibilities. 
118 If they could not see that the rope was attached to anything, then they might well fail to 
be morally responsible of course. 
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come running through the door, but are not determined to run into objects next to 
doorways knocking them over, then the agent is agentially responsible for the 
possibility of the table being knocked over, which needs to be distinguished from 
their determining that it is knocked over.119 
Notice that I have not said that the future events, which are determined by 
the taking of a particular path from a junction, need to be foreseen, or even 
possibly foreseen by the agent.  This might seem a little strange, making agents 
agentially responsible for things which may even be a long way in the future, or 
things which they could not have possibly foreseen.  However I suspect that 
concern here is due to a lingering connection with moral responsibility.  We do 
sometimes reflect on the past, and with hindsight note the significance of past 
choices given their impact on our future possibilities.  We can be thankful that we 
chose a particular course, not because we were hoping to achieve the end we now 
value, but because it worked out that way.  We can also regret not having chosen 
differently if we are prevented from pursuing some end because of past choices.  
But we do not praise or blame ourselves for these past choices, and friends might 
say that, “we couldn’t have known”, but they will not say, “that had nothing to do 
with you”.  Friends may say, “there was nothing you could have done”, but in 
these contexts it seems this is shorthand for ‘there was nothing you could have 
intentionally/knowingly done’.  Agents may react with surprise to the effects of 
their actions, but it does not absolve them from playing a role in bringing them 
about.120 
Although this seems to put an awful lot in the power of agent’s past actions 
and choices, we should note that the garden of forking paths is rarely as simple as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 In this case, plausibly, the children may well be agentially responsible for knocking the 
table over, but the agent who pulls the rope may be morally responsible – highlighting the 
need for care in distinguishing the two types of responsibility. 
120 We might be concerned that we need to say more here about intentional action.  
Intentional actions are plausible candidates for our most significant actions, at least, in 
terms of expressing ourselves.  But I do not want to get drawn here into a lengthy 
discussion of what kind of knowledge (and other conditions) are required for an agent’s 
action to be intentional.  Although linking significance to intentionality has some limited 
promise, I think that in terms of whether agents are free to perform actions that are free 
and significant, we have said enough with the freedom of action guidance, and freedom of 
value-alignment.  The sorts of circumstances that could limit an agent’s knowledge in a 
way that limit their ability to be intentional in performance of an action, whether personal 
interactions (like a manipulator) or natural, are already covered by these types of freedom.  
So if an agent was not free to act intentionally, we would already have identified them as 
not free to possess action guidance and/or value-alignment.  The conditions for intentional 
action add a complication that will have to be left for another investigation, where space 
can be given to its subtleties (just consider the length and depth of Anscombe’s excellent 
Intention (1957)).  It is also plausible that there can be non-intentional actions that are 
significant, so there is some justification for taking this question to be tangential, or at least 
peripheral, to the main concern of this project. 
	   76 
these limited examples can describe.121  We might be concerned that we have just 
‘pinned the blame’122, so to speak, for all occurrences in the life of an agent, on 
their distant past choices.  This would misrepresent the situation.  Surely my past 
choices have influenced my life, but did not set my future in stone?  Although 
there are choices agents can make at a junction that determine some features of the 
future path, there are a great many other influences on the evolution of the path 
that an agent takes.  Indeterminism in the natural order (luck, randomness) and 
interaction with other agents (human and non-human) all affect the evolution of 
the path that traces the life of an agent.  There can be some choices that do 
determine a great deal, perhaps of great significance to the agent.  But often when 
we engage in this sort of reflection on our past choices matters are complex.  
Although my past choice may have made possible some future event on my path, 
that event finally obtaining probably depended on a great many other contingent 
junctions, at which my path may have diverged, and things may have gone 
differently.  Sometimes, it would have taken some unlikely event, or a great many 
contingent events together, to have finally evolved my path away from some event 
occurring.  So as I look at the possible paths further down the path, there may be 
fewer of them that allow an escape from the event’s occurrence.  So our ‘pinning 
the blame’ is sometimes probabilistic, as is our ability to act in a way that engages 
our plans for the future, which explains why we may feel an intuitive disconnect 
with the claim that freedom of choice can be derivative.  However the garden 
analogy remains a useful one for talking about whether a particular degree of 
freedom, or freedom regarding some particular event, is something that is up to 
the agent. 
So, returning to Joe, who finds himself unable to decide any other way than to 
move in with his girlfriend; Joe could not have done otherwise, and so how his 
decision can go is not something that is now up to him.  But although he cannot 
now decide otherwise, he could (past tense) have used his freedom to be otherwise 
constituted now.  If Joe had exercised his freedom of choice differently in the past, 
then he would have ended up with different reasons concerning his romantic 
attachments, financial security, practical living arrangements and so on.  He may 
have actually found himself in different external circumstances, like having 
different job prospects, or may have had different ideas about what he wants and 
desires.  If the reason that Joe now possesses no reason to not move in with his 
girlfriend is because of a past exercise of Joe’s agency, one where he possessed 
freedom and there were alternative possibilities relevant to the possibility of his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 We should also note that some philosophers have suggested that agents may have 
relatively few opportunities to stand at a junction and have their future path be up to them, 
for example if matters are only up to agents in Buridan’s Ass type situations, where a tie 
break is needed, then these situations are probably rare; others have disagreed. 
122 Not morally, but agentially. 
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presently being constituted with some reason to decide differently, then Joe’s 
being only able to decide to move in, is something that is up to him.  Note that it is 
not enough to just ask whether there were alternative possibilities in the past.  It 
may well be that Joe possessed alternative possibilities in the past between being 
constituted with no present alternative by either being motivationally dominated 
by fear of rejection, or by emotional attachment to his girlfriend.  While these two 
possibilities may be significant for Joe, they do not mean that whether he decides 
to move in with his girlfriend, rather than deciding not to, was ever something that 
was up to him.123  This is where the garden of forking paths analogy is helpful: if 
something, deciding M rather than not-M, is up to the agent then they must now 
be at a junction where at least one open path is their deciding M, and at least one is 
their deciding not-M, or, there must be some past junction where at least one open 
path determines their later deciding M, and at least one determines their later 
deciding not-M. 
So there is no need to make the rather counterintuitive proposal that in order 
to possess freedom of choice Joe must have the power to decide, against literally all 
reason, not to move in with his girlfriend.  But for Joe’s deciding to move in to be 
free, it must be the case that in the past Joe possessed some opportunity to avoid 
being left with no alternative possibility regarding his decision now – and whether 
this opportunity was taken or not, needs to be something that is settled by Joe.  Joe 
may have had many opportunities to avoid being constituted as he presently is, 
but if these were all averted by the actions of his girlfriend (who happens to be an 
evil neurosurgeon) then how Joe presently decides is not something that is up to 
him.  If Joe’s girlfriend somehow engineers his psychology, not by implanting 
alien desires and beliefs, but by removing anything that gives Joe a reason not to 
move in with her, then Joe’s decision is up to her, not up to Joe, so Joe is not free.  
Note that were she to interfere with Joe to remove some reasons not to move in 
with her, perhaps leaving only one, then Joe would still be free if he settles the 
matter and an alternative possibility exists for him.  In fact, Joe’s girlfriend could 
interfere with Joe at some point in the distant past, perhaps just after he speaks to 
her for the first time at a party, and could manipulate Joe so that he has one free 
choice later during that party that with either determine that he move in with her, 
or will not so determine.  If Joe settles the choice between these two alternatives, 
then his decision much later to move in with her, the one that now lacks any 
alternative possibilities, is still free. 
But surely there is something wrong with saying Joe would be free under such 
manipulation?  Well, what if a choice Joe freely makes at the party, perhaps to kiss 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Note however, that although he may not be free regarding whether he decides to move 
in with his girlfriend, he would be free regarding why he decides to move in with his 
girlfriend. 
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the girl he has met, does determine that he will have no alternative possibilities 
years later when he has to decide whether to move in with his girlfriend.  There is 
no manipulation – Joe’s girlfriend is not an evil neurosurgeon, and has not 
planned to trap Joe, or manipulate him in any way.  Would this trouble us in the 
way that a personal manipulator does?  I do not think it does.  We can even 
imagine Joe thinking about his decision to move in or not, and saying to himself, 
“from that kiss onwards, all those years ago, wheels were set in motion that caused 
me to fall hopelessly in love with this girl, so that I cannot help but move in with 
her” (apologies for Joe’s rather cheesy internal monologue).124  We do things all 
the time that curtail our future possibilities, and things happen to us all the time 
that have substantial impacts on our future possibilities.  This does not mean that 
agents are thereby losing their freedom of choice.  There remains a substantial 
amount that is still up-to-agents, because it is relatively rare for agents to perform 
actions that have such extreme impacts on them that they are left with no reasons 
to act otherwise whatsoever.  Agents do have the power for self-creation, but they 
are also the product of their environment, and the myriad of factors that entails.  
They exercise their power for self-creation, for making themselves who they 
choose to be (the way they are constituted), in response to the challenges their 
interaction with their environment throws up – this power is not absolute, which 
is a very widely held admission.  The fact that freedom of choice, so construed, 
allows for this complexity, and the possibility of who we are being affected by 
more than our own choices, counts in favour of this analysis. 
However there is something to be said about Joe’s girlfriend (the evil 
neuroscientist) when she interferes with Joe.  There is a curtailment of Joe’s 
freedom here, but not by taking away his power of choice.  It brings us back to the 
beginning of this chapter, and to freedom of possibilities.  We noted that things 
happen to agents that limit, or open up, future possibilities.  We said that there 
might well be ethical guidelines relevant to thinking about how we impact on 
other agents.  It might be bad when we impact others in a way that curtails the 
possibility of them pursuing projects that would be of worth to them.  It might be 
good when we impact on others in a way that enables them opportunity to 
discover the good, and embrace it in their choices.  So, Joe’s girlfriend does curtail 
Joe’s freedom of possibilities, and it is the ethical question this raises that provokes 
our reaction that this is unfair, and Joe is less free.  We can see that this is an 
ethical judgement we are making about Joe’s situation, rather than a metaphysical 
one about his powers of agency, by changing the moral status of the interaction 
and noting how we judge differently.  Consider the case where Joe is pathologically 
afraid of being alone, and so cannot help but decide to move in with his girlfriend.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 There is a similarity between this way of arguing and Pereboom’s four-case argument 
(2001).  Dennett also discusses the pitfalls of personification of determiners (1984:61). 
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However, Joe’s girlfriend won’t let him decide until she has talked with him (she is 
now a psychoanalyst, not evil) and helped him to manage his fear and realise the 
open possibilities before him.  He is no longer constrained in his choice, and is free 
to choose to move in ‘for the right reasons’.  I think we would now judge the 
manipulation to be something that, in the relevant sense, enhances Joe’s freedom.  
This case opens up possibilities, so let us consider one more in which possibilities 
are curtailed.  This time we will make Joe have reasons to move in with his 
girlfriend as well as reasons not to.  His reasons to move in are good ones, he loves 
her, it makes financial sense, and so on.  But his only reason for not moving is a 
pathological fear of abandonment due to an incident in his childhood.  He knows, 
when he thinks about things clearly, that his girlfriend would never abandon him, 
and were she ever to leave, it would be due to a breakdown in their relationship, 
under which conditions he would not want to live with her anyway.  So, he realises 
that the possibility of her leaving is not a reason not to move in with her.  It might 
seem contrived to make Joe have this pathological fear as the only possible 
motivator for deciding not to move in, but Joe (as you may have realised by now) 
is quite a strange chap.  Joe’s girlfriend is once again a skilled psychoanalyst, and 
she influences Joe into losing his pathological fear.  Joe is left with no alternative 
possibilities.  But it is not clear that we should say that Joe’s freedom was thereby 
destroyed. 
The ethical questions raised by our impact on others do seem to concern an 
agent’s conception of the good, as well as some objective judgement about what is 
good.  When we interfere with agents in a way that allows them to align 
themselves more closely with the good, we are doing a good thing.  When we 
divert people from the good, or do not allow them to form their own conception 
of the good based on their own exploration of matters (that is, we do not allow 
them to come to conceive of something as good by discovering the goodness of it 
for themselves), we do something bad.  I think these are plausible principles, but 
do not mean them to be dogmatic.  They are just examples of how we could think 
about the relevant issues.  A useful example of these principles is that of the young 
initiate who is duped into joining a brainwashing cult.125  The initiate makes a free 
(as in up-to-them) choice about joining the cult, but one that is made in 
significant ignorance.  They are then subjected to manipulation, leaving them with 
values, and a conception of the good, that are at odds with ones they would have 
approved of prior to joining the cult, or ones that they would have discovered are 
actually bad, given the opportunity to freely investigate the matter (as in freedom 
of possibility).  However, if we discovered that a loved one had been manipulated 
by a cult, and were sure that our judgements about their values and beliefs were 
well founded (perhaps we have received an infallible moral pronouncement from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Kane (1998) considers a case like this. 
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God), then although our interaction with this person to manipulate them out of 
their brainwashed beliefs might involve a very similar type of manipulation in 
terms of altering their conception of the good, and their values, this would not 
only be good, but might be something that we have a duty to do.  Although these 
ethical questions are interesting and practical, we will not dwell on them further 
here.  However, it is interesting to note that God has a particularly important role 
to play in this regard when it comes to providence, and his interactions with 
human agents.  Human agents may make choices that so constrain their future 
possibilities that concerning some things, it is now impossible for them to change.  
Such an exercise of freedom of choice to constrain future alternative possibilities is 
very significant for the agent concerned.  But, there is nothing about such an 
exercise of choice that destroys the possibility of such an agent remaining free in 
the future.  They can still possess freedom of choice, as well as the other types of 
freedom.  Since this point will be of obvious importance to us, it is worth 
highlighting. 
 
Frankfurt-style counterexamples, and the consequence argument 
So, alternative possibilities are a necessary condition on an action’s being free, 
although the alternative possibility need not be concurrent with the action, and 
may be prior to it.  The central importance of alternative possibilities means that 
we cannot go much further without saying something about Frankfurt-style cases.  
We have already met these, and have considered whether agents like Jones, who is 
subjected to the counterfactual interventions of Black, are performing actions or 
not.  We saw that there was reason to doubt that it was possible for an intervener 
to really secure Jones performing the action required in the counterfactual 
scenario, but if we put those concerns to one side for a moment, we can see that 
there are other reasons to doubt that Frankfurt-style cases present the problem 
they are sometimes taken to.  The point of these cases is to present a 
counterexample to the claim that agents need to be able to do otherwise in order 
to be free.  Frankfurt’s original target was to show that agents do not need to be 
able to do otherwise in order to be responsible, but the issues are the same if we 
consider the problem in terms of freedom of choice requiring that agents have an 
alternative possibility available to them.  In Frankfurt’s original case Jones was 
considering whether to kill Smith, and Black was stood at hand ready to intervene 
to secure Jones’ going ahead with killing Smith, in the event of Jones not doing so 
by himself.   The idea was that Jones could not have done otherwise, and so there 
were no alternative possibilities, and yet in the event, Jones acted on his own, and 
was responsible for killing Smith (both morally and agentially, though Frankfurt 
focussed on the former).  Frankfurt did not elaborate on the details of how Black 
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would secure Jones doing what he wanted.  Obviously Black physically moving 
Jones’ limbs would not work, as Jones would no longer be performing the action.  
Bribing or threatening Jones might increase the chance of Jones doing what Black 
want, but for the Frankfurt case to succeed Black’s desired outcome needs to be 
completely secured.  There have been a number of influential developments of 
Frankfurt’s original case to fill in this gap,126 and cases now often feature a 
neuroscientist who is somehow able to read every detail of Jones’ neurophysiology, 
even down to the quantum level,127 and has also installed devices that will kick in 
should Jones fail to act, or be activated by the scientist or one of his measuring 
devices.  Vihvelin (2013:97 ff.) has usefully noted that the only methods open to 
Black involve either blocking Jones’ deciding not to pull the trigger in some way, 
or pre-emptively initiating a trigger-pulling event should Jones be about to decide 
not to shoot Smith.128  The blocking device is triggered by Jones starting to 
perform a non-shooting action, whereupon the device, sensing the beginnings of 
this action, prevents that action from being performed and replaces it with a 
shooting action by causing Jones to perform that action in some way.  The pre-
emptor device is triggered by a reliable indicator that Jones is about to act in a 
non-shooting way, whereupon it jumps in to supplant this eventuality by causing a 
shooting action instead. 
The literature on Frankfurt cases is vast, and we cannot discuss all the issues 
it raises.  But we should note some prominent reasons to think that they do not 
present a threat to our claim that freedom of choice requires alternative 
possibilities.  First of all we might doubt the possibility of a pre-emption device.  If 
Jones possesses a free choice, then he stands at a junction, and nothing about the 
past determines which way he will go.  So the device cannot read anything about 
Jones prior to his acting that would tell it which way he was going to decide, 
because it is the nature of free choices to lack any prior determinant.  The 
possibility of a pre-emptor device begs the question against an incompatibilist 
analysis of freedom, at least, against ones like ours, by assuming that an agent’s 
actions are determined by their prior mental states.  But we rejected this in the 
chapter on action.  By the time Black can know what Jones is going to do, it is too 
late to prevent Jones exercising his agency freely between alternative 
possibilities.129  Blocking devices do not have this problem though.  They work by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 See particularly Mele (2006) and (1995). 
127 Despite the fact that this is ex hypothesi impossible because of the uncertainty principle. 
128 Vihvelin is not alone in noting this distinction, but has a clear discussion of it, and some 
interesting remarks about why Frankfurt’s strategy is doomed to fail, even if on is not an 
incompatibilist of the sort we have developed.  I will not discuss her argument here 
however, as we are really more interested in identifying the sense of freedom we are 
interested in, than arguing for it. 
129 We have allowed that prior free choices can fix future action though, so it might be 
thought there is some scope for these devices to read past intention formation for example.  
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changing the agent once it has been determined how Jones is going to act by his 
beginning his action.  Consider the blocking case in terms of the garden of forking 
paths.  The path splits at the point where Jones makes130 his decision: one fork 
leads to his killing Smith, the other to his not doing so.  But then Black’s device 
intervenes, and on the fork that would have led to Jones not killing Smith there is 
another change in the path, one that now determines that Jones will pull the 
trigger.  But by the time of the second junction it is too late.  Jones has already 
exercised his freedom to do otherwise to make the forking of the path at the first 
junction something that is up to him.  The intervention of Black’s device can 
prevent Jones from succeeding in his action, but it cannot prevent Jones from 
having freedom of choice, because it can only intervene after the choice has been 
made.  If it is objected that the device intervenes between the start of the decision 
and the completion of it, in order to prevent this conclusion, then more problems 
arise.  If at this mid-decision point (we will suppose, for the sake of argument that 
there is one) the path has forked so that the device knows its intervention is 
needed, then effectively the decision is made, even if Jones is not consciously 
aware yet, or has not moved his body yet.  If the path has not yet forked, then it is 
true that the decision is not yet made, but it is also true that the device must now 
be functioning as a pre-emptor, and the former objections will apply.  So a 
blocking device cannot rob Jones of a relevant alternative possibility. 
There is a lot more to be said about how to respond to these cases (and 
learned from them).  But this identifies strategies for responding, which is enough 
in the context of this project.  However these responses do depend on the 
conception of freedom of choice as a particular kind of up-to-us-ness, and it 
would be good to provide some argument in its favour.  We will be brief, but that 
is justifiable, because this plank in our theory of free action is one that we have to 
assume in the context of our theological puzzle.  Agents need to possess at least 
some genuine aseity, which means that at some point there is a fork in the path 
that is entirely up to them, one that cannot be determined by prior states along the 
path.  If it were not, then there would be no aseity, which is essential to the 
response to the problem of evil, whose coherence we are interested in.  The 
consequence argument is the classic formulation of this concern that freedom is 
incompatible with determinism.  The literature on this argument is vast, but 
thankfully we only need to consider it enough to clarify further the sense of 
making a difference, or up-to-us-ness that we are interested in.  The locus classicus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
However, in this case there is an alternative possibility for Jones still, but it is one that was 
exercised in the past, and nothing about Black’s devices can now affect it.  These types of 
scenarios are not an apt target for Frankfurt-style arguments. 
130 Or begins to make – though whether making a decision is an extended process possess 
parts is itself suspect, however we will let that pass for now. 
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is van Inwagen’s An Essay on Free Will (1983),131 in which he gives the basic form 
of the argument, 
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature 
and events in the remote past.  But it is not up to us what went on before we 
were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are.  Therefore the 
consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us 
(1983: 56). 
The disagreement between compatibilists and incompatibilists centres on 
whether to understand the power to do otherwise in a conditional way or not.  The 
compatibilists favour the conditional analysis, which allows the power to do 
otherwise expressed in ‘could have done otherwise’ to be analysed as ‘would … if 
…’.  For example incompatibilists might claim that Joe could have done otherwise 
than decide to move in with his girlfriend (and that this is important to assessing 
whether he was free).  The compatibilists can respond that they agree, and what 
makes Joe free is that had he been constituted differently, with different desires 
and motives, then he would have decided differently than he did, which all goes to 
show that how Joe decides is up to him.  But note that the compatibilist means that 
it is up to facts about Joe, whereas the incompatibilist means that it is up to how 
Joe exercises his power of agency.  The compatibilists mean that had the past been 
different, Joe’s decision could have been different.  Perhaps the past could have 
been different, either because the laws are not fixed, or because there is natural 
indeterminism in the evolution of the world.  But neither of these things are under 
the control of Joe, and especially not when they are located in the past. This 
conditional analysis captures the idea of being free from external constraint or 
impediment.  But we have captured this with freedom of action guidance and 
value-alignment – in freedom of choice we have identified a different sense in 
which agents are free.  Kane (1998:48) notes that it is typical for the discussion to 
stall when incompatibilists charge the compatibilists of begging the question when 
they import a conditional analysis of the power to do otherwise into the 
consequence argument.  Compatibilists charge incompatibilists with begging the 
question by ruling out such an analysis from the start. 
Kane also discusses several objections to the conditional analysis.132  Austin 
(1956) suggests the example of standing over a three-foot putt.  It is possible to 
make the putt, and it is possible to do otherwise – to miss it.  However there is 
nothing to suggest that I would make the putt if I tried.  Kane notes that therefore 
‘would … if …’ statements are not a necessary condition for the truth of ‘could…’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Note also the important exchange between Lewis (1981), and van Inwagen (2000), 
(2004) & (2008). 
132 Since Kane provides such a succinct summary of the debate, I have followed him closely 
concerning the conditional analysis. 
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statements (54).  He also notes that determinate causation is not required for 
agents to count as the cause of an event.  The golf example is a case of probabilistic 
causation, if I try really hard, I may be more likely to make the putt.  Kane 
mentions that Anscombe (1971) states that one can be said to ‘cause’ or ‘produce’ 
and outcome without that outcome being determined or inevitable. 
Lehrer (1964) suggests another example in which the agent is presented with 
a tray of red sweets.  Nothing prevents the agent from taking one of the sweets and 
eating it if they choose to do so.  However suppose that the agent has a 
pathological aversion to things that are the colour of blood.  In such a situation the 
agent cannot eat the sweets.  However it is true that they would if they tried.  
Therefore the ‘would … if …’ conditional analysis does not provide sufficient 
conditions for an analysis of ‘could do otherwise’.  Kane discusses a supplement to 
the conditional analysis of ‘would … if you had willed to choose …’.  However we 
would then need to add the condition that the agent could have so chosen.  
Therefore the supplement is inadequate because it introduces another instance of 
‘could’, or ‘can’.  Kane notes Davidson’s response (1973) that the supplement of 
‘would … if you had wanted (desired) otherwise’ avoids the regress to a ‘can’ 
because wants are not actions that the agent performs.  However ‘if you could not 
have done anything to control the aversion or overcome it, then you could not 
have eaten the sweets’ (58).  So the power to do otherwise and eat the sweets 
depends on the power to control a motivation.  This is not to turn wanting 
otherwise into an action, but is to ask whether there was some action that could 
have been performed that would have made that motivation less effective in 
producing an intentional choice.  This is again a matter of looking into the past of 
an agent and asking whether they exercise the power of self-creation to influence 
who they are.  The important issue is how we acquired our psychological 
constitution.  Which brings us back to our discussion of self-creation and up-to-
us-ness.  It may well be that compatibilists would disagree with this analysis, and I 
suspect that at this point the dialectic would stall, as it appears to have done in the 
literature, with both sides’ arguments running against differing intuitions about 
free will.133  I will not attempt to resolve this stalemate here, and luckily we do not 
need to, since we have theologically motivated the assumption of our intuition, 
and are investigating it’s coherence.  What we need to consider next is how this 
indeterministic power of self-creation could be coherently realised in an agent, for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 It is worth mentioning that more nuanced approaches to a compatibilist rendering of 
being able to do otherwise are possible, such as the new dispositionalists (see Vihvelin 
(2004) and (2013), and Fara (2008).  However there is good reason to think that the 
dispositional analysis only explains how agents are in control of how they do actually act, 
and possible the possibilities for action (see McKenna (2009) and Fischer (2008)).  But this 
has to do with freedom of possibilities and freedom of action guidance. 
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it will be how agency is embodied in an agent, and the mechanisms by which it is 
exercised, that are the possible focus of divine influence. 
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4. Agents, Causes and Luck 
 
Having developed a sense of what agents would need in order to be free, we 
now need to consider how it is that agents could possess this freedom, and 
crucially how it can be exercised in a controlled way.  Since, for our purposes, we 
are assuming incompatibilism (what we introduced as aseity), we do not need to 
argue that our analysis of freedom of choice is necessarily correct, or is true, but 
only that it can be coherently conceived.  If it can be coherently conceived, that is, 
if a coherent analysis is possible that responds to prominent objections against this 
sort of incompatibilism, then we can trust our conditions of freedom and apply 
them to our theological puzzle.134  Approaches to answering these questions by 
incompatibilists fall into three broad categories: event-causal, agent-causal, and 
non-causal.  Event-causal accounts claim that free actions count as being 
controlled by an agent in virtue of the causal structure of the production of that 
action.  Agent-causal accounts are similar, but rather than examining the causal 
structure of an action in terms of it’s production by events, they adopt a substance 
causal approach, and claim that the agent must stand in relation to the action as 
substance-cause.  Non-causal accounts deny that causation is the appropriate tool 
for analysing when an agent controls an action.  There are a great variety of 
theories that have been developed within each of these classifications, especially 
concerning the processes involved in the production of actions, and the place of 
indeterminism in them, but we will not attempt to survey them.  However, some 
recurring issues do arise.  The most prominent issue for incompatibilists is the 
luck objection.135  We will sketch this, and look at how it affects a couple of 
prominent theories.  We can then consider a strategy for meeting this challenge. 
 
The luck objection introduced 
The luck objection is really a family of objections, but the common 
component is that luck, or randomness, or chance, is a control-diminishing factor 
in the production of action.136  A helpful way to sketch the luck objection is to 
consider where we could locate indeterminism in action production. 137   By 
indeterminism we mean to pick out the possibility of doing otherwise, the point at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Of course, our discussion, while falling short of establishing the truth of a certain 
analysis of freedom of choice, is one that I think is correct, and should go a substantial way 
towards motivating this analysis.  Unfortunately, a thorough discussion of all of the 
pertinent issues is beyond the scope of this project, so we will only hit the highlights. 
135 It should be noted that the luck objection is also a problem for some compatibilists, see 
Beebee and Mele (2002). 
136 See the seminal Nagel & Williams (1976), and for overviews of the luck problem see 
Levy (2011) and Mele (2006). 
137 This approach is suggested by Ekstrom (2000). 
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which there is an alternative possibility (in a non-counterfactual sense).  Let us 
assume a process of action production that is causal in nature, to see how luck may 
present a problem for it.  Suppose that agents come to possess certain reasons, 
motivations and attitudes, and that there are events of their so doing, these then 
serve as inputs into a process of rational deliberation, which issues in a practical 
judgement about possible actions an agent could perform, the agent forms an 
intention, on the basis of their deliberation, which leaves them with a persisting 
motivation to perform a particular action which they have now chosen, then, 
when the conditions pertinent to that intention are satisfied, the agent performs 
the action.  So, what if an agent is at the end of this process with a persisting, well-
founded intention to do A; does introducing the possibility that they do B instead 
help establish their freedom?  It seems that this is tantamount to insisting that 
agents are free when they can orient their agency towards one end, A, and then 
without further deliberation, do B instead.  In such circumstances, we might worry 
that their doing B is an irrational act, since it does not represent the agents pursuit 
of an end which they have ‘chosen’.  Quite where we should identify choice is 
controversial, and perhaps a case can be made that agents form intentions, but 
that their choice is exercised when they finally act.  But, for most, it seems that 
some choice has been exercised in taking up an end in an intention to act a certain 
way.  The agent has done all the hard work of determining which end aligns best 
with their beliefs, desires, values and motivations, has taken into account the 
chances of success of various actions for achieving the end they want, and has 
committed themself to a course of action, to doing A.  Their subsequent failure to 
perform A, and to perform B instead, would seem to be something that would 
come as rather a shock to the agent, defeating their exercise of agency-related 
powers up to that point.138 
So, we can see why the language of ‘luck’ and ‘chance’ is appropriate here.  If 
the agent does actually succeed in performing A rather than B, they could count 
themselves to be lucky to have had one of their intentions successfully issue in an 
action they wanted, or had chosen, to perform.  If they fail to do A, then they 
might count themselves unlucky, and actually a victim of chance.  After all, they 
had done everything possible to secure doing A (which perhaps was morally, or 
prudentially better), only to have the introduction of the indeterministic 
possibility of their doing B thwart their powers of agency leading up to that point.  
This seems to be a control-diminishing sort of indeterminism, because the agent 
has exercised their control in forming their intention to A, but then has no further 
control over whether they actually perform A.  Although the agent has the power 
to introduce the possibility of their A-ing, their actually doing so, remains a further 
question.  Wouldn’t it be better if agents’ intentions invariably guided the actions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 This sort of luck is discussed with the nice example of promise making in Mele (2004). 
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they perform – if their intentions determined the actions they perform?  This is a 
plausible suggestion.  In fact, the intervention of indeterminism seems akin to the 
intervention of a manipulator in depriving the agent of freedom of action 
guidance.  Of course, randomness should not to be personified as another agent, 
acting upon the unfolding process.  We rightly identify an event as random, when 
it lacks anything that determines its outcome.  But this is the point here.  Should 
the agent do B, and have their intention thwarted, there is nothing we can identify 
as the cause of the agent B-ing rather than A-ing.  So, the ultimate cause of the 
agent’s action is – well, there is no cause.  It just happened that they did, after all A, 
or, it just happened that after all that preparation to A, they B-ed.  After our 
discussion of the importance of up-to-us-ness, it is easy for us to see why freedom 
of choice prohibits this sort of indeterminism in the production of free actions.  
This sort of indeterminism does not diminish the freedom of agents; it destroys it.  
The fact that a question remains about the doing of A or B, means that the 
question of up-to-us-ness has not been settled, and in the absence of some 
mechanism enabling the agent to cause A or B, this question cannot be up to them. 
So, what about locating the indeterminism in between the deliberation and 
the intention formation?  We might be suspicious about whether there is any 
space between these two for indeterminism to occupy, but supposing that there is, 
it looks to be problematic.  At least now the agent’s intentions are not frustrated by 
chance, and so the agent has control over their actions because there is no gap 
between their intentions and actions.  But the question of control now arises over 
the production of the agent’s intentions.  If they deliberated about A and B, and 
formed a practical judgement that A was preferable, should they then come to 
hold an intention to A, they would be lucky to do so.  Contrariwise, should they 
come to hold an intention to B, they would the unlucky victim of randomness.  It 
appears that for the agent to be in control there has to be a close connection 
between their deliberation and their intentions, just as there should be between 
their intentions and actions.  So, if we are going to find a place for indeterminism, 
we will have to look at the process of deliberation itself.  The agent has various 
inputs to this process (desires, motivations, etc.) and concludes the process with a 
practical judgement.  Given that our folk psychology and phenomenology of free 
actions often conceives of the process of deliberation as one that could go any 
number of ways, and where uncertainty is resolved, this may be a more plausible 
place to locate the indeterminism.  But if we break the deliberative process down 
into a series of causally connected events and states, then think about what sort of 
connection we would like to obtain between them for the process to be one that is 
controlled, the same concern about luck re-emerges.  For instance, if DAB is the 
event of the weighing of the ends A and B, and DA is the state of realising that A 
outweighs B, then we want there to be a close connection between DAB and DA.  If 
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there was not a close connection then we might worry that despite the inputs to 
the deliberative process, an agent could produce any old practical judgement.  It 
would be analogous to possessing a calculator that produced a random number, 
no matter what the sum entered was. 
Perhaps we can place some limits on the possible practical judgements agents 
could produce by their deliberating, so that agents deliberating about what to have 
for lunch do not decide to bite the person next to them (though if there is no way 
to stop the slide into randomness, this could be a concern).  But in matters of 
moral and prudential importance we often find agents faced with significant 
choices between two or more alternatives, such as which job to take, which person 
to save, or whether to move in with their girlfriend or not.  If there is 
indeterminism in the process of deliberation then we might worry that agents’ 
strongest reasons do not win out, which would be significantly at odds with our 
ordinary conception of deliberation as agents trying to figure out what they ought 
to do based on what they have strongest reason to do.139  The last place to locate 
the indeterminism would be in the acquisition of desires, beliefs and other 
psychological states that can stand as inputs for agency.  Beliefs, in particular, are 
normally taken to be things that agents acquire passively.  If that were correct, 
then indeterminism about belief acquisition would be troubling.  It would give us 
reason to doubt that those things that produce beliefs in us are well equipped to 
connect the content of our beliefs with those things in the world that our beliefs 
are about.  Even if these inputs are not passive, and there are things, perhaps like 
desires, that we actively take to be desirable to a certain extent, then we need there 
to be a certain connection between our perceiving the features of something, our 
reflection of the value of those features (and perhaps our conception of the good).  
Luck would undermine our ability to form desires for things that we find 
satisfying, to believe in things we have reason to think true, and to take to be 
reasons things that connect us to the world, including, self-reflexively, ourselves.140  
Randomness limits our ability to possess this connection.  It is analogous to Kant’s 
veil that limits our access to the noumenal world of things as they are.  Our 
practical and moral deliberations could be based on phenomenal representations 
of what is true, desirable, rational, etc., without the ability to secure that these 
representations resemble the noumenal at all.  So we see that luck presents a potent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 I am sure that readers will find my causal characterisation of deliberation rather at odds 
with earlier comments about whether agents have to act on their strongest reasons, or 
whether they are caused to act by their strongest reasons.  We will have more to say about 
this in due course, but for now I am only interested in sketching matters in a way that 
highlights ways in which the luck objection can manifest itself, and this happens to be 
more easily seen on a causal theory of action. 
140 We are ignoring for simplicities sake many substantive questions about the status of 
things like desires and reasons, especially internalism/externalism.  But, again, we are only 
interested in seeing how luck could present a problem. 
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challenge.  The insistence on some indeterminism, some place where matters are 
not determined by what goes before but can go otherwise, creates the possibility of 
things being random, or chancy.  And, so the objection goes, this randomness 
undercuts the agent’s ability to exercise control. 
 
Event-casual responses: Kane and Ekstrom 
Let us consider one of the most influential event-causal attempts to respond 
to this problem.  We will look at Kane’s account of free will, which is 
representative of event-causal strategies.  Kane’s account targets an agent’s 
possession of free will, rather than free action, and is framed in terms of the 
freedom required for moral responsibility.  So we need to say a little about the 
difference, but we will see that the essence of incompatibilist freedom as the up-to-
us-ness required for freedom of choice, remains the same.  Kane proposes a 
definition of free will; ‘the power of agents to be the ultimate creators (or 
originators) and sustainers of their own ends or purposes’ (1998:4).  Kane thinks 
that while incompatibilists can accept compatibilism between intentions and 
action, they must insist on indeterminacy between reasons and choices.  With 
these points in mind Kane suggest the following definition of willing and 
voluntarily willing (1998:30): 
(W)  An agent wills to do something at time t just in case the agent has reasons 
or motives at t for doing it that the agent wants to act on more than he or she 
wants to act on any other reasons (for doing otherwise). 
(V)  An agent acts voluntarily (or willingly) at t just in case, at t, the agent does 
what he r she wills to do (in the sense of W), for the reasons he or she will to do 
it, and the agent’s doing it and willing to do it are not the result of coercion or 
compulsion. 
These two definitions exclude coercion, and preserve intentionality.  The 
distinction between willing and doing so voluntarily is important when 
considering problems like Frankfurt-style counterexamples where agents will 
something but only at the behest of another agent. 
Kane suggest that freedom required for moral responsibility has two 
conditions: alternative possibilities and ultimate responsibility.  He gives the 
following definitions for these two conditions (1998:33-35): 
(AP)  The agent has alternative possibilities (or can do otherwise) with respect 
to A at t in the sense that, at t, the agent can (has the power or ability to) do A 
and can (has the power or ability to) do otherwise. 
(UR)  An agent is ultimately responsible for some (event or state) E’s occurring 
only if (R) the agent is personally responsible for E’s occurring in a sense which 
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entails that something the agent voluntarily (or willingly) did or omitted, and 
for which the agent could have voluntarily done otherwise, either was, or 
causally contributed to, E’s occurrence and made a difference to whether or not 
E occurred; and (U) for every X and Y (where X and Y represent occurrences of 
events and/or states) if the agent is personally responsible for X, and if Y is an 
arche (or sufficient ground or cause or explanation) for X, then the agent must 
also be personally responsible for Y. 
Alternative possibilities (AP) is a common condition in the free will 
literature, but Kane thinks that incompatibilists stake too much on this alone.  
Ultimate responsibility comes in two parts, and the ultimacy condition identifies 
the agent as the ultimate and originating cause.  Kane mentions Aristotle’s 
concern that agents must be originators, or must provide the explanation for what 
they originate.141  He is thinking of something like character formation.  If we are 
responsible for action flowing from a virtuous character, then we must also be 
responsible for the character we possess.  In other words we cannot be only an 
instrumental cause.  For an agent to be ultimately responsible the buck must stop 
with them.  The responsibility condition identifies the agent as a necessary causal 
element for their responsible action.  The agent’s action (or inaction) does not 
provide sufficient conditions, as there may be other contributing conditions 
outside their control, for example other agents, or environmental factors.  But in a 
case of responsible action, when we ask why the action occurred, our answer will 
have to include ‘because of what the agent voluntarily did’ in the sense of (V), and 
hence did not have to do.  So when action is responsible the buck stops with the 
agent, and specifically with the agent’s choice.  This is very similar to our 
condition of up-to-us-ness in freedom of choice. 
Kane responds to Dennett’s (1984) challenge to (AP) in considering the case 
of Luther who uttered, “here I stand, I can do no other” and yet despite his self-
exclaimed lack of alternate possibilities is counted as responsible for his actions.  
Kane argues that in order understand a case like Luther’s we need to investigate 
how the person came to be the way they are.  Was Luther responsible for being the 
kind of person that uttered as he did?  If there was nothing that Luther could have 
done that would have made a difference to who he was then he would not have 
been responsible.  But Kane notes that this is to invoke (UR), so in order to 
preserve the requirement for (AP) it has to be understood alongside (UR). Recall 
that (UR) has two parts, (R) contains the requirement for APs and that (U) 
contains the requirement that the agent be responsible for the arche or sufficient 
ground of action.  Kane claims that it is (U) that captures the incompatibilist 
intuitions that cause them to object to compatibilist accounts (like Frankfurt’s).  
Kane states that (U) makes it clear that ‘ultimately responsible agents must not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Compare with Chisholm (1964) and our discussion in chapter one. 
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only be the sources of their actions, but also of their will to perform the actions’ 
(1996:73), (U) precludes the possibility of determinism if free actions exist.  While 
heredity and environment limit possibilities, we want to know whether after all 
this is taken into account is there anything left over that is up to us?  Kane 
proposes the term ‘self-forming actions’ (SFAs) for the kinds of acts an agent 
needs to originate if there is to be responsible action.  He defines SFA’s thus: 
SFAs … are the undetermined, regress-stopping voluntary actions (or 
refrainings) in the life histories of agents that are required if U is to be satisfied, 
and for which the agent is personally responsible in the sense of R.  The agents 
must therefore be responsible for them directly and not by virtue of being 
responsible for other, earlier actions (as would be required if they were not 
regress-stopping).  This means that, for SFAs, the “something the agents could 
have voluntarily done (or omitted) that would have made a difference in 
whether or not they occurred” is simply doing otherwise, rather than doing 
something else that would have causally contributed to their not occurring 
(1998:75). 
So SFAs satisfy (AP) in an incompatibilist sense that requires indeterminism.  
Coming full circle to Dennett’s challenge of Luther’s, “Here I stand” brings Kane 
to describing the important thing about Luther being that his will was a will of his 
own making.  When he acted as he did, he acted of his own free will.  This ties in 
(UR) with this common phrase used when talking about free will and 
responsibility.  Kane states: 
While SFAs are required by UR for there to be ultimate responsibility at all, 
SFAs are not the only actions for which we are ultimately responsible, according 
to UR.  Luther’s “Here I stand” would have been an affirmation for which he 
was ultimately responsible, even if it was determined and even if he could not 
have done otherwise, so long as it was a willed action (issuing from his 
character and motives) and he was responsible (as U requires) by earlier 
undetermined SFAs for the character and motives from which the affirmation 
issued.  In other words incompatibilists do not have to hold that all actions for 
which agents are ultimately responsible must be undetermined; ultimately 
responsible actions form a wider class of actions than undetermined SFAs 
(1998:77). 
Kane proposes that different actions can arise from the same past, without 
occurring merely by chance, by arguing that SFAs involve agents in parallel 
processing.  Consider one of his examples142: a woman is on the way to a meeting 
that is important to her career, but while walking notices a mugging taking place 
in a nearby alley.  She then experiences an ‘inner struggle’ where her moral 
conscience tells her to stop and intervene to save the victim, but her drive for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Kane has used this in several places, I have adapted it from Kane (2011). 
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career ambition tells her that she cannot miss this meeting, and must keep 
walking.  ‘She has to make an effort of will to overcome the temptation to go on to 
her meeting.  If she overcomes this temptation, it will be the result of her effort, 
but if she fails, it will be because she did not allow her effort to succeed’ (2011:387).  
The woman possesses conflicting reasons, or motivations, and the presence of this 
conflict presents an obstacle to either of those reasons being effective in 
production of an action.  Because the woman has a reason to stop and help, she 
tries to do the moral thing, and makes an effort of will to resist the temptation to 
pass on by.  However because she has a reason to go to her meeting she also makes 
an effort of will to resist the temptation to delay going to her meeting by stopping 
and helping.  Both of these efforts of will are of indeterminate strength – and it is 
here that Kane isolates the place of indeterminism.  One of these efforts of will 
‘wins’, and our agent acts one way or the other.  Given the indeterminate strength 
of these two efforts, and their direct causal connection to the actions they produce, 
there is genuine indeterminism about which action is performed.  Whichever 
action is performed, it will be true that it is an action that the agent wanted to 
perform, tried to perform, and had reason to perform.  So, Kane claims, the agent 
is actively involved in the production of the action.  Their production of the action 
is grounded in their character, and the motivations it can produce. 
But, Kane has not escaped the luck objection.  Let us focus on whether the 
agent has control over whether she stops to help, or goes on to her meeting.  The 
agent possesses two conflicting motivations, and the agent wills something if, 
when they act, they do so in accordance with their strongest motivation.  It 
appears that Kane wants us to imagine the agent’s action producing faculties as 
being in stalemate when these conflicting motivations are at parity.  It might be 
difficult to say that they need to be exactly equal, but we can rectify that by 
stipulating that motivations need to achieve a threshold majority to be ones we can 
identify as the agent’s will.  The efforts of will are not well defined, but since they 
act on the agent’s motivations they seem to point to a hierarchy, or perhaps web, 
of motivations.  There are lots of issues for Kane here, about whether these efforts 
of will are actions (in which case we might worry about a regress), about problems 
of regress in hierarchical models of the will, and about whether we can actively 
change our motivations by dint of effort.  But even if these issues can be resolved, 
the effectiveness of these efforts of will is not something that is up-to-the-agent.  
Kane explains the inherent indeterminism of the strength of these efforts as being 
due to quantum indeterminacy that is amplified by the chaotic nature of complex 
neurophysiology.  This fixes the final effective strength of the effort of will as being 
something that cannot be determined by any prior condition, and is genuinely 
spontaneous (within a certain range). 
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If an agent only had one effort of will, with determinate strength, then we 
could say that the exercise of this effort of will on the agent’s motivation, in order 
to direct action production, constitutes an active engagement of the agent in 
controlling their actions.  But our next question would be about whether the agent 
possesses control over their possession of a certain effort of will’s being a part of 
their psychology.  This is to apply consequence argument style reasoning to the 
agent’s acquisition of, or possession of, this effort of will.  Note that for Kane, the 
agent possesses an effort of will to resist a temptation, or do a certain act, because 
of their character.  So with one effort of will, our focus would be on the regress to 
the agent’s early character formation, and whether they exercised control.143  We 
can apply the same consequence argument style questioning to the change of state 
of the agent that takes them from possessing two indeterminate strengths of effort 
of will, to the state where one effort is determinately stronger than the other.  On 
pain of regress this change cannot be one that is caused by some prior effort, or 
change in the agent.  Kane has located the root of this change in quantum 
indeterminacy to avoid just such a regress, or determination by some prior event 
or state.  So, to the question of what the resolution of these two efforts of will is up 
to, the only answer that can be given is, ‘chance’.  Since control resides, for Kane, 
in his story about how agents cause their actions, this means that which effort of 
will is successful is something than cannot be under the agent’s control. 
However Kane has done something to explain an agent’s control over their 
actions.  The action produced when our agent finally walks on to her meeting, or 
stops to help, is one that fits with her character, is one that she willed voluntarily, 
and possessed an alternative possibility concerning.  However it was not 
something that was up-to-her.  She did not possess freedom of choice about 
whether she stopped to help, or went to her meeting.  The complex story about her 
motivations, and efforts of will, does secure something, but it only secures freedom 
of action guidance.144  But we have found that this sort of freedom is quite 
compatible with determinism.  Therefore what Kane has done is to explicate a 
sense of freedom that is compatibilist in nature, because it relies on a compatibilist 
friendly source-model of agential control, but has developed his theory in a way 
that is sensitive to incompatibilist intuitions about the need for alternative 
possibilities.145  However this does nothing to secure freedom of choice, and the 
introduction of indeterminism to the essentially compatibilist friendly story, has 
only created a problem of luck.  We can appreciate the concern of compatibilists, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 I am doubtful about Kane’s ability to contend with this problem, but we have no space 
to discuss it here. 
144 Kane’s conditions of (V) and (W) also secure freedom of value alignment, the freedom 
from manipulation. 
145 Clarke (2003) has also noted that there is something ‘compatibilist’ about Kane’s 
account. 
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who see an admission that control has to do with causation, and then find the 
possibility of a complete causal explanation of how the agent acts being 
undermined by an event which does not have a contrastive causal explanation.  
Kane does talk about the agent being an arche (a beginning point) for their action.  
But the arche he has in mind is the agent being the primary sufficient cause of the 
conditions from which action was possible, which secures the agent as the source 
of their action.  However the arche we are interested in is that of a junction in the 
garden of forking paths, the arche at which the production of action went one way 
rather than another.  There seems to be a deeply held intuition among many 
incompatibilists (especially those of a more agent-casual persuasion) that this 
arche should be the agent, or be caused by the agent146.  Kane enables us to cite the 
agent as the reason why one of either A or B occurs.  But the agent cannot be the 
reason why A rather than B occurs, or vice versa.  On Kane’s account the answer 
to this second question must be ‘luck’. 
Ekstrom (2000) develops an account that attempts to deal with worries about 
luck in an agent’s process of deliberation, by placing the indeterminism at an 
earlier stage of the process.  Indeterminism within the process of deliberation (or 
any other psychological process contributing to decision and intention) would 
mean that the agent is not really exercising control over the output of the 
evaluations their psyche makes.  Instead the indeterminism must be located prior 
to intention formation.  The key idea is that not all causation involves 
necessitation.  In indeterminate causation the cause merely increases the 
probability of an effect obtaining.  She argues that probabilistic causation is well 
established in physics now, for example radioactive decay.  But then the question 
becomes ‘how is the intention under control?’  If ‘I prefer x’ only raises the 
probability of ‘I intend x’ and does not necessitate it then control is lacking.  
Therefore Ekstrom locates the indeterminism prior to preference formation 
during deliberation.  According to Ekstrom deliberation can issue in intentions or 
preferences.  Preferences are similar to Frankfurt’s second order desires but are 
also formed in a search for what is good and are thus connected to the agent’s 
conception of the good.  Acting on a desire is not necessarily free, for example in 
the case of addiction,147 however acting on preference is free, since it is authored 
by the agent.  However if preference formation is deterministic (i.e. the function of 
past conditions and deterministic causal laws) then the past becomes the author, 
and control is lost.  What we need is ‘undefeated authorisation’ which is a 
preference that is not coerced and is not a product of the past through 
deterministic causation.  Ekstrom (1993: 608) describes an authorised preference 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 As it is for those volitionists who base control on some primitive mental act. 
147 Although there is reason to doubt Ekstrom is right about this, and that addicts do ‘not 
have a choice’ – see Pickard (2013). 
	   97 
as one that coheres with an agent’s other preferences.  The set of preferences that 
an agent would defend are indicative of the agent’s true self, or character.  Ekstrom 
notes that deliberation resolution does still look arbitrary, and she hopes to 
alleviate this by explaining her conception of an agent.  An agent is marked by a 
certain character and the power to change that character – reform.  Character is 
the input(s) that cause but do not determine the outcome of deliberation.  
Therefore whatever the outcome, it’s source will be the agent’s evaluative faculty 
(and the idea appears to be that it cannot be traced back any further).  
Determinism would threaten this model if character formation was determined by 
the past, but according to Ekstrom this is not the case because of the 
indeterminism inherent in character reform. 
The key issue for Ekstrom is that her account does not sufficiently ground 
control, at least, not the sort of control required for freedom of choice.  We require 
a real ability to control which of the forking paths we follow, rather than the 
counterfactual possibility that other forks could have been open if the ‘trunk’ 
preceding it had been different.  On Ekstrom’s account the forks appear at the 
point of deliberation prior to preference formation.  She claims that the agent is in 
control of which alternative obtains because it is the agent’s own character that 
guides the ‘choice’ between forks.  However I do not think that the character’s 
involvement in the process is enough to ensure control.  The character raises and 
lowers the probabilities of various forks obtaining through a complex coherence 
relation that each fork shares with the agent’s set of preferences.  So there is a sense 
in which the agent is in control of the probabilistic lie of the land prior to the 
outcome of deliberation.  The agent directly affects the likelihood of any fork 
obtaining, and they do so in virtue of who they are, not in virtue of randomness.  
However the luck objection can still be made because the final outcome of 
deliberation rests with the indeterminism, and not with the character of the agent.  
By analogy: although the character may load the dice, for example by adding two 
dots to the ‘one’ to make it a three, when it comes to decision time the dice are 
rolled and could still fail to land in a way that secures the most probable outcome.  
There is nothing the agent can do to secure one particular outcome.  Ekstrom has 
the agent as controlling the outcome of deliberation because the past and causal 
laws do not determine the outcome.  The agent’s character plays a controlling role 
in limiting which forks could obtain (although remember that it is a limiting of the 
probability of an outcome obtaining rather than limiting the possibility).  However 
the agent has no control whatsoever concerning how these probabilities finally 
play out.  The final say, the up-to-us-ness, is in the hands of luck (or 
indeterminism). 
The role of indeterministic coherence evaluation threatens the agent’s 
ownership of their character creation, so that not only are current preference 
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evaluations susceptible to luck, but the entire agent is.  Remember that character is 
defined as the set of an agent’s preferences and presumably the relations that these 
share.  Her account of an agent is that it is a being that possesses character and the 
power to reform that character.   So if each preference that is introduced to this set 
arises through the same indeterministic process Ekstrom has described, then the 
contents of this set cannot be determined by the past: an autonomy from the past 
has been secured.  However we might doubt that the agent’s true self can rightly be 
identified as character when, as already objected above, the final say about the 
contents of this set rests with randomness rather than the self.  Ekstrom’s proposal 
is complex and subtle, but ultimately fails to avoid the luck objection.  There are 
many other varieties of event-causal free will, but we will not need to look at any 
more.  By considering how the luck objection is fatal to these two theories, we have 
gone far enough to see why it is such a perennial problem for incompatibilists.  
These two theories demonstrate a general approach to the problem, and despite 
variations on their theme, the commitment to event-causal control and 
indeterminism will continue to raise the problem of luck. 
 
Abandoning a causal analysis 
There is a general problem with any approach to up-to-us-ness that attempts 
to explain agential control in terms of causation.  We want agents to have control 
over which fork in the path they take, or which action they perform.  Up-to-us-
ness captures this idea of control as the agent being the one who determines which 
fork is taken, rather than it being something that happens to them.  Causation 
looks like it will be an apt tool for explaining the exercise of control, because 
causes work by determining that one thing is possible (or certain) and making 
alternatives impossible.148  So, event-causal theories attempt to explain what sort of 
agent-involving state or event must be the cause of an action, to satisfy that action 
being up to the agent.  The ‘right’ chain of causes leading to an action enables the 
agent to exercise control over their action.  But once this causal model of agential 
control has been adopted there is a problem as soon as indeterminism is 
introduced.  Since control is constituted by an appropriate causal chain, a break in 
this chain would constitute a breakdown of control.  But indeterminism just is the 
introduction of a break in this casual chain.  Indeterminism means that whatever 
comes before cannot determine what comes afterwards.  Now, if this 
indeterminism came before the agent’s time of deliberation, or perhaps even 
before the agent was born, then we would not worry about this instance of 
indeterminism affecting their ability to control their action – as indeed 
compatibilists are wont to not worry about the consequence argument.  This is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 Pink makes this point (2004:115). 
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because an appropriate causal chain could still obtain in the agent.  But placing the 
indeterminism there means it cannot be something any state of the agent now has 
any influence over, or can interact with.  It does not help us provide the agent with 
alternative possibilities they could influence with freedom of choice.  So event-
causalists must place the indeterminism somewhere within the causal chain we 
would identify as ‘action producing’.  But doing this undercuts their ability to tell a 
causal story about the agent’s control.  If control obtains when the right sort of 
cause determines what happens, then the absence of this cause doing the 
determining signals that control does not obtain.  When indeterminism is 
introduced, luck, or chance, or randomness, is introduced as an additional 
determinant of outcomes (or so we have argued).149  But this indeterminism 
cannot be controlled, because in order to be controlled it would have to be causally 
determined, in which case, it would no longer be an instance of indeterminism.  So 
event-causal theories seem doomed to fail.  The marriage of a causal theory of 
control, and indeterminism, is destined to lead to the luck objection. 
Pink (2004) & (2011) has noted that we already have reason to be suspicious 
that causation will be the right tool for analysing free control.  Causation does not 
look like the sort of power that will be able to explain freedom because they are 
fundamentally different types of power.  Causation is a one-way power; a cause 
can only produce the effect it is a cause for.  Causes do not have control over the 
kinds of effects they produce.  Freedom is however a two-way power (something 
that Kane talks about at length but does not connect with the difference from 
causal power).150  Freedom is a power to do A or B.  For example, if I throw a brick 
at the window the glass will break, assuming the brick is thrown with sufficient 
force.  When the brick hits the glass, given the properties that the brick possesses 
as a cause and the properties the glass possesses to be operated upon, there is 
nothing that can happen other than the glass breaking.  Something may prevent 
the glass breaking, but that something would be another cause operating on the 
brick and glass considered as a system.  My decision to throw the brick is different; 
I can decide to throw the brick, or not to throw it.  If decision is an exercise of 
freedom of choice then it is a two-way power.  I have control over which decision 
will obtain, and which action I will perform, and self-determination means that 
the obtaining of one rather than the other is something that I deliberately do.  The 
way I act is up-to-me.  But my exercise of control does not entail that one result 
must obtain, or had to obtain.  By exercising control, the result is the obtaining of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 We should remember that this is also the case for probabilistic indeterminism.  The 
influence over probabilities can load the dice, but when they are rolled, the result will be 
subject to chance. 
150 Some people prefer the term multi-way power, as we need not be limited to only two 
options.  This is right, but as long as we remember that we mean ‘at least two’ this term is 
not problematic. 
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one of the possibilities.  But whatever mechanisms I possess that make it possible 
for me to control, and that are so constituted as to enable my controlling this 
action (or decision), do not make it the case that one possibility must obtain – a 
different possibility could have done.  Causation determines, and thus controls, by 
making any alternatives impossible.  However our common sense conception of 
freedom suggests that our exercise of freedom to A excludes randomness but still 
leaves it a possibility that I could do B.151  Therefore freedom and causation 
exclude randomness, i.e. determine in a controlled way, in intrinsically different 
ways, which suggests that it would be a mistake to try to explain free control in 
terms of causal control.152  So the power exercised by an agent in freedom of choice 
situations (which we can appropriately call the power to choose), is unlike the 
power of causation.  Because they have fundamentally different properties, it is a 
mistake to try to reduce the former to the latter.  So we have a number of reasons 
to suppose that we are not going to be able to explain how action is controlled by 
utilising causation.153 
 
Does agent-causation help? 
But what about agent-causation?154  It is frequently charged that agent-
causation does not resolve the problem, but merely labels, or renames it.155  This is 
not obviously true of all agent-causal theories, but it is worth considering why it 
could be a problem.156  If an event-causal theory of control is adopted then a 
regress of explanatory events is generated.  Events control their effects by being 
sufficient for their occurrence, but each event identified as relevant to the exercise 
of agency must be random or controlled.  So to preserve control we postulate a 
prior sufficient cause, which is another event, to protect the theory from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 For a good discussion of whether this leaves what is done as inexplicable see Ginet 
(1995), and other essays in O’Connor (1995). 
152 This is noted by Pink (2004:115). 
153 Note also that this insight explains why libertarians run into problems when they are 
asked for contrastive explanations of an agent’s acting as they do.  Libertarians should not 
be drawn into providing a contrastive explanation, for it begs the question against a non-
causal account of control.  See Mele (2000) for an instance of this question begging. 
154 Sometimes agent-causation is charged with being metaphysically weird, because it is 
thought that it tries to ground the agent-causal power beyond, or above, the natural causal 
order.  However this objection need not concern us, since there are versions of the theory 
that allay these concerns, and in the context of a project concerning theism and heaven, we 
have already admitted what these objectors conception of the natural order would count as 
metaphysically weird anyway.  See Clarke (2000). 
155 This can be an issue for volitionists, where it can sometimes be charged that the will is 
personified.  A theme we see from antiquity through to scholasticism, see Steel (2004) and 
Pink & Stone (2004).  Note also that agent-causation is not a label applied only to 
incompatibilist accounts, see Markosian (1999). 
156 For example Lowe (2001) identifies important agent involving events involving 
intention, but denies that a causal explanation of these events is possible.  See also Pink 
(2004) 
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randomness.  But then we ask again whether this event is random or controlled (it 
could of course be determined and not random, but out of the agent’s control, 
however we are not interested in this possibility).  Agent-causation identifies some 
event in the production of action, often decision (though some theories identify 
the action itself, and many conceive of the decision as itself an action), and to 
protect from randomness puts the agent in a direct causal relation with that event.  
The claim is then that since the agent is not an event, the regress is terminated.  
The agent stands in the relation of substance cause to the event of the action or 
decision.  Now this may prima facie seem appealing.  After all we are looking for 
self-determination, so a theory that proposes that the controlling factor is the 
agent has clearly grasped something of what we are looking for.157 
However labelling the need for a controlling factor as ‘the agent’ has done 
nothing to explain how this control is exercised.  Objectors want to know what it is 
about the agent, this substance, that explains the agent acting, especially when it 
comes to explaining why the agent acted when they did.  After all an agent can be 
in possession of reasons and still not act, so what is it that takes us from an agent 
primed for action, to an agent performing an action?  How are agents ‘moved’ into 
performance of actions?  Because we are still analysing control in terms of 
causation, there must be something about the agent, qua substance, which makes a 
difference to the effect it produces.  Candidates for this difference could be 
changes in the properties of the substance, or in relations the substance has.  But 
these, objectors will argue, are events.  If it is denied that there is any property that 
makes a difference, objectors will not be happy to call it an instance of causation, 
or will again call it chancy.  Pink (204:108) notes that we need to be careful not to 
assume that the only way something can be determined is causally.  We have seen 
that there is reason to be concerned about whether causation is the right kind of 
power to associate with freedom.  However we do want to say that agents have the 
power to determine how they act.  So, should we try to analyse freedom of choice 
non-causally?  This power of choice in acting does seem to be a different sort of 
power to causation – so yes, the non-causal approach does look like our only 
possibility for analysis of freedom of choice.  I suspect that some agent-casualists 
have intuitions that would lead them to agree with much of what we have 
discussed about the difference between agential self-determination and normal 
event-causation.158  But they would say that causation is still an appropriate term, 
as long as we distinguish ‘agent-causation’ from other types of causation.  As long 
as the dispute is terminological, it does not matter, but in order to bring these 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 See Chisholm (1964), O’Connor (2000), and Clarke (1993) & (2003) for important 
developments of the agent-causal approach. 
158 There seems to be a significant overlap between these views, although there can be 
differences. 
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differences to the foreground, we should say that freedom of choice is not a causal 
power, but it is still a power exercised by agents to determine how they act. 
 
Non-causalism, agents, and whether actions are events 
An immediate challenge to conceiving of freedom of choice non-causally is 
that a causal explanation can, apparently, still be asked for.  However the agent’s 
action is controlled and determined, if it is an event, then it does have a cause, 
since every event has a cause.  The principle that every event has a cause is rather 
underdeveloped stated in this form, perhaps even naïve, but it does plausibly point 
in the direction of something insightful.  Even if some events exhibit some 
indeterminism, such as radioactive decay, there are still casually relevant factors 
pertinent to the opportunity for an event’s occurrence.  But we do not need to 
argue that any such principle is false.  Having admitted that there is some intuition 
here that may be troubling, it points us in the direction of examining the status of 
actions as events.  If actions are not events, then the objection is averted, however 
the principle is construed. 
If actions are identified with events, then the difficult question is, which ones?  
Suppose that I laid out the rake, lured my neighbour into my garden and then 
distracted him at the crucial moment, leading to his tripping and impaling himself 
on the rake.  Is the event of his death something that is a doing of mine?  What 
about the subsequent repossession of his house, and the depression suffered by his 
children?   At some point it becomes inappropriate to call these events a doing of 
mine, though drawing a clear line here is difficult.159   Some have suggested 
identifying actions with bodily movements.  However this suggestion runs into 
problems since some of what we consider actions do not involve movements at all, 
for example if I do not want to be disturbed I can refrain from answering the 
telephone (Hornsby, 2004).160  In this case my refraining seems to be something I 
can decide to do, even intentionally, and is a plausible candidate for an action.  But 
it does not involve my moving my body in any way.  Indeed, some of the things I 
do are to think, to calculate, to watch, to enjoy listening to, and so on – so called 
mental actions.  So the physical location of the event does not seem to help us 
identify what is an action.  As well as a problem with identifying events proceeding 
from an action, or the obvious point at which our consideration of the agent doing 
something begins, there is a regress problem.  If an action is an event that is caused 
by the agent, then we will next ask whether the causing of this event is itself 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 The problem of regress in identifying basic actions, and individuating actions is 
discussed by Goldman (1970), and explanations that do not rely on causation, and thus 
avoid the problem, begin with Stoutland (1968) and Chisholm (1964) 
160 See also Bach (2010), McGrath (2005), Thomson (2003) and Alvarez (2001). 
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another action (see Alvarez & Hyman 1998:222).161  If it is, then a regressing chain 
of events is established whenever an agent acts.  It is difficult to see how we might 
terminate this regress, or avoid it altogether, once we have claimed that agents 
cause their actions, and that actions are events. 
We can utilise a distinction made by Hornsby (1980) between an agent’s arm 
moving, and an agents moving of her arm.162  The event of my arm moving may 
not be an action, for example if you moved it while I was asleep it would not be an 
action.  But my moving of my arm is the sort of thing that can be an action.  
Actions have a possessive description, but the possessive always qualifies the 
subject of the verb which describes the act, who is the agent, and not a part of their 
body, a place, state, or time.  So ‘my raising of my arm’ and ‘Richard’s raising of an 
arm’ are both statements referring to an action.  But ‘my arm’s rising’ and 
‘Richard’s arm going up’ are not; in the first the possessive qualifies the object of 
the verb, and in the second there is no subject.  Now, if actions are events, then 
should we identify the event of my arm moving as being the same event as that of 
my moving my arm?  This move is frequently made.  But it appears not to be the 
right move, because my moving of my arm is the cause of may arm moving.  
Events cannot cause themselves, so there must be two distinct events here, or my 
moving of my arm is not an event.  As Hyman puts it ‘an action – the causing of a 
change – cannot be identified with the change caused, because causation is a 
genuine relation’ (2006:156).  But if my causing my arm to move is a distinct 
event, then we face a regress again.  So, we are faced with the alternative proposal, 
that my action of moving my arm is not an event. The action of my moving my 
arm is not the motion of the arm itself, so what is it? 
Normally the event of someone doing something is an event of their bringing 
something about.  Hornsby (2004) uses the example of a tea-drinker who puts her 
cup on the table, where the result of the event of putting it on the table, is that the 
cup is now on the table.  If I move my arm, the result is that my arm is raised.  By 
acting I cause something to happen, some change to occur.  My action constitutes 
my changing something in the world, making some state of affairs obtain, but it is 
not the event of my causing this change.  Alvarez and Hyman make the point 
clearly saying, 
a sentence which reports an action entails that an agent and an event stand in 
the relation ‘is the causer of’… to act is to exercise a casual power – to cause, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 We will not consider the possibility of basic actions being caused by some prior volition, 
since ths does not appear to terminate the explanatory regress when causation is the tool of 
analysis, but for an attempt at this see McCann (1975 and 1998).  The idea also appears in 
Reid (1843). 
162 This is normally noted by subscripts where to moveT is a transitive use of the verb, and 
to moveI is intransitive.  We do not need to examine this detail, but it will be a useful 
reminder to those used to these terms. 
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bring about or effect an event.  But the exercise of a causal power is neither an 
event, nor the relation between agent and event that it entails.  An action … is a 
causing of an event by an agent (1998: 233). 
So events relate to actions as effects, as Hornsby has it, ‘what agents cause, then, 
are not the events that are their actions, but the effects or results in terms of which 
their actions may be described’ (2004:18).163  So there is a sense in which ‘agents as 
causes’ is relevant to agency, but it is not that of agent’s causing their actions.  An 
action is not the effect of the agent, but an action constitutes the agent’s causing 
some state of affairs to obtain.164  Another way of noting this, though slightly 
awkward, is that actions are not something done by the agent; they are a doing of 
something by the agent.165 
This helps us to understand why it is that the exercise of a non-causal power 
by an agent to act one way rather than another counts as controlled rather than 
random.  When an agent exercises their freedom of choice, and acts a certain way, 
they do not control their action by doing something else, their action just is their 
controlling how they act, what results they bring about, and what ends they direct 
their agency towards.  An agent’s action is not the effect of their control, it 
constitutes their controlling how they act.166  Remember that we have argued that 
performing an action requires an agent to possess motivation towards an end, or 
ends, that they take their action to be a means to satisfying.  When an agent acts 
they make one (or more) of these ends ones that they direct themselves toward.  
The agent acts on a motivation they possess, and their action constitutes acting for 
that reason (in order to satisfy that desire) because it is an application of their 
capacity for practical rationality to how they act.167  Agents are not caused to act by 
their reasons and desires, otherwise they would not be exercising control – they 
would be being controlled.168  Instead agents possess a multitude of reasons and 
desires, and they exercise their freedom of choice over how, and when, they act on 
those reasons, or satisfy those desires, by acting – which is intrinsically doing 
something for a reason.169  Performing an action constitutes my ability not just to 
move my body, but to direct my self towards certain goals – and directing myself 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 See also Stout (2010). 
164 See Steward (2000) on this issue from the perspective of whether a causing is an event 
that could be in an agent. 
165 See also Ruben (2003) for criticisms of viewing actions as events, and also the place of 
this assumption in the causal theory of action. 
166 Pink (2011) emphasizes this relation in terms of constitution.  We could also articulate 
this theory of action by distinguishing it from volition based theories, which are closely 
related, but still causal in character, see Pink (2008). 
167 Remembering that we have not said anything about the need for this capacity to involve 
conscious deliberation, though, in paradigm cases we are often interested in, it does feature 
prominently. 
168 We will discuss Davidson’s objection to this in a moment. 
169 This point is also made by Alvarez (2009). 
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at a goal involves orienting my actions towards the achievement of some effect 
(end) which my action results in, in order to satisfy some desire I possess.  The 
connection between my desires and reasons, and my actions, is not a happy 
accident of chance, nor is it that that of the former causing the latter.  My action is 
the exercise of my capacity to possess desires and reasons, and to act upon some of 
them.  So this capacity for choice is wielded not by my reasons, or desires, or some 
mental state, but is wielded by the self, the agent.170  What the agent is, is a 
complex question, but in our context the agent is at least the instantiation in a 
substance of certain powers, including the power of choice, and the power of 
causation, along with the faculties requisite for the exercise of those powers – so 
the ability to form and to hold beliefs and desires, for practical rationality 
(deliberation, intention, means-end reasoning, etc.), perceptual sensitivity to the 
world around them, and the ability to conceptualise the good and make evaluative 
judgements.171 
This commits us to the view that agents are not reducible to a collection of 
mental states (or their physical realisers).  It is a benefit that we are committed to 
the position that it is an agent that performs an action, and not a state, or part, of 
that agent.  As Velleman (1992) has argued, an agent is ineliminable from our 
description of what happens when someone acts.  Although I do not want to argue 
at length against the causal theory of action, Velleman’s comments are apposite.172  
The standard Davidsonian causal theory describes an action as an agent’s desire 
for a certain end, and their belief that a certain event would be likely to further that 
end, jointly producing a bodily movement that will contribute to, or constitute, 
that end’s obtaining.  Velleman complains that, 
In a full-blooded action, an intention is formed by the agent himself, not by his 
reasons for acting.  Reasons affect his intention by influencing him to form it, 
but they thus affect his intention by affecting him first.  And the agent then 
moves his limbs in execution of his intention; his intention doesn't move his 
limbs by itself (1992: 462). 
So the initial suggestion, that actions are things that agents do, requires some 
qualification.  The ‘things done’ are the effects of the action that allow us to 
identify and describe the action, or the event (act), which constitutes performance 
of the action.  But the action is not the event itself, but the doing of the act by the 
agent.  Actions do not describe events, processes or states, but are about how 
agents interact with the world to produce events and processes, and maintain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 So there is a close connection between non-causalism and agent-causalism. 
171 There is, of course, a lot more to be said about this question that we do not have space to 
tackle, but see the later discussion of character especially. 
172 Taking on the causal theory of action in detail, would be a project in its own right, 
remember that we will only need to say enough to motivate the claim that freedom of 
choice is coherent. 
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states.  So the action of an agent is not reducible to the event of the agent 
performing something.173 
 
Non-causalism versus apparent causal explanations of action 
However we have not finished dealing with our original objection, because if 
there is an event of the agent acting in a certain way read in terms of ‘an event of 
such and such a result being brought about’, then we can still ask about the causes 
of this event.  And if a causal explanation can be offered, then this would seem to 
undermine the non-causal strategy we have developed.174  However our comments 
about the centrality of the agent will help us to understand the place of any such 
causal explanations of agent-involving events like this.  We should expect an 
examination of action explanation to help us to identify and understand 
something about agents, because if actions are the doings of agents, then agents 
should figure in the explanans.  If agents were not a part of the explanans then it is 
difficult to see how we could possibly establish that an action was a doing by an 
agent.  This was Velleman’s point above (which is really more about action 
explanation, than action); it is also made by Hornsby in critiquing the causal 
theory of action’s explanation of actions as being caused by desires. 
For even where there is an event of the agent's doing something, its occurrence 
is surely not what gets explained.  An action-explanation tells one about the 
agent: one learns something about her that makes it understandable that she 
should have done what she did (2004: 8). 
We need to take care to distinguish several types of explanation of action (or agent 
involving events).175  Sandis (2012a:333ff.) has distinguished three senses in which 
action explanation is proffered,176  
i) Why A’s body moved  
ii) Why A’s action of moving her body occurred  
iii) Why A moved her body 
Sandis explains that, 
In (i) we are searching for the cause of the event that was the movement of A’s 
body.  What is sought in (ii), by contrast, is the cause of the (related) event of 
A’s moving her body to occur.  Finally, to provide an explanation of (iii) is to 
explain […] why A performed the action of moving her body. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 See also Wiggins (1998) on Hume and causal/contrastive objections. 
174 For a recent collection on the issue of whether reasons are causes, and the causal theory 
of action, see D’Oro and Sandis (2013). 
175 For an overview of the need for distinction see Stout (2005), and also Goetz (2008). 
176 See also Sandis (2012b) for a fuller discussion of the effects of conflating these senses of 
explanation on the development of action theory. 
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We have already argued that the movement of an agent’s body should not be 
confused with the agent’s moving of their body.  So it is no surprise that if these 
are distinct things, even in different categories, since actions are not events, they 
will have different types of explanation. 
Consider the example of my raising my arm to gesture to a friend that I see 
walking down the road towards me.  My action is my raising of my arm – my 
causing of my arm having been raised.  However there is also the event of my arm 
rising, the actual bodily movement, and there is also the event of my acting in such 
a way as to raise my arm.  The explanation of my action itself concerns iii), and 
explanations of ‘causings’ by agents must be teleological in nature, that is, 
explanations of why an agent acts as they do must refer to goals that the agent 
adopts – the ends at which their action aims.177  Since actions are the exercise of 
practical rationality in an action constitutive way, and since actions intrinsically 
involve goal-orientation by the agent, the ends at which an agent aims by so acting 
must figure in the explanation.  Alvarez (2013:147) considers the example of an 
agent watering the plants at dusk, since watering them in the middle of the day 
would be ineffective because of evaporation.  The agent has a reason for watering 
the plants at dusk – some fact about evaporation, the loss of water, and the need 
for plants to have time to absorb water to keep healthy.178  But the reason does not 
explain the agent’s action, because they need to be aware of this fact for it to have 
anything to do with their action.  But even if the agent is aware of this fact, still it 
does not explain their action, because without the agent possessing some goal at 
which their action aims there would be no connection between the beliefs (or 
reasons) the agent has, and the kind of action they perform.  The fact about 
evaporation only explains the agent’s watering the plants at dusk on the 
presupposition that the agent has a goal of keeping the plants healthy.  If the agent 
has the goal of keeping the plants healthy, or economising on water, then the 
reason is relevant to how they act.  But the possession of desires that could 
motivate an agent towards some end or goal is not sufficient for the agent actually 
being oriented towards a goal.  Agents orient themselves at goals by acting – which 
can include actions such as making decisions, forming intentions, making 
practical plans, making evaluative judgements, and so on.  Therefore the event of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 See Sehon (1997) & (2005), and McLaughlin (2013) for more on why purposive 
explanations are non-causal. 
178 I am not going to discuss internalism/externalism about reasons, as this would be a 
considerable undertaking at this point.  For the record I agree with Dancy (2002) that 
reasons are states of affairs, and not mental states.  However, were someone to be 
committed otherwise I think that there is some scope for internalists to construct 
workarounds to allow reasons to play the role in freedom of choice that they need to, even 
though this may not be the best solution.  So, it is not essential for us to discuss here.  For 
more discussion of the superiority of externalism, see Alvarez (2010), Dancy (1995), and 
also Stoutland (2001). 
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coming to realise that there is some reason, or the acquisition of a desire (in other 
words, events), cannot provide an explanation of why an agent acts.179  So the 
explanation of my raising my arm could be something like: ‘in order to greet my 
friend’, it will give the goal at which my action aimed, a goal I adopted by so 
acting.180 
However, another explanation that could be offered is that I saw my friend 
walking down the road.  The event of my seeing, if this does explain my acting a 
certain way, would then be a casual explanation, which would be problematic.  But 
this explanation is not really about why I acted a certain way, instead it is an 
explanation of why my action of raising my arm occurred, or to be more precise, 
why the event of my acting in such a way as to cause the result of a raised arm 
occurred.  These questions correspond to Sandis’ category ii).  The key insight 
here is that although there is something pertinent to understanding the agent’s 
action by considering the event of my friend walking down the road (or my seeing 
them doing so), it does not undercut what we have said about event-causal 
explanations destroying the ability of agents to possess freedom and control.  This 
is because although there is an event of my friend walking down the road, whose 
casual influence is felt by me, the agent, and my faculties of perception, belief 
formation and so on, the occurrence of this event need in no way be seen as 
something that determines the occurrence of my action.  This event does provide 
the opportunity for me to gesture to a friend, but it does not necessitate it.181  One 
way to look at this is that the occurrence of this event is a structural cause that 
makes it possible for me to act on a motivation (perhaps I have been longing to 
run into a friend and greet them).  Or we might say that the occurrence of this 
event introduces a reason that the agent could act on, but whether they will do so 
or not is not determined by the possession of this reason.  However the 
introduction of an event-cause, whether we consider it in terms of being a 
structuring cause rather than a triggering cause of my action, or whether we just 
say that it is an indeterministic contributing cause, does not introduce any threat 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Sehon (1997), (2005) and (2010) argues in considerable detail about the irreducibility of 
teleological explanations.  See also Schueler (2003). 
180 It may be that I saw my friend some way off, and did not raise my arm until they were 
close enough to see my face.  If I decided I would raise my arm, then I adopted a goal at 
that point.  But my decision, or formation of an intention, does not cause my later raising 
my arm – after all I could have failed to do so.  But my decision does alter my motivational 
state, my awareness of certain reasons I possess, and the focus of my attention.  In a way I 
orient myself at the goal of greeting my friend when I make the decision, but the tense of 
this statement matters.  When I decide my goal is that ‘I will greet my friend’, and when I 
actually raise my arm my goal is ‘to be greeting my friend’.  These two are related.  This is a 
relatively minor point, but worth consideration to avoid thinking that agents can only 
adopt goals by present bodily movements, or any such similar view.  We will consider how 
our motivational state may influence how we act shortly. 
181 See especially Dretske (1988) and (2010) for more about structuring causes and action. 
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of randomness, because an agent’s control is exercised and explained by their 
acting a certain way, and that fixes us squarely in the realm of iii).  So the presence 
of a causally structured explanation of my action that cites an event is not in 
competition with our non-causal analysis of freedom of choice, as long as we 
distinguish explanations of my action, from explanations of the event of my 
acting. 
The other sort of explanation of my action that could be offered might go 
something like this: ‘my arm rose because a neural motor control system caused 
certain muscle groups to contract’, or a variation on this theme.  This is an 
explanation of why my arm went up, which corresponds to Sandis’ i).  The 
comments we made above are also pertinent to these sorts of explanation.  As long 
as the neurophysiological event-causal chain leading to and including my arm 
going up is not deterministic, then there is space for the agent to do otherwise.  
But, once again, this stipulation does not mean that we have introduced the threat 
of randomness again.  For an agent’s control is exercised in the constitutive 
relation between his capacity for practical rationality and his action.  In fact, if this 
chain of events is a description in finer detail of what it is for an agent’s arm to go 
up, or an agent to raise their arm, then these neurophysiological details will be part 
of the result, caused by the agent when they act a certain way.  Alvarez puts it this 
way, 
And it seems plausible to suggest that these motions [my arm going up] are 
caused by neural states and events and, more generally, by a complex of 
neurophysiological occurrences and conditions.  However, these motions are 
not themselves actions but the results of actions: they are (among) the things 
we make happen when we act (2013:153). 
But there is a prevalent concern that our neurophysiology is a physical 
system, developing deterministically according to well-defined natural laws, and 
that this would prohibit any agent from having the power to make anything 
happen otherwise.  So although the admission of these causal explanations having 
a place in explaining agency does not prohibit control, it may prohibit freedom of 
choice, because there could not exist alternative possibilities.  Although there are 
sceptics about it’s plausibility, we noted that Kane has suggested that quantum 
indeterminacy could be present in neurobiology, and could be amplified through 
chaos inherent in the complexity of the system to provide alternative possibilities.  
However, even if this is so, it is difficult to see how a quantum fluctuation could be 
something that is a result of an agent’s power to act.  It may be important for 
helping us see why there is sufficient causal slack at the physical level to allow for 
other forms of causation, without breaking physical laws.182  There are other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 See Ellis (2009). 
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prominent proposals.  O’Connor (2000) has championed the idea that our 
complex neurophysiology may exhibit a complexity sufficient for the emergence of 
non-physical properties, and associated powers and relations.  Emergent dualism 
avoids the ‘metaphysical wierdness’ of Cartesian dualism by grounding the 
existence of emergent properties in the natural realm we are familiar with.183  It is 
also independently motivated since emergence is used to explain the behaviour of 
biological systems other than in the context of action.  A second possible avenue of 
explanation is that our neurophysiology allows for consciousness (even if 
physically realised) to play the role of bringing together multiple parallel strands of 
possible influence, and resolving them – the global workspace theory of 
consciousness.184  Although I suspect that some combination of emergence and a 
global workspace theory may get us what we need here, we do not need to concern 
ourselves with the details.  Both of these suggestions are forms of top-down 
causation, which make room for the sorts of alternative possibilities that could 
conceivably be a result of an agent’s action.  If it is possible that there is an answer 
to this question of how room can be made for alternative possibilities, even if the 
details are yet unknown, then the objection is not fatal, and the prospects seem 
promising, and there is no reason to conclude that freedom of choice is physically 
impossible.185 
 
Davidson’s challenge, and objections to the causal theory of action 
The non-causal analysis of freedom of choice has survived the challenges 
presented thus far, however two important issues remain that deserve special 
attention.  The first of these is Davidson’s challenge, which concerns what it is for 
an agent to act for a reason.  The second issue is why, given that agents may do all 
sorts of things given the plethora of reasons and motivations available to them, 
agents persist in so often acting according to their strongest desires or reasons.  
Davidson motivates the move from a non-causal to a causal theory of action by 
challenging non-causalists to explain how we can analyse an agent’s acting for one 
reason rather than another in the presence of multiple reasons for action.  
Davidson challenged the non-causal norm by noting that a ‘person can have a 
reason for an action, and perform the action, and yet this reason not be the reason 
why he did it’ (1963).  So in virtue of what is it true that an agent acted for a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 See Clarke (2000) on worries about metaphysical ‘weirdness’, or extravagance. 
184 See Baumeister, Mele & Vohs, (2010), and Levy (2014), for a discussion of this theory.  
Although I have used the term ‘parallel’ the way I conceive of this is more akin to a 
superposition of cognitive and evaluative states, which the agent has the power to resolve 
one way or another.  But for those unfamiliar with the metaphysics of superposition, 
parallel, is the next best term, and not much hangs on the difference. 
185 For more on these issues, and the prospects for a solution see Gibb, et al. (2013), 
O’Connor (2000), Murphy & Brown (2009), and Murphy et al. (2009). 
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reason?  We can frame the challenge clearly by asking when an agent has more 
than one reason for A-ing, φ and ψ, what makes it true that they acted only for φ 
and not for ψ?  Davidson responded that the reason that causes my action 
identifies which reason I act for (1963).  For example, suppose I am the judge of a 
competition.  Your being my close friend gives me a reason to award the prize to 
you, but also, and in a judgement quite independent of your being my friend, your 
entry to the competition is the one I regard as the best, which furnishes me with 
another reason to award you the prize.  If I award you the prize, in virtue of what 
is it true that I awarded you the prize for the reason that your entry was the best, 
and not, unfairly, because you are my friend?  For Davidson, the answer can only 
be that the former reason caused my action, whereas the latter did not causally 
contribute to the production of the action. 
Davidson’s challenge motivated the development of a causal theory of action 
that had the resources to explain action in causal terms sufficient to answer this 
question.  The causal theory of action, or varieties of it, dominate the philosophy 
of action, and although the causal theory of action we will examine is not 
Davidson’s it is Davidsonian, and represents a core consensus in broad brush 
terms.186   The causal theory of action claims that we can identify a bodily 
movement as an agent’s action by the causal antecedents of that bodily movement.  
As current orthodoxy has it, when an agent has a desire for X and a belief that 
their A-ing would be likely to produce X, this belief/desire pair are jointly 
sufficient to cause that agent to A, where A is the bodily movement that 
constitutes their action. 
We have already given some discussion to what it is for an agent to act for a 
reason, but it would be good to highlight these claims again in response to 
Davidson’s challenge.  We argued that when an agent acts they do something that 
is intrinsically goal-directed, and in order to be an action, that goal must be an end 
that the agent desires, and the agent takes their action to be a likely means of 
achieving that end.  The possession of a desire for an end, and the prospect of the 
means of satisfying that desire (or achieving that end) give the agent a reason to 
act.  Their reason for acting is ‘to satisfy this desired end’, which in our example 
was one of either ‘to please my friend’, or ‘to reward the best entry’.  Davidson’s 
challenge effectively begs the question against the non-causal account by pointing 
to goal-direction, which is acting for something, and then pointing to the action 
itself, in terms of the bodily movement, and asking what connects the two together 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 See for example Mele (1992 and 2003), Davis (2005).  Another interesting issue for the 
causal theory of action, is whether the connection between beliefs and desires is necessary, 
but we will not explore this because of space, though the issue may run parallel to some of 
our previous discussion.  See Melden (1961), Stoutland (2001) and Dancy (2004), a brief 
defence on behalf of the causalists in given in Mele (2010). 
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in the right way.  However for the non-causalist the bodily movement that is part 
of the action, minus the goal-directedness, is just not an action anymore.  So the 
challenge presents somewhat of a problem, if it is accepted as legitimate then the 
non-causalist has agreed to answer a question about what makes a certain bodily 
movement acting for a reason, when they do not even think that the movement in 
question is acting any more.  It is therefore no wonder that once this concession 
has been made, answers seem worryingly incoherent.  What the non-causalist 
should do, is to object that the challenge is not legitimate as the question itself 
belies a fundamental misunderstanding about what actions are.   
Actions are all goal-directed, they all aim at an end, and the power agents 
exercise in freedom of choice is to choose which ends they act for (which can be 
more than one).  Performing an action constitutes the agent’s ability not just to 
move their body, but to direct themself towards certain goals – and directing 
themself at a goal involves orienting their actions towards the achievement of 
some effect (end) which their action results in, in order to satisfy some desire they 
possess. The agent’s action is the exercise of their capacity to act for a reason.  So if 
an agent possesses two reasons, one to make their friend happy, and the other to 
reward the best competition entry, the question of which reason they acted for is 
settled by looking at the intrinsic property of the action itself.  Often agents will be 
conscious of these properties introspectively, but if not then we may not have 
epistemic access to the answer.187  So the answer to ‘what makes it the case that the 
agent acts for one reason rather than another’ is ‘the way that the agent acts’.  If the 
agent acts in order to make their friend happy, this identifies acting for this reason, 
and if the agent acts to reward the best entry, the identifies this other reason.  
Davidson takes it that the actions in both of these cases are identical, and so the 
only differentiation between them has to be in terms of their causes.  However, 
because they are inherently goal-directed, they are not the same action, and we can 
differentiate between them by considering the properties of the actions 
themselves. 
We can do more to deal with Davidson’s challenge however, because there 
are reasons to doubt that the causal theory of action can itself deal effectively with 
explaining under what circumstances an agent has acted for a reason.  These 
objections give us reason to doubt the causal theory, weakening any qualms about 
the non-causal analysis.  Firstly, we should consider how well the causal theory can 
answer its own challenge, or rather, some problems that arise from its answer.  In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 It is worth noting that if, as Alvarez suggested earlier, neurophysiological events are 
ones we cause by acting, because they are among the results of what we do, then there may 
be clues as to the intrinsic properties of an action here (especially when the result is not 
just the final state, like an arm raised, but a process) which would be discovered 
empirically even though they are not introspectively accessible by an agent.  This may turn 
out not to be the case, but we should not rule out the possibility at this time. 
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order to examine the causal answer we need some idea of what these reasons are 
that are supposed to be causing bodily movements.  This is not an uncontroversial 
topic, but thankfully a sketch will suffice us.  Reasons play a role in practical 
reasoning, which is teleological in nature.  That is to say that it takes a means-end 
form.  Reasons motivate agents to perform actions by rationalising the act, A-ing, 
as a means to achieve a desired end, E.  For most causalists (who are normally paid 
up members to the project of naturalising action explanation) the cause of the 
action is taken to be a mental state (or event, depending on your ontology) that 
can stand in the relation to the bodily movement as efficient cause, therefore 
motivation is given a causal reduction.  The details of neurophysiological 
mechanisms do not matter to us. 188   Whatever they are, they are physical 
realisers189 of pro-attitudes towards A-ing; that is, agents with reasons for A-ing 
possess a pro-attitude, or desire, towards the end at which A-ing aims, and this 
desire motivates the agent to A.  Although my beliefs and abilities are causally 
relevant to what actions I perform, it is common to see a focus on the motivational 
role of desires in causal theories.  Causalists, like Mele (2003), take an agent’s 
desiring E to be the reason for their A-ing.190  My desiring E motivates me to act to 
satisfy that desire and is the reason for my A-ing.191  So my motivational state 
causally explains why I act, and also reveals my reason for acting (hence 
Davidson’s challenge is answered). 
To return to our example, we recognised two reasons presenting themselves 
to my practical reasoning: your being my friend, and your entry to the 
competition being the best.  So I possess two mental states, a state of desiring to 
celebrate our friendship, and a state of desiring to honour the best entry to the 
competition.  Note that I have substituted plausible ends to be the objects of my 
desiring, since under the above analysis it is ends that are desired, however other 
analyses of the objects of desire are available, but I do not think it matters to my 
point here.    Now, I award you the prize, and you want to know the reason why I 
did so.  The reason will be either my desiring to celebrate our friendship, or my 
desiring to honour the best entry to the competition.  Somehow, we are able to 
ascertain that the latter reason, i.e. mental state, was causally responsible for my 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Though, some have argued that the nature of the ontology of mental states could 
provide an objection to the causal theory, see Sehon (2000), or for broader issues Heil & 
Mele (1995). 
189 The relation of realiser is also controversial, but alternatives could be substituted here if 
desired. 
190 These are so called motivating reasons, see Everson (2010) for a discussion of this 
conception of a reason, and Alvarez (2010) for a more extended critique. 
191 It is worth pointing out that I think causalists are guilty of equivocating between ‘the 
reason for my A-ing’ and ‘the reason for which I A’, see Alvarez (2010) and Sandis (2012), 
and that this may lie at the root of where the causal story is going wrong.  But my task here 
is not to argue that point, only point out a dilemma for the position as it is commonly 
construed, so I let sleeping dogs lie. 
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action.192  You are understandably relieved; I was not motivated by your being my 
friend, but by the quality of your work.193  Remember that motivation is given a 
causal reduction under the causal theory of action, and that although desire has 
the pre-eminence in causal explanation, these factors are intimately causally 
relevant to the possession of the relevant states.  Another way of talking about this 
would be that our friendship was not causally responsible for the award, but the 
quality of your work was. 
Let us think again about the role of reasons in motivating action in situations 
where the agent possesses multiple reasons for action.  Since reasons are 
motivationally relevant only when they are causally relevant, any reasons that are 
causally superfluous to the actual efficient causing of my action do not play a role 
in motivating my action.  If I act for a reason, in the presence of other reasons, 
then although the other reasons may have a role in deliberation etc. they cannot 
motivate my action, nor even be something that I desire in acting, on pain of 
contradiction, since what motivates me is my desiring, and my desiring of 
something is my reason for acting.  Now, this seems to be a strange result, and one 
that we should be loath to accept.  Why should we not say, as I take common sense 
folk psychology to say, that I am motivated by all of the reasons that supply me 
with rational grounds for my action?  I may feel bad about awarding you the prize 
for the sake of our friendship, but it certainly motivates me to ensure you receive 
the prize.  Even if this sounds too objectionable, casting the objection in terms of 
desire may seem less so, since it is difficult to deny that in such a situation, when I 
award you the prize, I desire to celebrate our friendship as well as honour the best 
entry.  If this were not the case then why would it be more special for me to be able 
to award the prize to a friend than to a stranger?  If I did not possess a concurrent 
desire to celebrate our friendship then there would be no aspect the experience 
that could contain an element of that desire’s satisfaction.  Or consider the 
concern I might feel, as I award the prize, that I am doing so for the right reason.  
Why would I experience a prick in my conscience unless my desire to celebrate 
our friendship, and the concomitant reason, are not still a part of my psychological 
state as I do so? 
It is clear that we can act in the presence of multiple reasons and desires.  But 
the critical point is that in the presence of multiple reasons and desires, it can still 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Hutto (2013), in D’Oro & Sandis (eds.), notes that Davidson’s proposal is not as helpful 
as it may appear in helping us to discover why agents act as they do, since it seems to 
require a sort of privileged access to internal causes with epistemic transparency, and quite 
why agents should possess this, especially in the face of so much empirical evidence that we 
do not, is far from clear. 
193 To be precise, I ought to say that it is the mental state realisers of my beliefs that you are 
my friend, and that your work is of a high quality, which do the causal and motivational 
work, but this précis is not damaging as long as this distinction is kept in mind. 
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be true of me that I act for only one reason.  It still makes sense for me to say that I 
am pleased to give the award to a friend, but that I did not allow this concern to 
influence my decision.  There may be some causalists who will deny the veracity of 
my introspective report that other reasons/desires did not in fact influence my 
decision.  We should certainly not deny that there could be influences over our 
decisions and action that we are not aware of, and some of these influences are 
certainly of a kind that includes them as part of our practical rationality.194  
However the presence of non-conscious internal influences over our actions 
concerns the question of why an agent acts as they do, rather than the question of 
what is the reason(s) that an agent acts for.  It is important to keep these questions 
distinct.  Despite the influences over my decisions and actions that I might be 
unaware of it still seems a part of the way we ascribe agency to people that they can 
so utilise their capacities for practical rationality and agency that they can act for a 
reason, that is, they can take something to be an explicit goal, or end, at which 
their forming of an intention, or performance of an action aims.195  It looks like the 
causal theory of action as we have examined it lacks the resources to make space 
for this feature of why agents act as they do. 
Perhaps the causal theory of action position could be maintained and 
causalist could claim that the role of plural reasons in deliberation include a 
substantial enough role to account for the folk psychological observations.  But 
this claim is not without problems, even if we allow that the influence of reasons in 
deliberation is dealt with sufficiently under causal theory of action.  Why should 
reasons, which provide a pro-attitude, and hence motivation in deliberation, 
suddenly fail to motivate any more once I have decided how to act, or once I 
initiate my action?  It cannot be that they are still reasons, pro-attitudes, and 
positively motivating, but are unused, or causally inert in action performance.  
Given the reductionist strategy of the typical causalist psychology once these 
reasons lose their pro-status, and any motivational strength, they cease to be 
reasons for action.  How could my acting for one of my reasons suddenly render 
another reason irrelevant, non-motivational, or no longer reason-supplying?  This 
would be a strange analysis of the role of reasons in action explanation.  Agents 
normally reduce the influence of a reason by consideration of countervailing 
reasons, and not by discovering that it is not a reason at all once they act for a 
different reason.  In fact, an agent finding themselves in a position where what 
they remember as a reason, φ, no longer supplies any rationalisation for action, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 For example, see Levy 2011, 2012 & 2014 on the evidence for implicit attitudes. 
195 We could say something slightly stronger: that they make something a goal.  But then 
the question arises whether they make something an explicit goal by forming a practical 
judgement prior to intention formation, or action, or whether their making it a goal is 
constituted by their so these.  This is not important now, as in ither case, they would still 
be explicitly acting for a reason. 
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associated desire, is likely to report that φ never was a reason in the first place 
rather than its losing this status.  While agents can be mistaken about reasons they 
could have acted on but did not (in hindsight) we certainly should not subsume all 
cases under this explanation.196 
An alternative strategy could be to say that all of our reasons are causally 
efficacious in deliberation, but only the strongest reason is the efficient cause of 
my acting (I wanted to award you the prize because of the quality of your 
submission more than I wanted to award it because you are my friend).  But this 
cannot be correct either.  Under this proposal, we could reduce the standard causal 
response to ‘an agent acts for a reason if one of their reasons is stronger than the 
others.’  Two problems would then follow: agents would not be able to act for 
multiple reasons, and agents would not be able to act akratically for a weak reason.  
Agents would not be able to act for multiple reasons because it seems unlikely that 
two or more reasons would possess exactly the same motivational strength, and 
unless this could be ensured the stronger would become the efficient cause of the 
action, and the reason for which the agent acts (according to causal theory of 
action), leaving the other reason no longer a part of the explanation of the reason 
for which the agent acted (though it may, of course, explain why they acted as they 
did).  It is a more natural causal picture, to allow each reason to supply causal 
influence in proportion to its strength, so that they are jointly causally responsible.  
But remember that this step back takes us to the beginning of our problem, 
explaining what makes it the case that an agent acts for one reason rather than 
others he possesses, so we would be no further ahead in answering Davidson’s 
challenge.  Agents would not be able to act akratically because doing so requires 
the ability to act for weak, and sometimes knowingly weak, reasons.  We do not 
need to survey the many different situations that can be labelled akratic action.  A 
case of an agent who acts for (on) a reason that they know to be one whose ends 
are of less value, and which they desire to avoid will suffice, such as succumbing to 
a minor temptation.  The only way to avoid this problem would be to claim that 
akratic actions are still actions, but are not performed for the reason that causes 
them (which would be to reject causal theory of action), or they are not performed 
for a reason at all (which the causal theory of action could perhaps make space for, 
though standardly if a reason causes the action, it is the reason the agent acted 
for).  In either case, it still seems that some agents can act akratically for a reason, 
which is itself akratic in nature. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 If there is some mechanism that alters our psychological states to ‘purge’ us of reasons 
that we do not act on in the scenarios imagined, then we might wonder why it does not 
operate at other times, for instance, when we act for more than one reason, that is, when 
we have more than one end at which our action aims.  It is difficult to see how the causal 
theory of action could elevate acting for a reason to possess such strange causal powers 
while maintaining the causal reductionist strategy of analysing reasons as mental states. 
	   117 
This demonstrates that the standard causal response, a causal theory of action 
that is Davidsonian in tenor, is ill equipped to answer Davidson’s challenge. Upon 
the adoption of causal theory of action we must either radically revise our folk 
psychological description of what acting for reasons is, or we are faced with 
considerable difficulties – features of acting for reasons that the causal theory of 
action cannot explain causally.  So, the original motivation to adopt a causal 
approach to investigating action explanation, i.e. as a response to Davidson’s 
challenge has been undercut, but there is one further prominent problem for 
causalists. 
Deviant causal chains are a counter objection to the proposed causal theory of 
action.197   According to the theory something is an action if it is a bodily 
movement that is caused by the right kinds of mental states, usually a desire and 
belief.  However it is possible to construct cases in which this causal relation 
obtains, and yet the agent intuitively fails to act.  Davidson (1973) introduces the 
example of a climber who wants to rid himself of the weight of his companion who 
is attached to him by a rope.  Moreover the climber knows that if he loosens his 
grip slightly, then this will be effective in getting rid of the weight.  But the climber 
does not decide to let go or loosen his grip, and forms no intention to do so.  
However the presence of this belief and desire so unnerves the climber that he 
inadvertently loosens his grip on the rope without meaning to, sending his 
companion to his doom.  So, in this situation, the same belief and desire that 
would be appropriate causes of the bodily movement in the case of intentionally 
letting go of the rope are present, and they also cause the bodily movement in 
question.  Yet intuitively, the agent has not acted, but is the victim of nerves.  The 
challenge for causalists is to explain why this is not an action, and the response is 
usually some variation, albeit a very complex variation, upon the theme of 
‘causation did not operate in the right sort of way’. 
Since the basic conditions have been met, what the casualist needs to do is to 
add a further condition that will explain why the deviant case is not an action, but 
leave non-deviant cases secure.  But they may not invoke the concepts of agency or 
action in so doing, on pain of circularity.  After forty years finding a non-
contentious proposal for this further condition has proven decidedly difficult.198  
Steward (2012) notes that there is reason to be suspicious that this tactic will in 
principle not succeed.  She notes that the general dialectic has been to note that the 
agent in the deviant case seems to lack control over his nervous twitch in which he 
loosens his grip.  But what is control?  It is a central concept in agency: that of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 For an overview see Stout (2005) and (2010).  The size of the literature on deviance is 
considerable, and worthy of a project in itself.  All we will do is identify a concern 
pertinent to motivating our rejection of the causal theory. 
198 For a discussion of some proposals, see Mele (1997) 
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some occurrence being under the agent’s control.  So control needs to be reduced 
into causal terms, and a general tactic is to add a sensitivity condition.  This 
condition stipulates that if the circumstances were even slightly different, then the 
agent would have moved differently.  That is to say, if the agent had intended 
differently, then they would have moved differently.  In the deviant case slightly 
different intentions do not lead to different movements, so the sensitivity is 
lacking.  For example, if the climber was considering his wanting to let go of the 
rope in a minute’s time, this would still have unnerved him causing him to let go 
of the rope.  However objectors to the causal theory are quick to object that this 
sensitivity condition can be met in situations in which agents fail to act, and that it 
therefore has not elucidated what control is.  The usual cases involve omnipotent 
neurosurgeons who have disabled the agent’s ability to move their body normally, 
but continuously intervene to move the agent’s body in a way that is sensitive to 
their intentions.  So the sensitivity condition is met, as is the causal condition, 
albeit via an intermediary, but intuitively the agent is not acting. 
The next counter move is for the causalist to stipulate that the causal chain 
cannot involve another person’s intentions, since such an interaction would 
constitute manipulation.  But once again, counter-objections are made.  What if 
the agent possesses a faulty faculty of motor control, but has be operated on to 
replace some nerve bundles with wires.  So, the agent is now able to move their 
own body again according to their intentions.  But, some of the wires have become 
severed, preventing the agent from exercising control.  A helpful friend agrees to 
hold the wires together so the signal can pass down them, thus enabling the agent 
to control their body again – but this is only because the causal chain now involves 
the intention of the friend to hold the wires together.  However, according to the 
condition added, this should not count as an instance of control by the agent.  
There is an intuitive observation that is relevant to resolving whether the agent is 
really in control, and that is that the agent is having his intentions enabled, and 
not blocked by the interaction of his friend.  Because of its readily intuitive appeal 
we might fail to notice something Steward picks up on (2012:60).  Saying that all is 
well as long as the process is one that belongs to the agent is tantamount to saying 
that all is well as long as the process is under the agent’s control.  But this is really 
just a clever way of saying that causation occurs in the right sort of way when it is 
under the agent’s control, that is to say, the agent exercises their agential control 
over what happens.  But this is clearly circular, since agential control is the very 
thing that the causalist needs to provide a reductive analysis of.  So, the tactics 
employed in the dialectic seem prima facie to involve causalists in circularity, 
which will not surprise us.  Our discussion of how to secure this sort of control 
took us directly away from a causal reduction.  So deviant causal chains remain a 
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telling objection to any Davidsonian causal theory of action, and undercut the 
motivation to move away from a non-causal theory. 
 
Explaining why agents tend to act on their stronger reasons 
We have responded to Davidson’s challenge by responding positively, and 
answering the question of what it is to act for a reason, and have also raised 
objections to motivate leaving the causal theory of action.  Now we must consider 
the second outstanding challenge for non-causal theories: why is it that we so 
often act in accordance with our strongest reasons and motivations?  As we have 
characterised matters agents can act on any of their reasons, as long as they 
possess the necessary prerequisites to be performing an action, it is an open 
possibility for them to perform an action, no matter how irrational (in the sense of 
silly, or imprudent) that action may be, or how weak the motivation or reason 
might be.  On the positive side, this makes room for agent to be irrational, silly and 
acratic, which agents clearly sometimes are.  However another incontrovertible 
observation about agents is that the very often do act sensibly, rationally and 
prudently.  When agents deliberate about what to do, they do make choices that 
seem to align with the best, or strongest, reasons for action.  On a causal theory 
this is easy to take some account of: stronger reasons and desires can exert a 
stronger causal influence on the outcome of deliberation, or action production.  
But for the non-causalist it is not obvious to see how this apparent influence can 
be accounted for, without relying on a causal conception of the influence of 
reasons and desire over outcomes. 
What could it mean to say that a motivation or reason is stronger than 
another without appeal to causation?  Although the causal approach is not without 
its puzzles,199 there is something intuitive about causal talk here, indeed it is part of 
our everyday way of talking about our reasons and motivations.  The idea that 
stronger reasons have a greater probability of being acted upon than weaker ones, 
because they exert a stronger causal influence over the direction of a deliberation, 
provides a simple causal theory based on probabilistic causation.200  What we need 
is a non-causal analysis of this intuitive idea.  Another way of thinking about this 
problem is that the various strengths of our desires and reasons can be thought of 
as having something to do with our character, or dispositions.  Now, it is highly 
plausible that a model of agency should allow character to have a role in shaping 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 For an in depth discussion see Mele (2003). 
200 Of course probabilistic causation prohibits true control, as we have discussed – so this 
will not do for us. 
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the outcome of deliberation, and how we act.201  All we will do is to sketch a 
response to this problem; one that I hope is plausible.  The details would be 
complex, and issues of character connect to those of virtue and normativity, as 
well as practicality.  So, we will gloss over some issues, but if we have a plausible 
avenue for development, then we can at least have some confidence that this 
problem is not insoluble for non-causalists. 
Ekstrom (1993) proposes that one way to think about character is as a web of 
preferences (which we should recall are a sort of second-order desire).  The 
imagery of a web is helpful, since coherence plays an important role in how agents 
authorise and assess new preferences and desires.  Although we should not adopt 
her probabilistic event-causal approach, the illustration of a web is one that is 
suggestive, and helpful.  We can conceive of an agent’s various motivations, 
desires, beliefs about the good, evaluative judgements, practical judgements, goals, 
ends, intentions, plans and reasons, as an interconnected three-dimensional web.  
The possession of this web is part of what constitutes being an agent, and in 
particular, being the person they are, with the character they have.  When we act, 
decide, judge and so on, the influence of the structure of this web is involved 
because this web is partly constitutive of the self that does the deciding.  Some 
items in this web are well connected, and deeply embedded.  For example if I have 
made an evaluative judgement that X is of great worth, then this will involve 
connections with various parts of my conception of the good (which provide a 
background for even making evaluative judgements), my beliefs about X, any 
desires, intentions and so on, that relate to various exemplifications of X, and with 
any ends or goals whose pursuance would be likely to increase my possession of, 
exemplification of, or promotion of X.  The judgement ‘X is of great worth’ has a 
large influence in my character, because it connects so much of my ‘self’ together, 
and is deeply embedded in who I am.  Other items in the web can be less 
connected, another evaluative judgment about ‘Y being valuable’ might only 
connect to a few possible ends, and might be something that I find connects to 
only one of my desires.  Now consider my failure to act, or judge, in a way that 
promotes X.  More would be at stake for me than a failure to act in a way that 
promotes Y.  More of my desires would be frustrated, and perhaps more of my 
plans would need revising, and so on.  Moving or changing items in the web can 
be more of less ‘difficult’ depending on how deeply embedded they are. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
201 Ekstrom (2000) poses this challenge, and it is also noted by O’Connor (2000).  Ekstrom 
responds with probabilistic causation in her event-causal libertarianism, O’Connor makes 
a speculative proposal about carried propensities for certain actions, but his struggle is to 
explain why this is not a form of non-agent-causal control.  In many ways my proposal is a 
development of insights from both.  See also Ekstrom (1993) and (2005). 
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However, this interconnectedness is not the only important structural feature 
of this picture.  When agents evaluate an end, or involve a desire in deliberation 
they do not exhaust their consideration of how potential choices can affect them.  
We are simply not able to calculate, deliberate, or evaluate, in a way that exhausts 
all of our interests, all of what could be at stake.  Even if we are capable of weighing 
every relevant factor, it would simply be impractical to suppose that we do so on a 
regular basis.  Some concerns are more prominent in our considerations; they 
have more of our attention.  In order to picture this imagine that the web, laid flat 
on the table, now has some items pulled upwards.  So the web starts to look like a 
three dimensional landscape with mountains and valleys.  Something like our 
desire not to feel thirsty, or hungry, might be a plausible candidate for items we 
would find at one of the highest points.  These high points do not represent things 
we care about most, that is a matter of being strongly connected to items reflecting 
my conception of the good, desirable and valuable, but represent items that are 
prominent in my thinking, ones that I do not need to concentrate to recall, but 
spring readily to mind and feature regularly in my interactions with this web as I 
think, deliberate and so on.  They are items that are uppermost in my mind.  My 
goal of remembering what I was going to add as a further footnote two chapters 
ago is plausibly lost at the bottom of some valley. 
Now as a matter of fact, when we reflect on the things that are uppermost in 
our mind, we would expect to find deeply embedded items featuring on these 
mountaintops.  After all, if something is well connected, then it will feature more 
regularly in my thinking, even if not directly, and by dint of regular interaction is 
prominent in my psychology.  Note also, that as I am conceiving matters, when 
one item is raised in its altitude it drags the rest of the web with it, and so closely 
connected items are also elevated in our mind, and some items may be elevated by 
their connection to several disparate and otherwise non-connected items of 
prominence.  I am conscious that I have used terms like ‘mind’, ‘psychology’, 
‘thinking’, and so on rather interchangeably.  I do not intend them to be 
understood in anything like a technical sense for the purposes of this sketch.  I 
only mean to gesture to whatever ‘theatre’ it is within which the elements of who 
we are interact with the world around us, and the possibilities this entails.  Note 
that although I have used terms like ‘deliberation’, and think, I am not committed 
to the view that consciousness is a necessary tool for interaction.  Although the 
role of consciousness is important, there may be much about the way that my 
character influences me, over which I am not reflectively aware, such as implicit 
biases.202  So when we say that something is prominent in my attention, these need 
not be conscious attention, it could be non-conscious or sub-conscious attention.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 See Levy (2012) and (2014). 
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However in paradigm cases we are normally interested in instances of thought, 
reasoning, deliberation and so on, which involve consciousness. 
Now, consider a case of and agent deliberating in order to make a decision 
about how to act.  What I want to suggest is that not only does the structure of the 
web, the agent’s character, influence how they decide, but that there is a reciprocal 
influence.  When we deliberate we do not only recognise the weights of reasons 
but we also assign weights to reasons.203  The details of the scope of this influence 
require some careful thought, since some forms of influence over certain factors 
would be rather implausible – for example can I influence my beliefs by what I 
do?204  However there is one aspect of this reciprocal influence that is more easily 
grasped.  When I act for a reason, that reason, and closely connected items in the 
web, receive a little tug upwards.  They become more prominent in my thinking 
and interaction with the world.  Partly this is because we rarely act in isolation 
from larger plans, and so when we act we commit ourselves in other ways, which 
may increase a reasons’ connectedness in the web.  But it is also a practical fact 
that as a result of deciding a certain way, acting a certain way, and so on, those 
features of the web connected to the reasons we acted for are ones that are more 
likely to feature prominently in future interactions.  This should not be an alien 
notion; after all we are familiar with developing habits of thought and behaviour. 
The other aspect of this reciprocal influence that is worth noting is that of 
assigning value to ends (and other subjects of evaluative judgement).  If we have a 
somewhat developed conception of the good, then our evaluation of how valuable 
an end is will depend on how well that end coheres with the things we have 
already assigned value to.  However our formation of such a judgement is not 
determinate, nor is it exact.  Part of our power as agents consists in not only 
settling how we act, but also what value we place on things, and what judgements 
we form.205  This is not only in cases where we reach an evaluative impasse 
between incommensurables (as is sometimes suggested), we can do so with 
impunity.  However when we do alter the value we place on something, when we 
elevate its prominence, this involves our not only producing an effect regarding 
this evaluation, but also the necessary restructuring that would allow this 
evaluation to cohere with the surrounding topography of connected factors.  
There is a cost, and the greater the change in value, the greater the cost.206  This is a 
cost of time, mental resources and so on required to effect such a change, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 Nozick (1981) considers this possibility, though in the context of a quite different theory 
of action. 
204 I leave this a genuinely open question, as there may well be some sorts of beliefs that can 
be changed by what we do. 
205 I will not re-describe how this is an instance of control, our early comments are equally 
relevant to these exercises of agency. 
206 This suggestion is found in Bratman (2000). 
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given the complexity of connections in our web, will often be a significant cost.  So 
we have power over our own character formation.  This is another aspect of self-
determination: we do not only want the determination to be done by the self, we 
also want the power to determine the self.  Exercising our agency in this way is a 
doing, and just as practical considerations limit how much we can do when we 
move our bodies, they limit how able we are to change ourselves.207  This helps us 
to understand why agents can have the power to reform their character, but also 
why their character is somewhat stable, and does not radically fluctuate.  On a 
more fine grained scale, it helps us understand why our beliefs, desires, valuings, 
and so on do not fluctuate wildly, and why those that are more central to who we 
are more resistant to reformation.  For instance it helps us understand why an 
addict finds it more difficult to change the way they ‘think’ about drug use, in fact 
often very difficult, than a new casual drug taker.  It is not that the addict cannot 
‘think’ or do otherwise.208  This also makes sense of why it is easier for us to change 
ourselves in our formative years.  In our early development, our web will be 
considerably less complex.  When we reach young adulthood, we start to engage 
the world, and ourselves, in a more self-reflective way.  Our experience becomes 
wider, we are less sheltered from the effects of our own actions, and we begin to 
utilise long term, intentional plans more as we need to commit ourselves to 
people, careers and such like.  So our web quickly becomes vastly more complex.209  
It is not that we cannot reform ourselves later, but often such major reform will 
involve our discovery of the good in something that we did not know about 
before, perhaps, for example, in moral or religious conversion. 
Understanding why it may be more or less difficult for us to change an 
evaluative judgement helps us to see why it is also more difficult for us to act 
contrary to our most prominent reasons.  When we do act against prominent 
reasons there is a cost, as resources are utilised to effect self-change.  However, this 
does not, or need not, do all the explanatory work.  It is also important to note that 
intrinsic to a goal is something we value that goal for, and thus, something we 
desire to be satisfied by achieving that goal.  It is part of our nature that we enjoy 
the satisfaction of our desires, but the more prominent our desires, the greater the 
satisfaction.  We do not need to say that the stronger reasons exert more causal 
influence.  A similar explanatory result is achieved by just recognising that we 
generally develop into persons who seek satisfaction.210  If we generally acted in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 There is some psychological evidence that mental doings do involve the use of limited 
resources, see Muraven & Baumeister (2000). 
208 See Pickard (2013) for a discussion of philosophers’ frequent mistreatment of addict 
cases, and the power of agents to change their mind. 
209 Perhaps Aristotle had something like this in mind when he argued that virtues, and the 
Nicomachean Ethics, are for men and not boys? 
210 Or beings, since this point is also relevant to animal agency. 
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ways that frustrated our strongest desires, we would derive less satisfaction from 
acting on our reasons.  In fact, if we generally acted in a way that frustrated our 
stronger desires, or at least disregarded their practical importance, then we would 
undermine our capacity to find ends desirable.  It is built in to our capacity for 
practical rationality that we care about how we act, and that we care about which 
ends we align ourselves with, our conception of the good, and so on.  This ‘care’ is 
not causal, it is practical, and plausibly it is something we develop as we seek to 
interact with the world around us effectively.211  We develop a standing aim to be 
effective, and successful, in our interactions with the world.  Although this is only 
a brief sketch, hopefully this gives us some indication as to why possession of this 
standing disposition, or tendency (avoiding causal reductions of these terms), 
along with understanding what is involved in acting for a reason, explains why we 
so often act on our stronger reasons, without needing to give reasons a causal role 
in action production.  So, the non-causal analysis of freedom of choice appears to 
be coherent, to have explanatory power, and to be defensible.  This gives us good 
reason to take the conception of freedom we have developed as not only capturing, 
or elucidating, our intuitions, but also as being a conceptions of freedom that can 
and does obtain for agents.  Now we can apply these conditions of freedom to our 
theological puzzle by considering what sorts of divine interactions agents could 






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 it is worth noting that the structure of how we value, and what we value, may be a useful 
as a tool for explaining what it is to be virtuous, or to hold a certain virtue.  On some 
accounts of virtues our caring about practical success is enough, though for a more 
‘morally motivated’ account we might need to introduce a normative concern to be 
successful at pursuing things that are actually good. 
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5. Heavenly Sinlessness and Significant Freedom 
 
So, we have discussed what it takes for an agent to act, and for those actions 
to be free, and we have defended this conception of freedom’s coherence.  Now we 
have the pieces of the jigsaw required to answer the questions we developed in 
chapter one, and in this last chapter our task is to assemble them, and apply our 
analysis to the theological puzzle of God’s preventing sin in heaven. 
 
What does it take for an agent to act freely? 
Let us remind ourselves of the criteria we have developed for free actions.  
We do not need to explain all of the details again, so this is only a brief summary.  
We were originally interested in what it takes for creatures to possess aseity, which 
we later related to freedom of choice.  But an agent’s freedom of action required 
them to possess more than just freedom of choice, not least because there are also 
conditions that need to be met for an agent to be performing an action.  First of all 
we characterised actions as an agent’s active ‘doing’, and gave the following 
conditions, 
IV. An agent must possess a desire (or other motivation contributing 
state), for a particular end, E. 
V. We must be able to describe the agent’s action in terms that identify 
it as aiming at this same end, E. 
VI. The agent must be aware of some feature of the world that provides a 
reason for them to take their action as a means to possibly achieve 
this end, E. 
Agents who act, perform something that is goal-directed, where they are 
motivated to achieve the end which they direct their action at, and are relevantly 
connected to the world, so that they have a reason for their action that is grounded 
in the way they, and the world, actually are.  We noted that agents can possess 
freedom of possibilities.  But this has to do with the range of possible actions an 
agent can successfully perform.  Since the elimination of sin requires agents to not 
even attempt sinful actions, God’s preventing saints from succeeding in 
attempting a sinful act will not help us explain how to prevent sin in heaven.  
However we do want agents to possess significant freedom, which means that 
agents need to have access to significant possibilities.  So once we have looked at 
how to prevent sin, we will need to consider whether heavenly agents are left with 
significant possibilities for their exercise of free action. 
When an agent is free they should be able to act in a way that accords with 
their all things considered preferences, given their character, desires, reasons and 
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so on.  This sense of freedom has to do with the power of self-determination, or an 
agent being the source of how they act, so that the action is expressive of the agent.  
We termed this freedom of action guidance.  If an agent possesses freedom of 
action guidance then their action must be produced by desires, reasons, and so on, 
of their own.  This condition would be most clearly broken if an agent were 
somehow made to act in a way that was against their preferences.  If this were the 
case then the agent would not be free to act according to their judgements, and it 
would not be the way the agent is rationally and motivationally constituted that 
governs what happens.  So, 
VII. The actions of free agents must accord with the way they are 
rationally and motivationally constituted. 
But we also considered the way that agents end up constituted as they are, 
particularly if their motivations and reasons are formed under freedom-reducing 
duress.  It is possible to interact with agents and influence their motivations and 
reasons; in fact, it would be difficult to avoid doing so to some extent.  In this 
regard, it is when agents are influenced in a way that manipulates their 
motivations and reasons in ways the agent would judge as bad that we are 
concerned that there is a loss of freedom.  Agents need to be able to form reasons 
and motivations that they value as good.  An agent’s valuing something as good is 
a matter of structuring their conception of the world around them and their 
relationship to it, and this in turn gives structure to their practical and ethical 
rationality.  Freedom of value-alignment is the freedom of an agent to align their 
motivational bases, purposes, ends, and the structure of their practical rationality 
with their conception of what is good.  We noted that freedom of value-alignment 
admits of degrees, since influence admits of degrees, as does the value agents may 
place on ends.  So, 
VIII. Free agents must not be so influenced that they are unable to form 
motivations and reasons for ends they value as good and must not be 
forced to form motivations and reasons for ends they value as bad. 
We then went on to discuss the need for free agents to possess an up-to-us-
ness, an active power of self-creation, concerning the way that they act.  Agents 
need to be more than instrumentally involved in their self-formation and choices.  
Being up to the agent to make a difference about whether something occurs or not 
we called freedom of choice.  Our discussion of freedom of choice drew on themes 
from our discussion of aseity in chapter one.  It involves agents in the active 
exercise of a multi-way power over how they act.  It is the exercise of this power 
that secures the agent autonomy from past determining influences and means they 
can be active in securing how they act, and not passive.  It marks a free agent’s 
ability to control their acting one way rather than another.  The exercise of this 
power is incompatible with determinism and also requires the existence of 
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alternative possibilities concerning possible actions the agent can perform (which 
can include refraining from acting as an alternative).  But we also argued that 
freedom of choice can be derivative.  An agent’s action can be said to be one over 
which there was freedom of choice, and hence control, not only if there were 
alternative possibilities that the agent settled at the time of their acting by their 
exercise of this active power, but also if the settling of alternative possibilities 
occurred by some past exercise of the agent’s active power in acting.  This 
highlighted the need for care when using the presence of alternative possibilities to 
discern whether agents are free.  There may be a great many things agents cannot 
currently do, or have no reason to do, which is not a limitation on their freedom, 
but a result of their exercise of freedom.  Simply stipulating that free agents need 
to be able to do otherwise (remember our example was Joe’s doing otherwise than 
agreeing to move in with his girlfriend) is not a good way of articulating what it is 
to be free.  So, 
IX. Agents possess freedom of choice regarding an action if the action 
they perform is up-to-them through the exercise of an active power 
to settle among alternative possible action, concurrently, or in the 
past. 
We should not need to say much to remind ourselves about an action 
constituting an agent’s application of their capacity for means-end rationality in 
their behaviour, since we covered this in the last chapter.  But we need to highlight 
again that agents can possess a multitude of reasons and desires, and they exercise 
their freedom of choice over how, and when, they act on those reasons, or satisfy 
those desires, by acting – which is intrinsically doing something for a reason.  
Importantly, agents can act on any of their reasons, and do not only ‘act’, when 
they act on their strongest reasons (or motivations/desires).  We described agents 
as possessing (and being partly constituted by) a web of beliefs, desires, 
judgements, and so on, whose topography models how some features of their 
character are prominent, and how changes to their character can require a ‘cost’ in 
reforming that topography.  When agents act against prominent reasons there is a 
cost, as resources are utilised to effect self-change.  When agents deliberate, decide, 
choose, and act, they do not only recognise the structure of their web, or the 
weights of reasons, or value of ends, but there is a reciprocal effect, and deciding, 
choosing and acting alter the structure of the web, or change the weightings 
assigned to reasons and ends. So the power agents possess is not only one over 
what actions they perform, but is also a power over the development of their ‘self’.  
Agents possess some power over their character.  The illustration of the web with a 
well-structured topography will be a useful illustration in our discussion. 
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We can summarise these conditions for free action as,212 
I. Motivation possession 
II. Goal-direction 
III. Reason awareness 
IV. Character accord 
V. Value alignment 
VI. Aseity 
 
How can God prevent sin in heaven – the beatific vision 
So, God needs to ensure that it is impossible for agents to sin in heaven, while 
preserving the conditions required for agents to remain free.  One of the most 
prominent themes in theological discussions of heaven is the beatific vision 
enjoyed by glorified saints.  The saints in heaven are glorified, that is to say they 
experience being brought into the presence of the glory of God.213  But they are 
also changed so that they are fit for heaven, and this change is the completion of 
their redemption.  There is a physical change, but more interesting for our 
purposes, the saints in heaven are perfected in their nature and character, so that 
they are without blemish or blame.214  When the redeemed reach this state, they 
have been glorified. 215   Roman Catholic Christianity also has a doctrine of 
purgatory, which is a place in which God perfects the redeemed prior to entering 
heaven.216  However this will not interest us, as we are interested in what the 
change to a glorified state consists in, rather than when it occurs.  So, purgatory or 
not, by the point of their glorification, God has effected a change in the redeemed.  
In the presence of God’s glory the saints experience the beatific vision, which is a 
particular experience of seeing, and knowing God. Since this is a key idea, we will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 These conditions, and the statements summarising them earlier in this chapter, are not 
supposed to be taken as rigorous definitions of the criteria, and are only devices for ease of 
reference.  For the details, we must refer back to chapters two to four.  Note also that I have 
avoided some well-known terminology, in favour of these terms, as I do not want to 
import additional theoretical baggage, for instance IV is close to Timpe’s (2008) 
‘sourcehood’, or Fischer & Ravizza’s (1998) ‘reasons-responsiveness’. 
213 See Romans 8:30.  Also, note that ‘the redeemed’ refers to all humans whose destination 
is heaven, and ‘the saints’ refers to the human occupants of heaven, not some special subset 
of the redeemed.  For a brief discussion of glorification see Demarest (2006), and Elwell 
(2001). 
214 See Colossians 1:22, Ephesians 1:4, Jude 24, and 1 Corinthians 1:8 & 13:10, where the 
focus is moral perfection. 
215 Eastern Orthodoxy has a similar concept, but call it deification, but we will not discuss 
the theological differences here. 
216 See Kreeft (2001:149 ff.) and Walls (2002), though the later is focused more on issues 
surrounding salvation. 
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consider its basis in Scripture to help us clarify matters.217  There are three key 
texts, 
1 Corinthians 13:9-12, ‘For we know in part and we prophesy in part, but when 
the perfect comes, the partial will pass away.  When I was a child, I spoke like a 
child, I thought like a child, I reasoned like a child.  When I became a man, I 
gave up childish ways.  For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. 
Now I know in part; then I shall know fully, even as I have been fully known’ 
(ESV). 
1 John 3:2, ‘Beloved, we are God's children now, and what we will be has not yet 
appeared; but we know that when he appears we shall be like him, because we 
shall see him as he is’ (ESV). 
Psalm 17:15, ‘As for me, I shall behold your face in righteousness; when I 
awake, I shall be satisfied with your likeness’ (ESV). 
The beatific vision provides the saints with a knowledge of God that is 
different to the knowledge available on Earth.  The translation of ἐπιγινώσκω as 
‘fully’ is a popular, but unhelpful translation, as it seems to indicate that we will 
know everything about God.  However, God is infinite, and we are finite, and thus 
limited in our cognitive abilities.  So it is impossible for us to know God fully in 
the sense of comprehensively.  The force of the preposition (ἐπι) can also be 
rendered as ‘exactly’.218  This contrasts with the idea that our earthly knowledge of 
God is limited by some imprecision, or uncertainty, as the context ‘seeing in a 
mirror dimly’ suggests, and is also borne out by the other texts.  Giesler (2004) 
describes the difference as our earthly knowledge of God being indirect, and our 
heavenly knowledge being direct.  On earth we are at an epistemic distance from 
God, and there can be epistemic uncertainty.  This means we are, to an extent, 
justifiably uncertain about some of our knowledge of God.  However, in heaven, 
there will be no uncertainty, and we will be fully convinced of what we know.  This 
may enable heavenly beliefs about God to play a greater role in our thinking.  Such 
beliefs would have the same sort of status as undeniable truths, ones that we 
cannot deny, contradict or question (as long as our capacities for thinking are in 
good order).  There is also an indication that we will know more about God in 
heaven than we do on Earth, such as the contrast between our ‘knowing in part’ 
being a state that will pass away.  So there may be things that we do not, or even 
cannot know about God, but will have access to in heaven.   
So, in heaven we will have more true beliefs about God, and experience of 
knowing God directly, and will have no uncertainty concerning our beliefs about 
God, or our experience of God.  We do not need to explore what the content of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 Generally, we will try to avoid as many questions of exposition and Biblical theology as 
we can. 
218 See Danker (2000) – BDAG 3rd ed. 
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these extra beliefs could be at the moment.  But we can ask whether this beatific 
vision, and especially the knowledge of God it imparts, could be something that 
would prevent sin.  First of all, it is sometimes suggested that it is impossible to sin 
in God’s presence because there is supposed to be something overwhelming about 
God’s presence, which so captivates creatures that they become unable to do 
anything other than obey.  We would still like to know why this occurs, as this is 
not in itself an explanation.  But it turns out not to be a helpful approach anyway, 
since it is in fact possible to sin in God’s presence.  The Devil, and angels, were 
created in God’s presence, and while there, sinned and fell.  If these free creatures 
were not overwhelmed into obedience, then neither would the saints be, unless 
there is some other difference between the two.  So being in God’s presence is not 
sufficient to prevent sin.  However this does not mean that there might not be 
something important about being in God’s presence.  Perhaps the presence of God 
is required for it to be possible to not sin, so it could be a necessary condition.219  
Even if it is not a necessary condition, and it is possible to not sin on Earth, it 
certainly would seem to be a relevant motivating factor – we are all aware of a 
general tendency to do the right thing when we are being watched.220  However, it 
is not a tendency that always works, and we need it to be impossible to sin. 
Could the knowledge the saints possess somehow alter their range of possible 
actions to prevent there being any sinful possibilities?  This approach asks whether 
there are just no sinful alternative possibilities given the way the saints are 
constituted – their reasons, beliefs, desires and so on.  An alternative approach, 
which we will come to in a moment, is whether the constitution of agents does 
leave sinful alternative possibilities, but for other reasons they are possibilities that 
cannot be acted on (so they are conditional possibilities whose conditions are 
never met).  The knowledge an agent possesses will provide the agent with beliefs 
about ends, some of which may be ends that the agent then desires.  What the 
agent knows will also give rise to reasons about the means to achieve certain ends.  
So if knowledge is going to prevent sin, it must do so by providing the saints with a 
rational and motivational base that cannot produce any sinful act.  Consideration 
of the first free creatures is again illuminating.  The Devil, and Adam, did not 
possess any false beliefs, or bad desires, when they were created.  All that God 
made was good, or in the case of Adam, very good.  This much is stated in the 
creation text, and is also a theological expectation – a perfect being should create 
the best possible creatures.  So it seems plausible to say that Adam and the Devil 
did not possess anything in their rational and motivational base that shouldn’t 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 We will not explore this, but there may be ramifications for original sin here, as well as 
the question of why there is no redemption available for angels who fall. 
220 Although this earthly analogy doesn’t quite capture what it means to be in God’s 
presence. 
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have been there, for example a desire for something that it would be wrong to 
desire, or a reason to act in a way that would be wrong.  If they did possess some 
flaw in their character, then they might rightly complain that they could have been 
better made.221  That is to say, something could have been done to prevent them 
sinning, and this would jeopardise the free will defence.  So our commitment to 
the free will defence, and our theological expectation mean that we have in Adam 
and the Devil, free agents without any flaw in their rational and motivational base.  
And yet, they fell.  So if it is possible for free agents with unflawed characters to 
fall, then any knowledge gained by the saints, via the beatific vision, does not look 
like it will be able to prevent the same possibility.222 
This does raise the question of why Adam and the Devil did fall.  We do not 
have space to fully explore this issue here, but I will say something, even if a little 
speculative, since it will help us to think about the agency of Adam, the Devil and 
the saints.223  Anselm’s De casu diaboli is, arguably, the most important work on 
this question.  Anselm claims that humankind lost rectitude, the desire and ability 
to rightly order desires, at the Fall.224  Rectitude is then restored at glorification.  
Since rectitude is supposed to preserve the saints in their sinlessness, one might 
wonder why it was ineffective prior to the Fall, which means that rectitude alone is 
not something that will do all of the explanatory work.225  However the idea that 
free creatures need to possess more than just good desires (and reasons, etc.) in 
order to do what is right is interesting.  Creatures need to apply their desires in the 
right way and can fail to do what is right if they fail to apportion each desire, or 
reason, its correct place in their deliberation.  An example may clarify.  In the Fall 
account in Genesis Eve takes the fruit after being tempted by the serpent to do so.  
But the serpent did not need to appeal to a sinful desire to take something that was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 I am using ‘character’ as shorthand for a rational and motivational base. 
222 The Scholastics wrestled with how to explain the role of knowledge and love in securing 
sinlessness (understandable, given the prominence of the natural law tradition).  We do 
not have space to exposit and examine their views, but see Gaine (2003) for a discussion of 
their approach, especially, Aquinas, Suárez and Scotus. 
223 Timpe (2014) contrasts intellectualist and voluntarist accounts of the primal sin in 
scholasticism, concluding that neither has the upper hand on the question of arbitrariness, 
which is, in a way, just the luck objection in a different context (in fact, our non-causal 
account can be seen as an attempt to synthesize some of the intellectualist and voluntarist 
concerns, but relating things to their concerns must be left for another time). 
224 It is difficult to relate Anslem’s discussion to modern categories of analysis, and it is 
unclear whether Anselm saw rectitude as a power that was distinct in its own right, or a 
desire that was an input to some other power, like the power to act, or decide.  I suspect the 
latter, but do not want to get drawn into an expository fight, it is not required for our 
purposes here to be this accurate in expositing Anselm.  For a detailed discussion, see 
Rogers (2008). 
225 There is a suggestion by Rogers (2008:89) that Anselm claims that ignorance is required 
for free choice, but then we are left wondering whether this would be ‘very good’, and in 
any case, this would mean that there is less scope for freedom in heaven.  Anselm’s 
conception of freedom is different from our account, so these differences are unsurprising. 
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forbidden, nor did he need to introduce a sinful reason or desire to Eve, which she 
subsequently accepted.  In fact, the telling part of the temptation was that eating 
the fruit would make Eve more like God.  Now considering the emphasis in 
Christianity on human perfection and growth being a matter of becoming more 
like God, Eve’s desire to be like God does not seem to be a desire that is out of 
place.  However, Eve acts on this desire, or for this reason, without balancing her 
consideration of what was appropriate to do with other reasons, such as to obey 
God, or to trust what God has said.  The serpent played a part in stoking some 
uncertainty in Eve concerning reasons that could have been brought to bear on 
her deliberation.  But this is illuminating for our problem.  Eve possessed the 
ingredients for right action, but these ingredients did not issue in the right action.  
We noted that as free human agent we possess cognitive limitations concerning 
our ability to include all reasons in our deliberations, and we also noted that we 
possess the ability to act on any of our reasons (often more than one).  This ability 
is required for us to possess aseity.  So perhaps Eve’s cognitive limitations create 
the space for uncertainty to be possible about how her reasons apply to the 
alternative possibilities before her.  Furthermore, since she possesses aseity, she 
can adopt any of her reasons in acting, and her acting for the reason of ‘wanting to 
become like God’ satisfies all of the criteria for being a free action.  So Eve’s sin was 
deliberate and not an accident.226  She was not forced to sin and possessed the 
ingredients required to act in a non-sinful way.  But due to the nature of freedom, 
she did not possess any further ability to order her reasons in a certain way.  A 
similar story would need to be told about Adam and the serpent, but we will not 
attempt that now. 
There is certainly a lot more to be said about the psychology of temptation, 
and Biblical scholars may complain about the exegesis of Genesis here.  But it does 
at least illustrate a point about what free agents can secure and what they cannot, 
and that is important for us.227  All of the ingredients for sinlessness can be in place 
in an agent’s psychology, in their rational and motivational base, and this makes 
performing a non-sinful action possible – but it does not make performing a sinful 
action impossible.  Clearly agents can sin if they possess a reason to sin that is itself 
sinful, such as my desiring to kill someone because I hate them, and my holding 
this knife behind them providing a means to satisfy this desire.   But agents do not 
need a reason to sin in this sense because sin can also be a matter of 
misappropriating their desires and reasons, which are perfectly good in the right 
contexts.  So if we are going to secure sinlessness, we need to do more than remove 
flaws in the characters of agents. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 Contra the objections that it was arbitrary, discussed in Timpe (2014). 
227 A helpful starting point for how temptation engages an agent’s practical rationality is 
Bratman (2008). 
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But perhaps there is some form of knowledge that is only available to those 
who have fallen and been redeemed.  This would mark a difference between the 
saints and Adam, and so could explain why what they know keeps them from sin, 
while what Adam knew could not.  There is a plausible candidate for what the 
saints know that Adam did not (in his innocence).  Adam had never sinned, and 
so he did not know what it was to feel guilt, shame, pain, separation and other 
experiences contingent on sinning.  Similarly Adam did not know the joy of being 
forgiven, the humility and repentance required for reconciliation, what it is to be 
the recipient of mercy, and so on.  Before we even consider whether this 
knowledge could prevent sin, there is a question about whether God could have 
created free beings with this knowledge.  Presumably God knows what guilt and 
shame are, as well as forgiveness and repentance, even though God has never done 
anything to be ashamed or guilty of, or that needed forgiving or repenting from.  
So, should it not, in principle, be possible to provide creatures with this knowledge 
without their having to experience sinning?  But perhaps it is not the propositional 
knowledge ‘that guilt feels bad in this way’, or ‘that being forgiven brings joy in 
this way’ that is the difference we are looking for.  The redeemed relate to the 
content of these propositions in a special, first-personal way.  Not only are they 
aware that sin is bad, or that guilt and shame have certain properties, but also they 
are aware that they were sinners, that they felt guilt and shame, and were 
transformed by experiencing forgiveness and reconciliation.  The difference is 
analogous to the difference between knowing that being in debt to someone would 
carry certain obligations, and knowing that I am indebted to you, and have certain 
obligations.  It shifts the focus of analysis from the properties of certain states, to 
an analysis in terms of relationship (one they are in), and the effect that certain 
events have had, or could have, on that relationship.  However, an objector might 
retort that God could perhaps have provided such knowledge, or awareness or 
what being in these states is like, through some other means, such as giving agents 
a vision or dream.  But let us assume, for the sake of argument, that there really is 
something that the redeemed have that Adam not only did not have, but could not 
have had.  Is this extra knowledge sufficient for preventing sin? 
The redeemed know that they did sin and were forgiven.  The have 
experienced the pain, guilt and shame of sin.  It is very plausible to suggest that 
such knowledge furnishes an agent with an extra reason not to sin.  After all, 
burning myself taking a pot out of the oven gives me a reason not to remove pots 
from the oven without a towel in future, and the burn, or memory of it, or the 
sight of the scar, all provide me with a motivation to avoid that action.  Perhaps 
the memory of having sinned, and then having seen sin for what it is, the horror of 
the pain it causes God, the loss of potential goods that then cannot be realised in 
our relationships, all seen with a clarity that the beatific vision imparts, is like a 
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vivid scar on the character of the saints.228  The possession of psychological states 
like this would certainly be helpful for preventing sin for the saints.  But does 
knowledge like this necessitate my never sinning again?  The problem, 
analogously, is that no matter how bad the scar, I still do sometimes burn myself 
on pots from the oven, or rather, can still so burn myself.  Given our discussion 
above of the capacity to misappropriate our reasons, this is not surprising.  So this 
extra non-Adamic knowledge could help prevent me from sinning but is not 
sufficient for doing so.  However, there is something positive to draw from this 
proposal.  If God could somehow ensure that I was always reminded of this scar 
and that it always effectively influenced my deliberations, then it could be 
something that God could use to ensure I don’t sin.  This might be a good thing, 
because if the only other alternative was to never let me near an oven again, or to 
always be guiding my movements when near an oven (like holding the hand of a 
child), then I might miss out on the opportunity to enjoy interacting with an oven 
in a good way.  The analogy is becoming a little stretched, but we will pick up this 
idea momentarily. 
The idea that knowledge imparted by the beatific vision is not sufficient to 
prevent sin could create a problem for us when we consider the issue of divine 
hiddenness. If the beatific vision overwhelms creatures, so that they are 
constrained to love and obey God, then this supplies a reason why God must 
provide creatures with an epistemic distance in order for them to have 
opportunity to freely choose to love and obey God.  Our discussion might lead us 
to note that this is not a wholly tidy arrangement of ideas, for Adam walked with 
God in the garden and may not have experienced divine hiddenness in the same 
way human agents do after the Fall.  But putting that to one side, the possible 
objection is that our claim that the beatific vision still leaves agents free to sin 
leaves us without a reason for divine hiddenness.  It is implied that we would really 
like a reason for divine hiddenness; because God’s apparent epistemic scarcity 
troubles us.  But we can propose an alternative reason.  Having sinned, if God 
were to be present in the way he is in heaven, and we were to see ourselves, God 
and our sin for what they are, we would be unable to countenance the idea of 
approaching God and asking for forgiveness.  Put another way, the beatific vision 
would see us consumed by guilt and an awareness of our shame and separation in 
relationship with God.  This would make it difficult for us to approach God, or 
consider turning to God. 
We have two options here.  On the one hand we could claim that such an 
overwhelming sense of separation would make our turning to God (and thus being 
redeemed) impossible, but that we would still be free as this would only limit our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 The redeemed are healed, but not cured. 
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doing one kind of thing, and we would still possess the capacity to be free 
regarding other possibilities.  This might be a difficult position to take, but the 
resources we develop in our answer to how sin is prevented may help to defend 
such a position.  But if it turns out, for some reason, to be a position whose costs 
outweigh its benefits, we can still defend divine hiddenness with a milder claim.  
Perhaps the sense of separation does not make turning to God impossible, but it 
makes it very difficult.  This is analogous to the issue of our knowledge of the scar 
of sin making it more difficult to sin in heaven, but still a possibility.  Now, given 
that God desires to see as many creatures redeemed as possible, and the salvation 
of more creatures is a good thing, if there is anything God could do to make 
turning to God less difficult, then he would have a moral justification for so 
doing.229  This could explain why God is distant between the Fall and heaven.  It 
provides a little breathing space for creatures to consider and explore their lives, 
God, sin, and so on, without being immobilised by an awareness of their sin and 
it’s effects.230  There is more to be said about the balancing act required here, as 
agents would need some awareness of sin.  Understanding how distant God 
should be, or whether there is space for closing the epistemic gap on some 
occasions (such as visiting angels, and visions) raises some difficult questions.  But 
I think we have said enough to see that this issue will not be fatal to the position 
we are developing.231 
 
How can God prevent sin in heaven – union 
So, we need something in addition to the beatific vision to secure that saints 
necessarily do not sin.  One avenue to consider would be Christology.  Jesus 
possessed a full, free humanity, and yet did not sin, because he was necessarily 
impeccable.  So if we understood why Jesus did not sin, that might help us 
understand the sinlessness of saints.  However this may not be as helpful as it 
might first appear.  The person, Jesus, could not sin, because he was divine and 
thus necessarily sinless (we will not try to explain why God cannot sin).  The 
humanity of Jesus’ dual natures meant that Jesus possessed the capacities relevant 
to the possibility of sin when they are considered apart from the influence of the 
divine person (and nature).  The influence of the divinity on the humanity is 
labelled perichoresis.  This interaction made it possible for there to be a human 
nature that was necessarily sinless.  However, for our purposes we are interested in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 Such help, Suárez calls congruent grace, see Craig (1989). 
230 Our discussion has been framed in terms of salvation and turning to God, but this 
approach could be extended, and there may be other aspects of flourishing in our 
relationships with God, and other creatures, that benefit from (or, on the previous option, 
require) some divine hiddenness for a time. 
231 For an excellent collection on divine hiddenness see Howard-Snyder & Moser (2002). 
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exactly what this influence that the divine nature exerted on the humanity 
consisted of.  So, understanding the effect of perichoresis when it comes to 
preventing sin, is not a solution to our problem, but the reoccurrence of our 
problem in a different context.  Christology may be helpful for understanding the 
means of this influence, but that is not central to our inquiry.  We could just label 
the means of God’s interaction with the saints as being by supernatural means.232  
Even in a Christological setting, we would still need to examine the capacities 
essential to free human nature, and how they can be interacted with to prevent the 
possibility of sin.233 
So, in order to prevent sin, there needs to be something extra, added to the 
saint’s character.  We saw that glorified agents may include some new prominent 
features in the topography that represents their character, such as their hating sin, 
recognising the pain of sinning, and so on, as well as positive reasons/desires such 
as the joy of forgiveness, their awareness of the need for dependence on God, and 
so on.  Let us just sum up whatever these new features might be as a ‘love for God’, 
which theological tradition suggests stands a good chance of being at the root of all 
of them anyway.  These features might be new in the sense that they are a fresh 
revelation of something never before apprehended by the redeemed, or could be 
new in the sense that they are an amplification of the awareness of some issue.  
The problem is that a prominent love for God does not necessitate never sinning.  
So the agency of the saints needs to be augmented in some way, to ensure that the 
love of God remains prominent and always has an appropriate effect, so that it is 
never a reason whose application is missed or diminished when agents act.  This 
means that this something extra must involve an interaction that limits how agents 
act for reasons, which means that God exercises some control over how agents act.  
This influence has two aspects, but they are two sides of the same coin.   Recall that 
we said that an agent influences their character when they act, and different 
reasons, ends and desires can become more or less prominent when acted on.  So 
agents need to be prevented from acting in a way that would mean that the love of 
God was made less prominent, though other features of who they are could 
change.  As long as the love of God is prominent relative to the agent’s other 
reasons (and dominantly so) then it exerts greatest influence over the way the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 For the record, the role of the Holy Spirit in the perichoresis found in the natures of 
Christ is relevant to understanding the ‘means’ question, and thus an exploration of this 
issue would be illuminating for the development of a metaphysics of sanctification, or as 
the Eastern Orthodox theologians would have it, deification.  This would lead us to 
develop a more Trinitarian picture of the relationship between the saints and God, and the 
different roles each of the Godhead could play in securing sinlessness.  But, though 
interesting, this is not an issue we have space to explore.   See Crisp (2007) & (2009), and 
Sanders & Issler (2007). 
233 I have tried to say only a little about this, since Christology raises so many metaphysical 
puzzles, and have only gestured to an avenue for future research.  A good introduction is 
O’Collins (2009), and Rae (2009). 
	   137 
agent orients themself towards the world (of heaven) and the way they order their 
thinking, deliberating and evaluating of it.  The structure of their web is the lens 
through which they interact with the world.  However, this structure does not only 
present weights of various reasons, values and so on to the agent, as the agent also 
has the power to alter the structure of their web, and they do this by exercising 
their agency in acting, choosing, forming intentions, making plans, and so on.  We 
noted that there is a cost in such restructuring, and so some restructuring is more 
difficult than others.  So agents also need to be prevented from applying their 
reasons, values, and so on, to the exercise of their agency in a way that does not 
feature the love of God as a dominant reason for what they do.234 
At this point, matters become very speculative, as we are not given many 
clues about how God might effect this influence.  However, the theme of 
permanent unity between God and the saint is a prominent theme in Scripture, 
especially in the sense of God becoming a part of human psychology (often using 
the term ‘heart’).235  This is expected, since we have already argued that God 
cannot provide an external prevention of sin.  When agents do act in a way that 
requires a change in their self we noted that there is a ‘cost’, or we could think of it 
being difficult, or requiring more effort, to act against a habit, or central character 
trait.  If God is acting upon the web of the saint (their structured set of beliefs, 
reasons, etc.), God can ensure that this ‘cost’ is always above a threshold that 
means that sinful applications of the agent’s rational and motivational basis 
through their acting are off limits to the agent, or beyond their ability to produce.  
In the same way that an agent has the power to change their ‘self’ and promote or 
demote ends, reasons, desires, and so on, God can also exercise his agency to 
promote and demote facets of the agent.  God could achieve this by the sort of 
normal influence of interacting with the agent, for example by speaking to them.  
In the same way, I could influence a friend to do something important by 
reminding them how important it is to them.  God’s acting in this way can be 
guided by God’s perfect knowledge of the agent, that is to say, God would always 
know what to say and when.  But the divine influence must go beyond this, for 
God needs to ensure that agents always listen and apply what they are told in the 
right way.  So there must be a form of divine influence over agents that exerts a 
promotion of some features of the saint’s self, or blocks what would have been the 
promotion of something that would have then been out of place, by exerting an 
influence counter to that of the saint.  Thus the power of change over the self is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 In other words, whatever heavenly agents do, it should be expressive of their love for 
God, perhaps not explicitly so, but since their web is interconnected, however they act will 
be oriented implicitly at the end of loving God. 
235 See Jeremiah 31:33, Ezekiel 18:31, Romans 5:5, 2 Corinthians 1:22, Galatians 4:6. 
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one that the agent possesses in cooperation with God.236  God does not take over, 
but is a contributor to self-formation. 
This second requirement is more metaphysically puzzling, but I raise the 
issue of the first form of influence to make the point that supernatural divine 
influence of the second kind might be something that is rarely required.  In the 
first place, the change effected by the beatific vision leaves agents strongly oriented 
towards acting rightly and evaluating the world as it actually is.  So we would 
expect the times when intervention is required to be rare, though they will occur.  
But also, much of what agents may need to keep them away from sin is by way of 
maintaining a healthy character.  Again this will require some times of 
intervention, but much of this maintenance could be by God showing things to the 
saints, talking to the saints, and the saints talking to each other.  This sort of 
interaction is no more a threat to freedom than my reading a book on how to be a 
good parent.  In fact, it may even be a good thing that much of the saints’ 
maintenance is via explicit interpersonal interaction, since relationships are largely 
constituted by two-way interpersonal interaction, and these forms of interaction 
may instantiate something valuable, which makes a relationship good. 
But rare though they may be, we do need to ask whether these special, 
supernatural acts of intervention are bad, or freedom destroying.  When an agent 
acts in a way that is cooperative with God237, that is to say, includes divine 
influence, are our conditions for free agency broken?  The agent will still possess a 
motivation for an end, since their action is the application of one of their own 
desires and they will be acting in order to achieve an end that they themselves 
possess, and the performance of the action will satisfy them.  God does not need to 
implant an alien desire or end; he only needs to manage the possible ends that 
agents aim at.  This could be by preventing one choice through supressing a desire 
or reason, or by ensuring the better choice by promoting the relevant desire, or 
reason.  Agents already have the ingredients required for good ends through what 
they have learned by being glorified.  Therefore motivation possession (I), and 
goal-direction (II), are both satisfied.  Reason awareness (III), is also satisfied, 
since agents, once adopting an end, or when adopting an end, do so because they 
are aware of their heavenly environment and know (in a way that does not admit 
of the possibility of error found on earth) that features of heaven, or of God, 
provide a basis for the appropriateness of their action to its goal.  Since the way the 
agent acts derives from ingredients found in the agent, character accord (IV) is 
trivially satisfied.  But does any of the influence God exerts mean that agents are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 I use the term ‘cooperative’ advisedly, bearing in mind cooperative theories of grace in 
soteriology, but that is a subject we do not have space to explore, though it is connected. 
237 Or decides, chooses, plans, or any other candidate for a use of agency which may 
require God’s supervision. 
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unable to form motivations and reasons for ends they value as good, or are forced 
to form motivations and reasons for ends they value as bad?  Well, saints have a 
perspicuous knowledge of which ends are good or bad, and do not evaluate any 
good end as bad, or vice versa.  God, necessarily, only promotes ends that are 
good, due to his good nature.  So it is impossible in principle for an end God 
promotes to be one that an agent would evaluate as being bad.  This is tantamount 
to saying that a saint would never judge any of this divine intervention as being 
unwanted or bad for the agent.  Therefore value alignment (V) is satisfied. 
The last condition is aseity (VI).  Given that some influence over the 
determination of the agent’s action in these rare situations is external to the agent, 
it does appear that what happens is not up-to-the-agent.  It will not do to claim 
that since the nature of the influence is cooperative, such that the way the agent 
acts is up-to-‘God-and-saint’ the condition is satisfied.  For aseity was supposed to 
mark the independence of agents in determining how they act among alternative 
possibilities.  The removal of a possibility by another was a mark of manipulation.  
But remember that this aseity is not entirely unfettered from all influence each 
time it is exercised, and the way that agents have exercised their agency in the past 
can mean that the absence of an alternative can still be something that is up-to-
the-agent, even though this is not through the agent’s current exercise of their 
powers.  So is the heavenly limitation of an agent’s possibilities for the exercise of 
their active power to choose a limitation that has resulted from a past exercise of 
their agency?  During our earthly existence we have ample opportunity to exercise 
our capacity in a way that limits future possibilities, but are any of the ways we 
exercise aseity relevant to this particular limitation, and, also common among all 
of the redeemed?  What about the decision of the redeemed to accept Christ’s offer 
of salvation?  This is certainly a necessary requirement on the redeemed, so will be 
a common exercise of past agency among all the saints.  But is it relevant to the 
limitation of my heavenly possibilities for action?  This is a little difficult to answer 
because it is not quite the same as the case of the drunk driver, which we 
considered in chapter three.  When we considered the drunk driver, his past action 
(drinking too much) directly prevented him from having the later possibility of 
braking in time to stop.  But my choice to accept salvation does not seem directly 
linked to my being unable to act in a way that would threaten the maintenance of, 
and integrity of my sinless character.  It requires the intermediary of God acting to 
get us from the choice to the actual prevention of a possibility.  By analogy, this 
might be like my asking you, who are also drunk, to see if you can do something 
about the brakes on my car, since I would like to make a bogus insurance claim, so 
you drain the brake fluid.  My later failure to brake is a result of my exercise of 
agency, but it also includes your exercise of agency, since you did not have to do 
what I said. 
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However there is an important disanalogy, asking God to ‘cut the brake lines 
of sin’ does not leave the performance of the divine action uncertain, for God has 
promised to do this, and cannot break his word.  So, because of the nature of God, 
in asking God to save them from sin, the redeemed have necessitated the way that 
God will intervene, and that God will actually intervene.  If we consider what is 
involved in an agent exercising their agency in accepting salvation, we will be able 
to see that the sort of heavenly influence the redeemed are subjected to will not be 
an unwanted surprise.  We will only offer some brief thoughts on the nature of this 
choice, but we can say enough to see why there is plenty of scope for the decision 
to accept salvation is relevant.  In order to come to a point of recognising that the 
invitation of salvation is something that is worth accepting, the sinner needs to 
come to a recognition that sin is a problem, and that it is a problem that the sinner 
cannot deal with on their own.  This involves consideration of the need for the 
forgiveness of past sin and some way of dealing with the prospect of their possibly 
sinning in the future.  The sinner must come to the recognition that their own 
control is insufficient.  The sinner also needs to recognise that salvation is by 
grace, that is to say, there is nothing they can do to merit salvation.  So the sinner 
acknowledges that God has offered to do something about sin (and the sinner may 
have only a vague idea what this will consist in).  The key though, is that part of 
what the decision to accept salvation consists in, is to put oneself in submission to 
God.  Having come to the end of one’s own efforts to exercise control over oneself 
in the right way, a sinner relinquishes their autonomy and invites God to 
participate in the controlling of their life – in their self-formation.238  So the nature 
of the decision to accept salvation involves sanctioning God to interact with the 
exercise of the agent’s capacities to act, think, decide, reason, evaluate, and so 
on.239  So there is a past exercise of freedom of choice, which is directly pertinent to 
the limitation of heavenly alternative possibilities, which can be the basis of the 
claim that the instances of agency we are focussed on, ones where God 
cooperatively influences the exercise of aseity, are derivatively free.  Thus 
condition VI is satisfied, and God’s interaction does not destroy freedom, but is 
able to prevent sin. 
Now, this argument does depend on a particular conception of the role of free 
agency in salvation.  This is a controversial issue, but we should bear in mind that 
those who are disposed to deny the role of libertarian freedom in salvation are also 
likely to be uninterested in developing a free-will defence.  Compatibilists about 
salvation are usually compatibilists about evil.  So although a defence of libertarian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 Although the sinner does not initiate this interaction.  God initiates the process of 
salvation, the sinner’s role is to relinquish their resistance, but this is still an exercise of 
agency.  See Stump (2012). 
239 Sennett (1999) suggests that earthly choices provide a pattern of character that enables 
God to intervene, but he claims that the saints only possess compatibilist freedom. 
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freedom in salvation is an interesting project, it is not one we need to undertake, 
since we are already committed to exploring what follows from the free-will 
defence.  A second issue is that there do seem to be some agents in heaven who 
never had the opportunity to exercise their own capacity of free choice in 
accepting salvation.  There are a number of candidates, but the prominent group 
are babies who die before developing the capacities required for free choice.  It 
seems harsh, or even evil, to commit these babies to an eternity of separation from 
God and heaven, and many Christians are committed to the view that God secures 
the salvation of babies.  We should note that this is not the only view though, and 
it has been the official position of some traditions that God only secures the 
salvation of the babies of the redeemed, however this does not really solve the 
problem, since these babies are still saved without recourse to any exercise of their 
agency. 240   The problem is that, without ever having exercised free choice, 
whatever God does to these agents in glorifying them, and keeping them from sin, 
does not look like it can be derivatively free, and then such interaction does seem 
to be freedom destroying.  Responses to this problem face a problem, since saying 
that the lives of these redeemed babies in heaven are still good (and sometimes it is 
claimed, free), leads us to wonder why God could not just do this with everyone, 
and we undercut the free will defence. 
Explaining what happens to the babies is, I think, probably the most difficult 
question in theology.  So, unsurprisingly, we will not attempt to solve it.  However, 
since we are interested in the possibility of consistency, if there is a plausible 
option to explore, this issue will not pose a fatal objection.  There are four options, 
the first two might be the worst-case scenario, but would resolve the problem as 
far as our discussion goes.  Either all babies do remain separated from God for 
eternity, or God annihilates the souls of all babies (so that they cease to exist).241  
What needs to be supplied is some explanation for why God’s doing one of these 
things is morally justified, and this appears difficult.  On the other hand God 
might supply babies who die with some post-mortem opportunity to develop their 
capacities for freedom, and to exercise a choice concerning their freedom, securing 
God the permission to either save them, or not.  This possibility lacks any clear 
Biblical support, but is perfectly consistent.  The fourth possibility is a Molinist 
solution.242  Perhaps the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom can ground God’s 
interaction with the babies, based on what they would have done.  Molinists may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 Roman Catholicism suggests that babies may escape punishment, but be denied the 
beatific vision, but there are a number of theological and Biblical reasons for rejecting this 
suggestion, however we cannot explore that issue here. 
241 This also raises some questions regarding original sin, but too many philosophical issues 
will rear their heads for the space we have if we attempt to map how this doctrine interacts 
with this problem.   
242 There is nearly always a Molinist solution to any theological puzzle! 
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be able to make this solution work, but will have to explain why God does not do 
this with everyone or only choose to create those he knows will be saved (or 
perhaps just accept a form of universalism).  But given that a response to the 
problem of evil, at least one that is libertarian, is going to have to answer the 
question of why this world, with all the people who are seemingly not saved, is the 
best possible world God could create, perhaps Molinists will have the resources to 
accomplish this task, or stand as much chance of succeeding as does the free will 
defence.  I am not going to endorse any one of these options, but only note that 
there does appear to be hope for a solution, and so the objection is not obviously 
fatal to our claim about the requirement for the exercise of earthly freedom. 
 
Why could God not prevent sin in the beginning? 
Given our discussion of the need for genuine creaturely aseity prior to God 
being able to interact in a non-freedom destroying, but sin preventing way, the 
answer to this question is straightforward.  God cannot create agents who have 
decided to submit to God, because an essential property of submission (in our 
sense at least) is that it is freely chosen.  If God created beings who were ‘submitted 
already’, then he would have creatures who did allow God to intervene, making sin 
impossible, and had characters prominently disposed to obeying God, but this 
would not really be submission.  Such beings would have never possessed an 
alternative possibility regarding their relationship with God and so would not be 
free concerning it.  Such a being would ‘do’ the things that saints might but would 
be like one of the radio-controlled agents we discussed when formulating our 
conditions for agency.  In this position such agents would not be submitted but 
would be dominated.  We could express this same idea in terms of other relational 
terms, for example un-free agents cannot really love God and cannot really 
worship God.  They could go through the motions and appear to be worshipping, 
but if there is any good or value in the relationship of worshipping, this would be 
lacking (see the discussion in chapter one). 
But would this be such a bad thing?  God could do this, and prevent sin, even 
though he would not have any free creatures.  We could suggest that forcing 
beings to be a certain way would be a bad thing in itself.  However, although it is 
plausible that disregarding the ‘rights’ of autonomous agents would be a bad thing 
to do, making robots do things does not seem to be bad for the robots – there do 
not seem to be any rights.  So if sinless created beings were not really agents at all, 
this would not be an objection.  However, we might argue that agency is required 
for some goods to obtain, and therefore, even though agency regarding sinning 
might be destroyed, it remains in some other way.  In this case agents would be in 
some way autonomous, and perhaps then in possession of ‘rights’ regarding any 
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curtailment, or destruction, of their freedom being a bad thing.  However, agents 
who are forced to be good, in a freedom preventing way, cannot possess a valuable 
freedom, even if there is a freedom left for them to possess.243  The reason why this 
is so, also explains why making non-free beings would be a bad thing, because 
there would be some value, or good, which it would be good to have, that was, as a 
result of the way God created, unavailable.  The reason is that if freedom is to be 
valuable, we need to be free to sin and that the value of freedom is a great good. 
Consider the second part of this claim first.  Whatever reasons God has for 
creating, given that there is an outstanding ethical question about whether the evil 
that has resulted from God’s creating is justified, they must be reasons that involve 
there being some good that obtains as a result of creating that makes doing so 
worthwhile.  So is there a reason to think that the greatest goods involve free 
beings in relationships with other agents?  Much could be said about this, but I will 
suggest only one line of thought to motivate our discussion.  God is the greatest 
possible good.  This is, hopefully, uncontroversial given some sort of perfect being 
theology. 244   So how does God instantiate goodness?   Is it by exhibiting 
astounding structural complexity, or by the vastness of his spatial extent, or 
temporal duration?  No, because these are not properties God can instantiate.  So 
creation cannot be a great good because of the beauty of the galaxies, or its 
evolution through time.  Or, at least, if this is what the goodness of creation 
consists in, it is far less than the greatness of the great good that God is.  Perhaps it 
is in the instantiation of moral perfections that the goodness resides.  Now we have 
not argued that freedom is required for moral responsibility, but did note that it 
does depend on freedom in some way.  So this would give us some reason to 
suspect that a greatly-good creation would require free creatures.  But the most 
obvious candidate for the greatness of God lies in the instantiation of perfect, 
loving relationships between the three persons of the Godhead, relationships that 
are so perfect that the three persons constitute a unified single being.245  So a 
plausible candidate for the great-good-making property of creation would be that 
it contains loving interpersonal relationships between free beings. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 Note that we might want to argue that agents who are forced to be good, are no longer 
free in any sense.  However this would be a considerable undertaking, and it is not 
necessary for us to do so to answer our question in this section.  Even if we did argue this, 
the points following would still need to be made, and since they are simpler to establish, it 
seems the preferred strategy. 
244 There is a question in the wings about whether God creating is necessary or accidental.  
But even if creating is necessary, it need not be because there is some good that God lacks 
without creation, it may just be good to instantiate more of that goodness, or to share it 
around.  This is a complex issue, but at least this indicates how we may begin to approach 
the question.  See Morriston (2001). 
245 The is a particularly social formulation of the trinity, but Latin Trinitarians could 
provide an alternative description here, so not much hangs on it.  See Rea (2009) and 
Sandler & Issler (2009). 
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So does the possibility of this good, that is, of a valuable freedom, require the 
possibility that free creatures sin?  If it does, then we have a clear reason why God 
cannot create creatures who cannot sin without frustrating the creation of 
something good, which would be irrational for God, since his reason for creating 
is to make something good.  The explanation of why valuable freedom requires the 
ability to sin draws on what must be the case for an agent to act for a reason.  
Having a character oriented towards the good, for goodness’s sake, requires the 
exercise of freedom of choice.  We noted in chapter one that if the active exercise 
of my ability to interact with something good is to have value, I must be 
responding to the goodness of that thing as I directly appreciate it.  There may be a 
value in a robot that is programmed to always ‘desire’ the good, or make good 
movements of their bodies.  But what we are focussed on here is the value there is 
in someone’s actually valuing the goodness of something, of their loving the good, 
choosing the good, and being attracted to the goodness of some end.  This means 
that I cannot be caused to desire the good, or to value good ends, but must exercise 
my own aseity in orienting myself regarding the good.  Therefore God can create 
agents who have the capacity to value good ends and desire good ends.  But if 
agents do not also have the capacity to fail to value good ends, and desire good 
ends, then agents have never had access to an alternative possibility concerning 
how they orient themselves concerning the good.  If this is the case, then they 
never possess freedom of choice concerning this aspect of their self-formation.  
Now, it is not that agents are presented, early in their existence, with a single 
choice to be good or bad.246  But if the formation of a self, a person, is to possess 
value, then any goodness that person instantiates must have been formed through 
the exercise of the agents aseity, or be derivative on the exercise of their aseity 
concerning some good-relating choice.247  Therefore there must have been, in the 
history of a valuable good person, some exercise (at least one) of freedom of choice 
that admitted of alternative possibilities that were not all towards good ends.  But 
this means that such agents must have had the opportunity, and ability, to sin.  To 
create an agent without this alternative possibility would be to prevent the 
possibility of that agent instantiating any valuable internal relationship to the 
good, or active expression involving the good.  And plausibly, to do so would be a 
bad thing to do.  So this provides us with an explanation of why God could not 
prevent sin in the beginning. 
Nagasawa, Oppy and Trakakis (2004) have offered an example that is 
supposed to demonstrate that agents can be created with valuable desires and 
states already in place.  They ask us to consider John and Mary, who are a couple 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 Matters may be different for angels, but we are focused on human agents here. 
247 And, given the prominence in agents’ conception of the good in practical rationality, 
such choices will not be difficult to find. 
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in love, who are duplicated.  Nagasawa et al. ask us to consider whether we would 
count the duplicates of John and Mary as being in love, and conclude that we 
should.  But they note that for the duplicate versions of John and Mary there is no 
prior exercise of freedom, and thus conclude that it cannot be a necessary 
condition.  However, we need to carefully consider just what has been duplicated.  
The duplicates would need to possess all of the memories of John and Mary, every 
belief and desire, every intention, and memory of every past action and intention.  
Just the isolated belief ‘I am in love with John’ would not be able to form the basis 
of a continuing flourishing relationship.  In the John and Mary case free choices 
were made which produced the states necessary for relationship.  They were made 
by the original John and Mary.  The issue then is if the original John and Mary can 
create the right states in the duplicates, God could do so without even involving 
the original John and Mary – perhaps the original John and Mary do not even 
exist.  If this were the case we would have good reason to suppose that God could 
create impeccable agents without the liability that libertarian freedom entails.  But 
before the question of whether this is metaphysically possible even becomes an 
issue, we have to first consider whether so doing would be ethical.  If not then the 
possibility, though interesting, is moot, since God cannot do something that is 
unethical.  Suppose we could invent a machine that would indeed duplicate John 
and Mary and we are on the ethics committee considering whether the machine 
should be used to duplicate free agents.  It would clearly not be a simple matter to 
decide that the machine could be so used.  What if the John and Mary duplicates 
discovered that they were duplicates – would it destroy their love?  I think that it 
would at least cause them to stop, and reassess their relationship.248  But such a 
reassessment would involve the duplicates in an exercise of their freedom of 
choice regarding whether they loved each other.  The fact that they would question 
their relationship demonstrates that such a love was not theirs to begin with.  As 
long as they were not aware that they were duplicates, they would think they were 
in love, and that someone was in love with them.  But the love would not be real, 
and would not instantiate the value that a true loving relationship would.  
Furthermore, there is reason to suppose that we would not be unaware of the ways 
in which God interacts with us in heaven, as a result of the beatific vision, so 
ignorance would not help keep the saints from questioning their relationships.  So 
this example does not constitute a counter-example to our claims. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 The number of films exploring this issue is indicative of an intuition that duplicates do 
not share all of the properties of their originals.  This is not an argument for this claim, 
clearly, but demonstrates that the claim cannot be denied without some serious thought. 
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Is there significant freedom in heaven? 
It has been thought by some that once the self has been sufficiently oriented 
towards God, the alternative possibilities that remain for agents in heaven would 
not be ones that are significant.249  This would mean that although we may have 
significant freedom on Earth, we do not have significant freedom in heaven, since 
we are not free to sin in heaven.  We said (in chapter one) that a choice is 
significant if it engages an agent’s capacity for freedom between alternatives that 
engage the agent’s evaluative faculties in an assessment that recognises more than 
one good option, and if the choice matters to the agent because in making that 
choice they are determining what goods they want to instantiate, associate 
themselves with, and to prioritise – the choice reflects their power to not only react 
to the goods around them, but to exercise their freedom over who they are, and 
the goods that constitute their character, interests, loves, and so on.  So once the 
redeemed have been glorified, are there any significant alternative possibilities for 
them to exercise their freedom between, any possibilities that enhance the value of 
possessing heavenly freedom?250  Or is the only scope for the exercise of heavenly 
freedom rather mundane, deriving all of its value and significance derivatively? 
Pawl and Timpe (2009) attempt to explain how there could be significant 
freedom in heaven by arguing that although we do not have the freedom to 
perform, or not perform, right actions, we do have the freedom to perform, or not, 
supererogatory actions.  They explain that a right action would be to adopt the 
Aristotelian mean and thus do the right thing.  The supererogatory aspect would 
be the extent to which the agent clings to the mean, the strength of their 
dedication to adopting the mean.  Cowan (2011) has attacked this suggestion 
arguing that in heaven all of the redeemed will want to cling to the good, which is 
God.  Therefore none of the redeemed will fail to perform any supererogatory 
action, and so it will not be a significant freedom for heavenly agents.  In heaven 
the redeemed do not just happen to do the right thing, they are necessitated to do 
so.  But they are necessitated in a way that involves their own psychological states.  
So if an agent’s psychological states necessitate their adopting the mean, then it is 
difficult to see how they could cling any tighter to the mean.  No heavenly agent 
will be any less clung to the mean, and no heavenly agent could possibly be more 
clung to the mean. 
Supererogation is an attempt to provide significant alternative possibilities in 
heaven.  But it looks like it fails to do so.  Pawl and Timpe think that preventing 
sinful actions could still leave some open options, but worry that if the only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 See Rasmussen (2013), and also notes in the discussion in chapter one. 
250 We discussed why it might be though good to have certain kinds of freedom in heaven 
in chapter one, and we will not reiterate here. 
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choices are as trivial as whether to sing in the heavenly choir or to play the harp, 
then this would not be a significant freedom.  But why look to supererogation?  
Pawl and Timpe do so because they constrain the sorts of possibilities that could 
be weighty to ones that are morally relevant.  But I think we should question 
whether morally relevant, or significant, choices are the only non-trivial choices 
that will make heavenly freedom a weighty matter.  If we can present an example 
of a heavenly choice that is open, and significant, then we will have demonstrated 
that Pawl and Timpe’s principle is incorrect, and will hopefully have a clearer idea 
about what sorts of significant choices heavenly agents might explore. 
Although the choice between playing the harp and singing in the choir might 
appear to be a trivial one, the choice of what the saint might sing to God about in 
heaven is not obviously trivial.  Perhaps it is a requirement that saints exercise 
their capacities in the worship of God, but how they express themselves, and what 
they express themselves about, could vary.  One saint might worship God by 
engaging in an exploration of the complexity and beauty of the cosmos, and in 
expressing to God their wonder at God’s handiwork, and what it might reveal to 
them of God’s character.  Another saint might worship God by engaging Jesus in 
conversation about the experience of forgiving his executioners while on the cross, 
and marvelling at the depth of God’s mercy and the perfection of his moral 
character.  So we have two forms of worship, cosmic, and moral.  I have chosen 
these two because it is very difficult to see how a human agent could engage in an 
appreciation of both cosmic and moral matters, at the same time.  Given our 
cognitive limitations, the explorations of these matters seem to be distinct 
endeavours, and not ones that can be undertaken simultaneously, or at least not to 
the same degree.  Since these are two forms of worship that are mutually exclusive, 
is the choice of which one to perform one that is open to agents?  Well, given the 
constitution of an agent, it may be that they are particularly well-suited to a cosmic 
exploration rather than a moral one and that this would engage them in love of 
God to a greater extent.  So there is some prima facie reason to think that given the 
constitution of a saint, there may be one choice here that is better for them.  By 
saying that the best choice would engage their love for God in a greater way we 
have, plausibly, made the choice one that is a moral matter, since failing to love 
God, or express your love for God, could be a failure to make of the saint’s 
heavenly relationship with God all that can be made of it.  Any lapse in the 
realisation of the potential for good would be cause to worry that a sin had been 
committed. 
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Now agents admit of variety when they enter heaven.251  After all, we are 
different from one another on Earth.  There does not seem to be any reason to 
think that it is necessary that all the saints be made identical to each other upon 
glorification.  After all, there is variety among the form and roles of the angels in 
glory.  So there can at least be some variety among the saints concerning what 
form their worship takes.  How you worship is partly constitutive of how you 
relate to and interact with God, therefore this variety means that there can be 
variety among the saints’ relationships with God.  But the presence of this variety 
does not mean that saints possess a choice.  Given their constitution upon 
becoming a saint, the evolution of their relationship with God, the different forms 
of worship they engage in at different times may still be something that they are 
always constrained in, on pain of sinning (or failing to realise the best relationship 
they can), and do not possess alternative possibilities concerning.  If this is the case 
then although there is significant variety in heaven, we are no closer to 
demonstrating that there can be significant freedom. 
But, we need to remember that as well as agents possessing the power to 
apply their character to how they act, how they act also has a reciprocal effect on 
how they are constituted.  In one way, this is quite a basic claim to make; after all, 
hopefully time spent discussing the cross with Jesus would effect a change in the 
worshipper.  But we mean more than this.  When agents act for a reason, that 
reason, the end at which they aim, the desires, beliefs and other psychological 
states relevant to acting for that reason, can all become more prominent in the 
constitution of that agent, or connected to their other states in different ways, or 
closer to the surface of the attention of the agent.  So the effect of acting a certain 
way on the agent is not only whatever effect is a result of the action, but also there 
is an effect of having acted for that reason, or in that way, quite apart from the 
results that follow later.  This does change the situation concerning how agents 
should assess whether they will worship morally, or cosmically.  For a given saint, 
they may possess a greater potential for realising great good in their relationship 
with God if they worship morally rather than cosmically right now.  But the 
measurement of the potential for great good does not only include an assessment 
of the good that will be realised in the performance of that action.  Suppose the 
saint instead decided to worship God cosmically, the good realised by the act itself 
would be less (by definition) since the saint would be less able to express their love 
for God.  However, by so acting, the saint would engage in self-formation that 
alters how they are constituted and thus alters the potential for future realisation 
of good.  The good that can be realised by the altered saint who worships 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 And in many theological traditions, while in heaven as well, often in significant ways, 
for example Stump  (2012) claims that the saints can be in a greater or lesser union with 
God. 
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cosmically, even though this is not a ‘strength’, will be different from the good that 
can be realised by the saint who goes with their strength and worships morally.  In 
the long term, there is nothing to say that the goods the cosmic worshipping saint 
will be able to explore, instantiate and participate in, will be of a lesser quality than 
if they had worshipped morally instead.  The goods will be different, and the way 
the saint relates to them will be different, because the saint changes as well. 
Let us illustrate to try and show that this is not an unusual idea.  Consider a 
normal human agent who wants to explore beauty as expressed in suggestion.  
They are an artist, and so will greatly flourish in this endeavour if they study the 
works of the great impressionists.  If they study the music of Debussy and the 
other impressionist composers, they will gain much less.  However, in the long 
term, if the artist sticks at his task, he may discover more through his slowly 
getting to grips with music, especially as he can now relate it to his knowledge of 
art.  Although he may not have as deep an appreciation for some details of the art, 
there may be details he would not have picked up on without a knowledge of 
music.  Whichever choice the artist makes, he will be able to explore beauty in a 
great way, but differently.  There is nothing about the fact that he is an artist that 
means that one choice will be worth more or less than the other.  Because we are 
limited in our time and opportunities on earth, we are used to making decisions 
like this by also factoring in the practicality of what is achievable given the time we 
have available.  However in heaven, there are no such limitations – time is on our 
side. 
So the constitution of agents does not determine that one course of action 
will be one that realises the greatest potential for great good.  There can be more 
than one possibility whose potential is not calculable in this way, since the 
potential will evolve and change with the agent – it may at best be a calculation 
that is ill-defined.  This means that the choice of whether to worship cosmically or 
morally is one that could be open to the saint, where concerns about doing their 
best, realising the greatest good, and so on, do not constrain the choices of agents 
to a single option.  This is because the choice is not simply about what the agent 
will do, it is also about who an agent will become.  But is an open choice such as 
this, an alternative possibility of this type, one that makes for a significant exercise 
of freedom?  A choice is significant if it engages the agent in evaluating and 
choosing between more than one good option, and if the choice matters to the 
agent because in making that choice they are determining what goods they want to 
instantiate, associate themselves with, and to prioritise – the choice reflects their 
power to not only react to the goods around them, but to exercise their freedom 
over who they are, and the goods that constitute their character, interests, loves, 
and so on.  Well, our imagined saint will exercise themself in evaluating the 
options, and we have described two good options that the agent is free to choose 
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between.  So the choice engages the saint in a non-trivial way.  Also, by making 
their choice the agent decides what sort of person they want to be, what interest 
they want to pursue, what ends they want to prioritise and what goods they want 
to explore.  This is the power of self-formation, and critically the formation of the 
self in relation to non-trivial matters. 
Consider also that the saint’s relationship with God (which may be the most 
significant or all matters) is partly constituted by the form of interaction that 
composes that relationship.  So this choice is one that gives the saint power over 
how they relate to God.  If our argument for these types of variety is correct, then 
the beatific vision is not the instantiation of a perfect relationship with God, 
because there is no single concept of a perfect relationship with God.252  Certainly 
the relationship is developed so that it does not contain any flaw, so there are no 
false beliefs about God.  But, if we think carefully, it is not surprising that there is 
no single perfect relationship with God, for if by perfect relationship we mean one 
that instantiates all true beliefs about God and explores all forms of interaction 
involving those beliefs, then such a relationship is impossible for a creature to 
possess.  Creatures are finite, and limited in their cognitive capacities; thus, they 
are not able to apprehend all of God.  So there is a limitation on the saints’ 
relationships with God.  However, the saints are free to explore how they relate to 
God and what can be known of God.  It is just that this may be an exploration that 
is without end.  So the beatific vision does not impart a perfect relationship to the 
saint; however, it does perfect the saint regarding their being equipped to enjoy 
God and to grow in their relationship with God.253  How this relationship grows, 
and what facets of God are explored when, and how, are matters that the agent has 
freedom of choice over, though God will provide input to the direction of the 
relationship too (after all it is not a relationship with something inanimate, but an 
active, three-personned Godhead).  Therefore, saints do possess alternative 
possibilities that are significant, and there is no need for them to be able to sin to 
possess such possibilities. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 Perhaps God may instantiate perfect relationship, but this is because God does not 
change, and cannot change. 
253 If the analogy helps, being perfectly proficient in the capacities required to play the 
violin would not stop me from developing in my enjoyment of playing a piece of music.  
Furthermore, as I play, it engages me emotionally, and changes me, so that if I play it 
again, the experience has some new dimension.  The analogy is limited as I may, perhaps, 
be able to exhaust the possibilities of engaging with a piece of music, whereas God is 
limitless, and the prospects for growth are richer. 
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Conclusion 
So, we have explored the conditions under which agents possess freedom.  
We considered how agents can be the sources of what they do when they are able 
to align themselves, and what they do, with ends that they value as good, when 
they possess reasons for acting in light of their sensitivity to their place in the 
world, and when they can guide their action in light of these concerns.  However 
free agents also need to possess some causal independence from the past, so we 
must be incompatibilists about free agency.  This means that agents must have 
access to some alternative possibilities.  We defended a non-causal theory of 
control that showed that it is coherent to claim that agents possess genuine control 
over which actions they perform.  This independence and control secures 
properties we need agents to possess for the free will defence, so they can be 
morally and agentially responsible for what they do. 
We discovered that given the nature of this capacity for freedom, and its role 
in instantiating great goods, it is impossible for God to prevent sin unless agents 
exercise their agency in a particular way first – in submitting to God.  The space 
between the acquisition of freedom and this submission, marks the space in which 
sin is possible for agents but God is not able to prevent them sinning.  This 
explains why God cannot prevent sin, without destroying freedom.  However, 
there is hope for free agents, for once agents have exercised their freedom in 
submission, God is able to prevent future sin in heaven.  Moreover, God’s 
prevention of sin in heaven does not leave agents without significant freedom, and 
there is scope for the exercise of heavenly freedom to involve agents in significant 
freedom of choice, and in control over who they are, their relationships, what they 
do – which are aspects of our agency we care greatly about. 
Therefore, our two claims 
iii) God cannot prevent sin without destroying free will; 
iv) In heaven, God prevents sin without destroying free will. 
are not contradictory, and we have good reason to maintain both claims as not 
only consistent with each other (which was our primary aim), but also, hopefully 
as well-grounded in our experience of agency, and a plausible analysis of what 
freedom actually does consists in. 
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